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 RÉSUMÉ 
Lorsque nous pensons à nous-mêmes, à toutes les caractéristiques physiques ou 
psychologiques qui nous définissent, à tous les objets que nous possédons, nous avons 
l’impression qu’ils ont un statut bien particulier dans notre esprit, qu’ils sont spéciaux pour 
nous. Notre propre visage est certainement parmi l’une des plus uniques et distinctives de 
toutes ces informations autoréférentielles. Dans ce travail, nous nous sommes penchés sur 
les spécificités du traitement visuel du propre visage. 
Dans un premier chapitre théorique, nous avons questionné la possibilité d’utiliser le 
traitement du propre visage comme un indice de conscience de soi (voir Chapitre 1). 
Ensuite, nous avons passé en revue les différentes études existantes qui concernaient la 
spécificité du propre visage ou d’autres informations autoréférentielles (voir Chapitre 2). 
Suite à cette revue de la littérature, il est apparu que l’intuition selon laquelle notre propre 
visage est un stimulus spécial n’avait pas pu être confirmée unanimement par les études 
qui nous précédaient. 
Ce travail ambitionnait donc d’évaluer empiriquement dans quelle mesure notre propre 
visage est traité par le système cognitif de façon différente des autres visages que nous 
rencontrons. Nous avons tenté de répondre à cette question selon trois angles différents. 
Tout d’abord, nous nous sommes intéressés à la précision de la représentation de notre 
propre visage en mémoire. Pour cela, nous avons utilisé dans notre première étude une 
méthode psychophysique permettant de déterminer dans quelle mesure nous sommes 
capables de détecter des modifications fines apportées à des photographies de notre 
propre visage (voir Chapitre 4). Ensuite, nous avons examiné si la reconnaissance de notre 
propre visage, mais aussi celle de notre propre corps, sont sous-tendues par des zones 
cérébrales spécifiques. A cette fin, au cours d’une seconde étude, nous avons utilisé 
l’imagerie par résonance magnétique fonctionnelle (IRMf, voir Chapitre 5). Enfin, nous 
avons testé si le propre visage est particulièrement apte à capturer ou à retenir notre 
attention lorsqu’il est présenté de façon inopportune alors que nous sommes occupés à 
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réaliser une tâche sans rapport (voir Chapitres 6, 7 et 8). Pour ce faire, nous avons eu 
recours, dans une série de trois études, à différents paradigmes attentionnels : un 
paradigme de jugement de parité, un paradigme de cécité attentionnelle, et un paradigme 
de recherche visuel lors duquel nous avons procédé à l’enregistrement des mouvements 
oculaires des participants. 
Tout au long de ce travail, nous avons adopté une approche visant à différencier les effets 
d’autoréférence de simples effets de familiarité. Pour ce faire, dans toutes nos études, nous 
avons comparé les réponses obtenues lors de la présentation du propre visage du 
participant à celles obtenues lors de la présentation du visage d’une personne hautement 
familière pour le participant (un ami ou un collègue du même groupe d’âge et du même 
sexe). Par ailleurs, dans les études attentionnelles, les réponses subséquentes à la 
présentation de ces deux visages familiers étaient également comparées à celles obtenues 
suite à l’apparition de visages de personnes inconnues. En somme, si les performances 
obtenues sur le propre visage et le visage très familier différaient, nous pourrions penser 
que ces différences sont dues à l’aspect autoréférentiel du propre visage. Par contre, si les 
performances ne différaient pas entre le propre visage et l’autre visage très familier mais 
que ces deux visages se distinguaient des visages inconnus, nous pourrions supposer que 
nous sommes face à de simples effets de familiarité. 
La première étude psychophysique a montré que la représentation que nous avons en 
mémoire de notre propre visage est très précise. Cette précision est seulement limitée par 
les capacités de discrimination perceptive de notre système visuel. Cependant, il en était 
de même pour le visage d’une autre personne hautement familière. De ce point de vue, il 
ne semble donc pas que notre propre visage soit spécial. Néanmoins, il semblerait que 
cette représentation soit sous-tendue par des substrats cérébraux spécifiques, comme 
indiqué par notre seconde étude en IRMf. Cette étude a aussi montré que notre propre 
corps serait également traité par des régions cérébrales spécifiques. De plus, certaines 
régions seraient dédiées au traitement abstrait de notre propre apparence physique 
puisqu’elles étaient impliquées indépendamment du type de matériel présenté (visage ou 
corps). Enfin, nous avons montré, grâce aux trois études attentionnelles, que le propre 
visage n’est pas un distracteur exceptionnel par rapport à d’autres visages familiers. En 
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effet, le propre visage ne semble pas capturer l’attention de façon automatique. Il 
semblerait que le propre visage bénéficie simplement d’une allocation de l’attention 
préférentielle par rapport à des visages inconnus. En d’autres termes, l’allocation de 
l’attention au propre visage est sujette à diverses contraintes (par exemple sa localisation 
spatiale) et il semblerait que l’attention soit nécessaire pour identifier le propre visage en 
tant que tel. 
Cet ensemble de résultats est discuté dans un dernier chapitre (voir Chapitre 9) où nous 
tentons de mettre les données provenant des trois perspectives différentes (représentation 
en mémoire, substrats cérébraux et propriétés attentionnelles relatifs au propre visage) en 
rapport. De plus, la possibilité d’utiliser le propre visage comme outil d’étude de la 
conscience de soi ou de différents processus cognitifs (reconnaissance ou attention 
visuelle) est brièvement passée en revue. 
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 PREAMBLE 
When we think about ourselves, about the traits that define us, about the physical 
characteristics or the objects that we own, we have the intuition that they have a special 
status in our mind. We deeply feel that they are different from everything else in the world. 
Let us start with a trivial example. Imagine that you are wandering with your family on a flea 
market on a Sunday afternoon. Suddenly your eyes fall on the exact same toy that you 
were fond of when you were a child and that you had completely forgotten. You cannot 
imagine that you would pass your way indifferently then. You surely would be seized by 
positive emotions and memories. You would probably feel like picking the toy up and 
handle it a short while or showing it to your spouse and children that are with you. 
Other examples of the importance of self-related information can be found in far more 
dramatic situations. Accounts from the Second World War describe how prisoners of the 
Nazi camps urged to see their own face if it happened that one of them found a tiny piece of 
mirror (Antelme, 1957). Seeing their own face was experienced as finding themselves back 
for a little while after their identity had been wrecked by Nazis (e.g., all their personal 
belongings had been confiscated and their names had been replaced by numbers tattooed 
on their arm, see Levi, 1987). Jonathan Cole (1999) has described in a whole book how life 
of people dealing with problems touching their own face (e.g., disfigurement, facial 
paralysis, etc) is affected. These terrible examples illustrate how our own face is an 
essential component of our identity besides other self-related information such as our own 
name. Since the discovery and the propagation of photography, passports or driving 
licences from all over the world have in common the presence of the name, of course, but 
also of an identity picture. 
The present work aims at studying the specificities of self-referential stimuli. Self-referential 
stimuli can be defined as all the information pertaining to oneself (see Figure 1). This 
information can concern abstract characteristics such as our own beliefs, tastes, or 
personal goals. It can also refer to more physical characteristics such as the appearance of 
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our own face, our weight, size and so on. Some authors (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 
1975) have distinguished public (i.e., visible from outside) from private (i.e., invisible private 
events) self-information. To anticipate a little bit over Chapter 1, different levels of self-
information have been linked to different levels of self-awareness (Morin, 2006). Public self-
information would be known by perceptual components of self-awareness while we would 
access private self-information with more conceptual levels of self-awareness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of different kinds of self-information in relation with 
different levels of self-awareness (from Morin, 2006). 
In the present thesis, we focused particularly on the self-face. The reason of this choice is 
that the self-face is probably the most distinctive among those stimuli pertaining to oneself. 
Indeed, contrary to other self-related information that can be shared with other people (e.g., 
our first name, our hometown, our food preference, and so on) our own face is a unique 
self-referential stimulus. Nonetheless, it is still unclear from the existing literature whether 
the importance of the self-face for his or her owner and its high level of distinctiveness gives 
rise to specific processing (e.g., Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004, but see Gillihan & 
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Farah, 2005) or not. Therefore, we will try to give an update on the existing literature 
investigating this matter and bring new data in order to answer this question more precisely. 
The two first chapters of this thesis will present reviews of the literature to date about self-
referential stimuli. First, in Chapter 1 we will ask whether the presentation of self-referential 
stimuli can be an efficient way to investigate self-consciousness. After having given an 
operational definition of self-consciousness, we will try to answer this important question 
according to four perspectives: a developmental approach, a comparative approach, and a 
neurocognitive approach focusing on the one hand on healthy subjects and on the second 
hand on populations suffering from alterations of self-consciousness. Second, in Chapter 2 
we will examine whether self-referential stimuli are really special. In other words, we will 
survey findings of previous studies that have assessed whether self-referential stimuli are 
processed differently and elicit specific responses by comparison with other stimuli that do 
not pertain to oneself. We will describe previous studies investigating self-referential stimuli 
according to three different topics: their representation in memory, the neural correlates 
subtending their processing and their attentional properties. 
After this summary of the existing literature, we will introduce our own practical work in 
Chapter 3. We will describe in more detail our choice to investigate the self-face and the 
original approach we have used to do so (i.e., assessing the specificity of the self-face by 
comparison with other personally familiar faces). 
In Chapter 4 we will present our first study in which we measured the accuracy of the 
memory for our own face by means of a psychophysical method. In Chapter 5 we will 
describe a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in which the neural correlates of 
visual self-face and self-body recognition were examined. In Chapter 6 to 8 we will report 
three studies evaluating the attentional properties of the self-face. Finally, we will close this 
work with a ninth and last chapter discussing our findings in regard with the previous 
literature. 
 Chapter 1 
PROCESSING SELF-REFERENTIAL STIMULI AS 
AN INDEX OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS? 
1. Conceptions of self-consciousness1 
Some authors have investigated the processing of self-referential stimuli with the 
assumption that it can be a direct way to investigate self-consciousness. But what is self-
consciousness? In some people’s eyes, it is the most fundamental issue in psychology 
(Rochat, 2003). Indeed, some see this phenomenon as the manifestation of the highest 
level of cognitive abilities (see Morin, 2006 for a review). Self-consciousness has 
constituted a central question in philosophy for a long time and only recently has become 
the subject of increasing systematic investigation (and excitement) in cognitive 
neuroscience (Gallagher, 2000). However, if each of us has a more or less precise idea of 
what the term “self-consciousness” refers to, it is undoubtedly among those concepts in 
psychology that do not make unanimity. So what exactly is self-consciousness? This term 
actually refers to a whole spectrum of different processes and abilities as a function of the 
definition ones adopts. The amount of existing different definitions is probably innumerable. 
In the present section, we will thus not seek to be exhaustive (while voluntarily neglecting 
                                                          
1 As no unanimous distinction exists between « self-consciousness » and « self-awareness » (except 
that “self-consciousness” is sometimes used in the sense of reflective consciousness while “self-
awareness” encompasses more perceptive aspects of one’s subjective experience, e.g., Zeman, 
2005) we will hereafter use these two words as synonymous. 
Self-referential stimuli and self-consciousness 
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philosophical debates) and will try to present the most usual and operational of these 
definitions of self-consciousness. 
1.1. Self-consciousness and consciousness 
First of all, it might be useful to distinguish self-consciousness and consciousness. 
“Consciousness” is also an ambiguous term that pertains to a virtually infinite numbers of 
definitions and theories (Zeman, 2001). It is thus crucial not to confuse these two 
phenomena. Indeed, they are independent, produce different effects and therefore should 
not be equated even if there exist interconnections between them (Morin, 2006; Zeman, 
2001). 
Consciousness covers different dimensions. Zeman (2001) distinguish three of them: (1) 
the waking state, implying the capacity to perceive and to respond to environmental 
stimulations, by opposition with those states (non-REM sleep or coma) where people are 
unconscious; (2) experience, that is, the ‘online’ subjective content of our experience from 
moment to moment. In that sense, we are conscious of something. This is the case for 
instance, when we perceive the smell of coffee coming from the kitchen in the morning; (3) 
mind, that is, the propositional content of our mental states, our desires, our goals, our 
believes, and so on. Trying to find an operational definition to start studying consciousness, 
Christof Koch (2004, p. 11) cites John Searle (1997) to whom “consciousness consists of 
those states of sentience, or feeling, or awareness, which begin in the morning when we 
awake from a dreamless sleep and continue throughout the day until we fall into a coma or 
die or fall asleep again or otherwise become unconscious”. This definition encompasses the 
same aspects that highlighted by Zeman (2001). For our present purpose of finding an 
operational definition of self-consciousness, defining consciousness as being awake and 
having an experience (of any kind) seems satisfying. Note that an important aspect of 
consciousness is its subjectiveness and privateness. Indeed, the access to our own mental 
states is restricted to ourselves and they cannot be accessed from the outside in the same 
manner (Kircher & David, 2003). 
Chapter 1 
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Self-awareness would in turn occur when we start to reflect on our experience and are 
explicitly aware of the content of consciousness (meta-consciousness, Schooler, 2002). 
Similarly, self-awareness has been defined as the ability to become the object of one’s own 
attention and to process self-information (Morin, 2006), or to become aware of one’s own 
states as one’s own states (Newen & Vogeley, 2003). From a phenomenological 
perspective, self-consciousness has been described as our knowledge “that we are the 
same person across time, that we are the authors of our thoughts/actions, and that we are 
distinct from our environment” (Kircher & David, 2003, p. 445). What seems to differentiate 
consciousness from self-awareness is thus their content. Mead (1934, see also Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972) already defined consciousness as the focus of attention outward, that is 
toward the environment and self-awareness as the focus of attention inward, that is toward 
the self. Kircher and David (2003, p. 449) express a similar view when they write that “in the 
same way that we think we are in direct contact with the world, although it is mere construct 
in our brain, we feel in direct contact with ourselves”. Note that restricting consciousness as 
a focus outward might at first appear misleading. Indeed, how should internal stimulations 
such as hunger or pain be classified? Are we automatically self-aware of our interoceptive 
sensations because they are coming from inside or are we just conscious of them if we feel 
and perceive them but do not think about them? According to Kircher and David (2003), 
pain is tacitly self-conscious because it is perceived from a first-person perspective. This 
point leads us to three main features of our experiences supposed to characterize self-
consciousness (Metzinger, 2003). The first one is the unity, when we realize that we form a 
coherent whole, in other words, self-coherence (Kircher & David, 2003). The second feature 
is constituted by the feeling of ownership (I know that I am the one who is doing, feeling or 
thinking something) and agency (I am the one who caused and controlled this action or this 
thought). The last feature is the perspectivity we adopt, that is a first-person-perspective by 
opposition with a third-person-perspective. 
In an interesting framework reviewed by Morin (2006), self-consciousness is integrated in a 
scale comprising different levels of consciousness (see Table 1). These levels gradually 
rise from unconsciousness to self-awareness, consciousness being positioned in the middle 
as a prerequisite for self-consciousness. As a matter of fact, self-awareness apparently 
implies consciousness (you could not be conscious of experiencing something that you are 
Self-referential stimuli and self-consciousness 
 12 
not experiencing) while the reverse is not necessarily true (a conscious being is not always 
capable of self-awareness and a being capable of self-consciousness is not conscious at 
every moment of the content of its consciousness). Self-awareness has thus often been 
described as a superior form of consciousness. An ultimate level of consciousness would 
be “meta-self-awareness”, that is the ability to become aware that you are self-aware (see 
Morin, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of recent neurocognitive proposals on levels of consciousness and 
self-awareness (from Morin, 2006). 
1.2. Levels of self-consciousness 
Exactly like consciousness, self-consciousness is a multi-faceted concept (Zeman, 2001). It 
can take different forms corresponding to different levels of cognitive abilities (Newen & 
Vogeley, 2003). 
Levels  Definition    Related concepts 
Meta-self-awareness Being aware that one is self-aware - Consciousness5 
- Extended self 
Self-awareness Focusing attention on self; processing - Consciousness4 
  private & public self-information  - Extended & private self 
- Symbolic self 
- Meta representational self-consciousness 
      - Conceptual self-consciousness 
      - Self-concept 
      - Reflective, recursive, self & meta-consciousness 
Consciousness Focusing attention on the environment; - Non-conscious mind 
  processing incoming external stimuli  - Ecological & interpersonal self 
- Neocortical level 
- Consciousness3-6 
- Sensorimotor awareness 
- Core, peripheral, primary & minimal consciousness 
Unconscious Being non-responsive to self and - Consciousness6 
environment    - Non-consciousness 
- Arousal 
- Limbic stage 
- Sensorimotor cognition 
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Zeman (2001) reports five different meanings for self-consciousness: (1) Proneness to 
embarrassment: in that sense, self-consciousness corresponds to the consciousness we 
have about others’ consciousness about ourselves. According to Zeman, such a self-
consciousness implies embarrassment in the company of others. It is thus a quite high-
order process in which self-consciousness is seen as a link between consciousness of self 
and of others; (2) Self-detection: this definition reflects the ability of an organism to respond 
to stimuli directed towards it or to change its behaviour as a function of the consciousness it 
has about its own actions; (3) Self-recognition: according to some authors (Gallup, 1970; 
but see Heyes, 1994; Mitchell, 1997), the capacity to recognize oneself in the mirror implies 
the possession of a basic self concept, reflecting a certain degree of self-consciousness. It 
has been studied extensively among primates and human children. This topic has brought 
extremely controversial debates as whether this kind of self-consciousness can be equated 
with high-order levels of self-consciousness, debates that we will address below; (4) 
Awareness of awareness: this definition implies the ability to attribute mental states (theory 
of mind) to explain or predict others’ behaviour. This ability would result from the knowledge 
of our own mental states; (5) Self-knowledge: this last definition includes everything we 
know about ourselves, not only as a body and a mind but also as a member of a broader 
social and cultural community. In that sense, self-consciousness thus evolves throughout 
lifetime. 
Zeman thus furnishes five different definitions of self-awareness without explicitly 
classifying them. Other authors have also defined self-consciousness as a multiple 
phenomenon but have clearly established a gradation from lowest to highest levels of self-
consciousness (see Morin, 2006 for a review). For instance, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 
(1975) have distinguished “public self-awareness”, that is the processing and knowledge of 
one’s own visible attributes (external appearance or behaviours), from “private self-
awareness”, that is one’s knowledge about invisible internal events (physical and 
physiological sensations, emotions, values, personal aspirations, and so on). The private 
self-awareness would reflect a superior form of self-awareness by comparison with public 
self-awareness (see Morin, 2006) because private self-information is more abstract than 
Self-referential stimuli and self-consciousness 
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public self-information2. Gallagher (2000) distinguishes two groups of approaches focused 
on two different aspects of the self, the “minimal self” and the “narrative self”. The former 
corresponds to how is it like to be the immediate subject of one’s own experience. It is 
unextended in time, that is, limited to what is immediately accessible to self-consciousness. 
The latter is more complex and extended in time. It refers to a coherent self including a past 
and a future. In line with this logic of gradation, Newen and Vogeley (2003) have proposed 
the existence of different levels of self-consciousness as a function of the complexity of self-
information that one is able to process. They describe five different levels of self-
consciousness related to five different kinds of cognitive abilities entailing increasingly 
complex forms of representation.  
1.3. An integrative summary 
Several other authors have developed similar theories that we do not have space to present 
in full here. Each of these theories has its proper taxonomy but Morin (2006) have 
integrated them into a more general framework (see Figure 1). An overall view of the 
existing theories as furnished by Morin allows finding out some similarities and constants 
about the different levels of self-consciousness that have been described.  
The different models generally agree about the existence of a basic self-consciousness at a 
perceptual level. At this stage, one somehow realizes that physical sensations, perceptions 
and feelings he/she is experiencing are taking place in his/her own body and a self-world 
differentiation occurs. This capacity is already present before birth in human infants 
(minimal self, Gallagher, 2000; ecological self, Neisser, 1997; phenomenal self-
acquaintance, Newen & Vogeley, 2003; Level 1-differentiation, Rochat, 2003). 
Subsequent levels of self-consciousness entail the processing of increasingly conceptual 
information about oneself. This type of information is not directly available via perceptual 
                                                          
2 Note however that it might not always be true when internal basic feelings such as hunger or pain, 
classified as pertaining to private self-awareness, are involved. In these cases, one could imagine 
more abstract and complex information related to public self-awareness. 
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experience and a mental representation has to be built (see Morin, 2006). Now, the self-
conscious being becomes able to identify him/herself as a unique entity but only from 
moment to moment. The individual is able to represent him/herself as an object with varying 
properties and differing from the properties of other objects. He/she can deliberately engage 
in self-exploration and react to stimulation directed towards him/her (conceptual self-
consciousness, Newen & Vogeley, 2003; level 2-situation/level 3-identification, Rochat, 
2003; recursive consciousness, Zelazo, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Various levels of self-consciousness as integrated by Morin (Adapted from 
Morin, 2006). 
Afterwards, the self-conscious organism not only understands that he/she is a discrete 
entity different from others, but also that he/she forms a coherent whole constant 
throughout time The self-conscious being is able to represent him/herself as taking part in 
complex events. He/she now starts memorizing episodic events and projecting him/herself 
into his/her own past or future in relation to a present experience (extended consciousness, 
Damasio, 1999; narrative self, Dennett, 1991; Gallagher, 2000; extended self, Neisser, 
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1997; sentential self-consciousness, Newen & Vogeley, 2003; level 3-identification/level 4-
permanence, Rochat, 2003; self-consciousness, Zelazo, 2004). 
A further stage is achieved when the self-conscious being acquires an even more 
conceptual knowledge about him/herself and concomitantly about others (his/her own or 
their will, goals, personality, feelings, behaviours, reactions and so on). He/she acquires a 
theory of mind. He/she has more and more abstract knowledge about people and situates 
him/herself in a broader social context (private self, Neisser, 1997; meta-representational 
self-consciousness, Newen & Vogeley, 2003; reflective consciousness 1-2, Zelazo, 2004).  
The ultimate stage seems to be reached when the self-conscious being can reflect on 
his/her own self-consciousness. He/she can take into account his/her own and others’ 
knowledge about him/herself to adapt his/her behaviour (self-concept, Neisser, 1997; 
iterative meta-representational self-consciousness, Newen & Vogeley, 2003; level 5-meta 
self-awareness, Rochat, 2003; reflective consciousness 1-2, Zelazo, 2004).  
All these levels seem to develop chronologically during human ontogenesis (see Newen & 
Vogeley, 2003; Rochat, 2003; Zelazo, 2004) and the highest levels cannot be achieved 
without first possessing the lowest. We can assume that once one has attained the highest 
levels of self-consciousness, he/she can still develop and improve his/her knowledge and 
the complexity of representations about the lower levels. Self-consciousness would be a 
dynamic process oscillating between all these different levels and one would not show the 
most complex form of self-consciousness at every moment (Rochat, 2003). 
Now that we have described the different aspects that the term “self-consciousness” can 
refer to, we will explore the different fields in which it has been investigated through self-
referential stimuli. In the next sections, we will in most cases remain focused on visual self-
referential stimuli defining one’s own appearance. Our central question will be whether 
presentation of self-referential stimuli and investigation of their processing can be an 
efficient way to understand the functions and the mechanisms of self-consciousness. 
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2. Comparative perspective 
Are we, human beings, alone with our self-consciousness? If for Descartes, animals were 
conscious automata just able to perceive and feel external inputs but without knowing it 
(Smith, 1998), the question of animal self-consciousness is nowadays actually still a subject 
of debate. For Descartes, human beings differed from the rest of the animal kingdom in 
their capacity to know that they know, in other words, self-consciousness (Smith, 1998). 
Since Darwin however (see Dawkins, 2006), there is a consensus that non-human animals 
(at least mammals and birds) are conscious, at least in the sense of sentience. It seems 
obvious that they are able to perceive external stimuli as well as physical sensations (see 
Zeman, 2001). But are they able to go a step further and think about their experience? Will 
they suffer beyond the direct sensation of pain or distress? This question is important by 
itself and also from an ethical point of view with regard to animal welfare for instance 
(Morton, 2000). 
Since animals do not possess a direct way (i.e., a language similar to ours) to communicate 
about their experience or the way it is to be them, researchers have developed different 
methods to answer this question of animal self-consciousness. We will focus on those 
involving the presentation of self-referential stimuli, and more precisely in the visual 
modality. The most extensively used method is probably the “mirror” or “mark test” (for 
reviews see Anderson & Gallup, 1999; Bard, Todd, Bernier, Love, & Leavens, 2004; 
Schilhab, 2004) assessing the mirror self-recognition (MSR). This test has above all 
involved chimpanzees and other primates. It has more recently been adapted for the 
investigation of cetaceans (Delfour & Marten, 2001; Reiss & Marino, 2001) and elephants 
(Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006; Povinelli, 1989). 
2.1. Self-recognition in primates 
When exposed to mirror, most animals with sufficient visual abilities will react as if they 
were facing a conspecific. After a while however, some of them may start to show mirror-
guided self-directed behaviours (see Gallup, 1968, 1970). Gallup (1970) designed the 
famous mark test in order to create an empirical tool that would be an objective measure of 
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such behaviours. In his initial study, four chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were first isolated 
in a cage for two days. Afterwards, a mirror was added and animals were exposed to it for a 
total of approximately 80 hours. During this period, as observed previously, chimpanzees 
first displayed social responses towards the mirror, but these responses gradually turned 
into self-directed responses via the mirror (i.e., for instance inspection of body areas 
otherwise invisible, making faces and so on) over a few days. Then, to assess whether 
these self-directed behaviours reflected self-recognition, the animals were anesthetized and 
while they were unconscious their eyebrow and the opposite ear were marked with an 
odourless and tactile-free dye. When the animals recovered from the anaesthesia (around 
four hours after having been marked), they were observed to count the number of 
spontaneous movements directed towards the marks while the mirror was absent. The 
mirror was finally reintroduced and the animals were observed in the same manner. Results 
showed that the number of responses towards the marks dramatically increased after the 
mirror had been reintroduced. The viewing time also increased by comparison with the 
baseline and visual inspection of the fingers that had touched the marked areas was 
observed. In addition, two additional naïve (i.e., with no mirror experience) chimpanzees 
were also marked while sedated and then introduced with a mirror. Contrary to the others, 
these subjects did not make any mark-directed responses, suggesting, according to Gallup 
that the others chimpanzees had learned to recognize themselves during the period of 
exposition to the mirror. 
Gallup (1970) repeated this procedure with macaques (see also Gallup, 1977), rhesus 
monkeys and cynomolgus monkeys but they failed to manifest any self-directed response 
and kept responding socially to their reflection. Gallup concluded that his data was the first 
demonstration of a self-concept in non-humans and that this ability for self-recognition, 
which required an advanced form of intellect, might be restricted to humans and great apes. 
These results have been replicated (Gallup et al., 1995; Kitchen, Denton, & Brent, 1996; 
Lin, Bard, & Anderson, 1992; Suarez & Gallup 1981) and extended to orang-utans (Suarez 
& Gallup, 1981) and bonobos (Westergaard & Hyatt, 1994). Attempts of extension to 
gorillas have been less clear as they were sometimes successful (Swartz & Evans, 1994) 
and sometimes not (Ledbetter & Basen, 1982). In line with Gallup’s claim, all the studies 
conducted on prosimians or monkeys had resulted in negative outcomes (for a review, see 
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Anderson & Gallup, 1999; Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002; but see Hauser, Kralik, Botto-
Mahan, Garrett, & Oser, 1995; or de Waal, Dindo, Freeman, & Hall, 2005 for a recent study 
with capuchin monkeys showing that they might discriminate self and others in the mirror). 
Later, it has been shown that chimpanzees capable of MSR can also recognize themselves 
in distorted mirrors and thus use movement cues in addition to usual visual cues to identify 
the reflection as themselves (Kitchen et al., 1996). According to Kitchen and colleagues, 
this indicates that chimpanzees possess abstractive abilities that allow recognizing 
themselves even on deformed images. A recent study also report cases (2 out of 10) of 
chimpanzees able to recognize themselves (as attested by self-exploration behaviours) on 
live video images (Hirata, 2007). However, other studies have shown that MSR is not so 
systematic in chimpanzees, some individual chimpanzees remaining unable to pass the 
mark test (de Veer, Gallup, Theall, van den Bos, & Povinelli, 2003 ; Kitchen et al., 1996; 
Swartz & Evans, 1991), and MSR being age dependent (Bard et al., 2006; de Veer, Gallup, 
Theall, van den Bos, & Povinelli, 2003; Lin, Bard, & Anderson, 1992; Povinelli, Rulf, 
Landau, & Bierschwale, 1993). 
2.2. MSR in other animals? 
Even if the mark test procedure was not necessarily used, the reactions of a wide range of 
animals to their mirror-image have actually been examined. These studies have revealed 
that most animals, including fish, dogs, cats, sea lions, monkeys (for a review, see Gallup, 
1968), marmots (Svendsen & Armitage, 1973) and birds (Diamond & Bond, 1989), interact 
with their reflection as if they were in presence of another animal. 
Some authors, however, have made efforts trying to adapt the mark test procedure to 
assess self-recognition in non-primates. Elephants, being reputed for their intelligence and 
given the dexterity of their trunk to explore their environment and their own body, appeared 
as ideal candidates (Povinelli, 1989). In the first attempt reported, two Asian elephants 
(Elephas maximus) were tested but failed to show any sign of self-recognition. Even if 
animals show substantial interest in the mirror after its introduction, this interest quickly 
declined over of few days. They did not “pass” the mark test as they never touched the 
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marked area while facing the mirror. One of them nevertheless inspected marks on the 
other one, indicating that the marks were visible to them. Despite their lack of self-
recognition, both animals appeared able to use the mirror to find otherwise invisible food. 
This indicates that the failure to pass the mark test found in these elephants (and also in 
other animals) is not due to an inability to process information related to spatially displaced 
items (Povinelli, 1989). More recently, however, one case of MSR has been reported in one 
elephant (Plotnik et al., 2006). In this second study, three Asian elephants were tested. 
Unlike other animals, they did not respond socially to their reflection when the mirror was 
first introduced (but presumably all of them had prior mirror experience in the zoo where 
they live). All of them nonetheless produced self-directed and mirror-testing behaviours (for 
instance they brought food and ate in front of the mirror, what they did not do at this place in 
the absence of the mirror) and tended to use the mirror to explore their own body. Each of 
them was marked on the right side of its head, and a similar but invisible sham-mark was 
applied on the left side. Only one out of the three elephants passed the mark test (i.e., 
touched the visible mark more often than the sham mark while or just after facing the 
mirror). Attempts with other elephants and next attempts with this same elephant were 
unfruitful. The authors concluded that contrary to primates that frequently autogroom and 
inspect specific parts of their body in detail, elephants might lack concern about their 
cleanliness and appearance. 
Similar experiments have recently been conducted with cetaceans. Due to their absence of 
hands, the procedure had have been adjusted and the interpretation of the animals’ 
behaviour is maybe even more complicated than with primates (Delfour & Marten, 2001). In 
one of these studies (Reiss & Marino, 2001), two dolphins were marked on different body 
parts that were invisible without the help of a mirror. They were also sham-marked or 
unmarked at two other moments. Their behaviour was compared in the presence and in the 
absence of mirrors inside the pool. Results showed that dolphins spent more time at the 
mirror location when they had been marked than in other conditions and also when the 
mirror was present than covered or absent. They used the mirror to explore the marks and 
went faster toward the mirror location when they had been manipulated (marked or sham-
marked) than when they had not been touched. Three killer whales (Orcinus orca)’s 
behaviour when facing mirror has also been investigated (Delfour & Marten, 2001). While 
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facing the mirror, they had specific head movements, they open their mouth, showed their 
tongue and play with a piece of fish in mouth longer than in the absence of mirror. One of 
them rubbed her head against the wall several times after having been marked and 
inspected her reflection in the mirror. Similar behaviours were observed in false killer 
whales but not in Californian sea lions that displayed social behaviours.  
In conclusion, these studies reviewed so far suggest that MSR might not be due to 
specificities shared by humans and great apes but rather that this ability might result from 
more general factors such as sufficient cognitive abilities and high encephalization (Reiss & 
Marino, 2001). However, a study with pigeons by Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner (1981) could 
at first sight question this view. In this study, pigeons were trained to peck at dots place on 
different locations of their body by reinforcement. Then a mirror was introduced in front of 
the cage and pigeons were further trained to peck at blue dots placed inside the cage. 
Then, a dot that could only be seen with the mirror was presented and pigeons received 
food if they peck at it. Afterwards, the same blue dot was placed on their chest and hidden 
from their direct view with a bib. Results showed that the number of pecks at this dot 
dramatically increased when the mirror was uncovered by comparison with a situation 
where it was covered. This study thus indicates that pigeons have the ability to explore their 
own body with mirrors. However, comparisons with traditional mark test studies should be 
cautious as the conditions were very different here (see Schilhab, 2004). Remember that 
the mark test has been designed to investigate further pre-existing spontaneous self-
directed behaviours with mirrors (see Anderson & Gallup, 1997, 1999). These spontaneous 
behaviours were inexistent in pigeons. Moreover, this reinforcement procedure involved 
food reward which is never the case in the classical mark test. As stated by Schilhab (2004, 
p. 116), “the study on pigeons was deemed incomparable and with no implications for 
investigations of chimpanzees”. 
This section illustrates that the evidence so far for MSR in non-primates is actually quite 
limited. Further inquiries are probably necessary to get more convincing data and stronger 
support for the presence or absence of this ability among the animal kingdom. The question 
thus arises of what this test really measures and how results should be interpreted. Does a 
failure to pass the mark test automatically exclude the possibility of self-consciousness, in 
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other words is it conceivable for some organism to be self-conscious while being unable to 
grasp the meaning of a mirror? On the contrary, does passing the mark test really constitute 
an evidence of self-consciousness? These questions have been the subject of many 
debates in the literature. 
2.3. Methodological and theoretical debates around the mark test 
According to Gallup and his colleagues, « the ability to correctly identify the source of the 
reflection as oneself – to become the object of one’s own attention – requires a cognitive 
category of self » (Anderson & Gallup, 1999, p. 180). They go further and claim that MSR is 
an indicator of self-awareness (Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002). Their reasoning is that 
the capacity to correctly attribute the source of the mirror image to oneself requires a pre-
existing self-concept involving three components: senses of continuity, of personal agency 
and of identity. As a result of its experience with its own mental states, the organism 
capable of MSR would in turn be able to make inferences about others’ mental states (i.e., 
theory of mind) (Gallup, 1998; Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002). On the contrary, species 
that do not manifest MSR should also be unable to show introspectively based social 
strategies such as empathy, deception and so on (Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002). 
This theory has been seriously questioned by others, either on the basis of methodological 
flaws identified in the mark test (Heyes, 1994), or on the basis of alternative interpretations 
of results to the mark test (Heyes, 1994; Mitchell, 1993, 1997). We will briefly expose some 
of the most prevailing criticisms (for a review, see Anderson & Gallup, 1999; Schilhab, 
2004; interested people will also find these arguments developed in detail in a whole issue 
of New Ideas in Psychology, Vol.11, Issue 3 devoted to this topic in 1993). 
1) Missing baseline: The mirror could just elicit social behaviour, while the gradual increase 
of self-directed behaviour in front of the mirror could only reflect a return to the normal level 
of auto-grooming after the chimpanzee gets habituated to the presence of the mirror. A 
baseline taking into account the number of self-directed behaviours (in general but also at 
the future location of the marks) prior the introduction of the mirror is missing to refute this 
interpretation (Heyes, 1994).  
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2) Anaesthesia hypothesis: the increase of mark-directed behaviour could just be an 
artefact produced by the anaesthetic (Heyes, 1994). Moreover, the argument that the 
control subjects (i.e., without prior mirror experience) that had also been anaesthetised did 
not engage in self-directed behaviour when facing the mirror is not an evidence that the 
other chimpanzees had learned to recognize themselves. It is actually perfectly logic that 
being exposed for the first time to a mirror, they were socially responding to their reflection 
(Heyes, 1994). However, some studies obtaining similar results as Gallup’s have been 
carried out without anaesthesia (Lin et al., 1992) but they did not use the same measures 
(i.e., they compare the number of mark-touching while looking toward or away from the 
mirror, and not in the absence of mirror) than in the classic mark test (Heyes, 1994). 
3) Viewing time: the observation that animals spend more time facing the mirror when 
marked than when unmarked does not prove that they understand that the mark is on their 
own body. Indeed, a viewing time effect can be found in animals that do not pass the test 
(Heyes, 1994; Mitchell, 1993). In line with this claim, it has been shown that children 
viewing a mark on their mother’s nose sometimes wipe their unmarked own nose (Lewis & 
Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This renders the interpretation of behaviour in front of the mirror quite 
difficult (Schilhab, 2004). 
4) Nonmentalistic hypothesis: According to Epstein et al. (1981), their study with pigeons 
illustrates that a self-concept is not necessary to pass the mark test (see also Heyes, 1994; 
Mitchell, 1993, 1997). However, as we already mentioned, this study involved reinforcement 
and food reward and therefore, these results obtained with pigeons are hardly comparable 
with those obtained in the usual paradigm (see Schilhab, 2004). Nonetheless, it is still 
possible that MSR just imply a very basic sense of self, just allowing a self-world 
differentiation, and not an elaborated self as can be found in humans (Heyes, 1994; 
Mitchell, 1993, 1997). Moreover, the links between MSR and theory of mind appear quite 
shaky to some authors. Indeed, accurate MSR can be found in cases of problematic mental 
states attribution in autistic children for instance (Heyes, 1994; Mitchell, 1997). It thus 
seems that a “strong” interpretation of MSR (as advocated by Gallup and colleagues) 
contrasts with a nonmentalistic more restrictive, “weak”, approach in the literature (see 
Schilhab, 2004). This point demonstrates the pertinence of a clear definition of self-
Self-referential stimuli and self-consciousness 
 24 
consciousness and the importance to keep in mind at which level of investigation one is 
situated as stated in the first section of the present chapter. 
5) Kinesthetic-visual matching: MSR is possible through two capacities, kinesthetic-visual 
matching, that is, the ability to detect contingencies between one’s own actions and the 
mirror image; and understanding mirror correspondence (Mitchell, 1993, 1997). Therefore, 
“recognizing oneself in the mirror does not require that one is aware of all aspects of self or 
that one monitors one’s mental states” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 26). This hypothesis is actually 
consistent with data showing that chimpanzees can recognize themselves via distorted 
mirrors (Kitchen et al., 1996). 
6) Problems of false negatives: in contrast with the points elaborated above as regard with 
misinterpretation of success to the mark test, a last issue concerns the cases in which the 
inherent characteristics of the mark test would not be suited to detect an existing ability of 
self-recognition in some species. As Schilhab (2004, p. 121) notes, “deficiencies solely in 
eyesight could then be responsible for the failure in passing the mark test”. In the same 
order of idea, it has been argued that some monkeys could fail the mark test because they 
could avoid eye-contact that is a sign of aggression to them. This would prevent them from 
getting the opportunity to learn that they are the source of the mirror-image (Hauser et al., 
1995). 
2.4. Conclusion 
The selected review of comparative studies presented above shows that visual presentation 
of self-referential stimuli can be useful to investigate self-consciousness in animals. 
However, as we have seen, the most used paradigm in this realm is still subject to debates 
as regard with the interpretation of the information it can bring. These debates highlight the 
importance of having an operational definition of self-consciousness to interpret data. As 
Morin has very pertinently noted, the question should not be to know whether animals that 
do recognize in the mirror are really self-aware but rather “what kind of self-awareness does 
self-recognition imply?” (Morin, 2006, p. 367). 
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The mark test is maybe the only test researchers have at present to study self-
consciousness in animals. However, they should keep in mind that if this test really 
assesses self-consciousness, it is probably just a particular component of self-
consciousness. Indeed, MSR could be explained via relatively simple processes involving a 
basic self-concept. We are thus still far from resolving the riddle of self-consciousness in 
the animal kingdom. If anything, the mark test is a detector of self-consciousness but it 
might be only of little help to understand further the mechanisms of self-consciousness. The 
main outcome of its use is that MSR seems restricted to organisms otherwise possessing 
high cognitive abilities and a highly developed brain. The possibility remains that the mark 
test may miss instances of self-recognition/self-awareness in some organisms. 
Researchers should ensure that the test fits the physical, physiological, behavioural and 
motivational characteristics of the organism under investigation and be wary of biases 
resulting from an over anthropomorphist point of view (Schilhab, 2004). For Greenfield and 
Collins (2005), there is no phylogenetic gap between the physiology of animals’ brains and 
ours. Therefore, “consciousness is most likely to be a continuously variable property of the 
brain, in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms (…). Consciousness will grow as brains 
grow” (p. 586). It might be the same about self-consciousness. Maybe the best way to 
progress in this field is nonetheless to keep in mind, as Dawkins says (2006, p. 9), that 
“animals are not little furry or feathered humans looking at the world through human eyes 
and science can help us to understand what it is like to look through those different eyes. 
Real respect for animals will come when we see them as sentient beings in their own right, 
with their own views and opinions, their own likes and dislikes.” 
3. Developmental perspective 
Visual presentation of self-referential stimuli has also been used with human children trying 
to understand the ontogeny of self-recognition and ultimately of self-consciousness. 
Interestingly, Amsterdam (1972) has developed almost at the same time as Gallup a similar 
paradigm to the mark test to investigate self-recognition in human infants (for a comparison 
of the test in primates and in human infants, see Bard et al., 2006). In several aspects, this 
test has been judged less rigorous than the one used in comparative studies (see Bard et 
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al., 2006). The differences between the mark tests used in the two approaches are 
summarized in Table 2 for information but will not be developed here. Moreover, we will 
also not address the debate surrounding this test since it is similar to that found in the 
comparative perspective. Here we will focus on the contribution of the mark test to the 
understanding of the ontogeny of self-recognition and afterwards will present the new 
developments brought by other paradigms. 
3.1. The mark test in human infants 
MSR in human infants does not simply appear one day. It develops following systematic 
successive stages (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Courage & Howe, 2002), up to the explicit 
recognition from around 18 months of age (Amsterdam, 1972; Nielsen, Dissanayake, & 
Kashima, 2003). Interestingly, the first stages of MRS in the infant humans are similar to 
those observed in the infant chimpanzees (Bard et al., 2006; Lin et al., 1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of the differences between the mark tests as used in 
developmental (Amsterdam, 1972) and comparative (Gallup, 1970) approaches 
(From Bard et al., 2006). 
The Mark test and Its Application: Amsterdam’s and Gallup’s Methods and Rationale 
Amsterdam (1972)     Gallup (1970) 
The Mark and its application 
Spot of rouge     Alcohol-soluble dye (Rhodamine B-base) 
Applied (covertly?) by mother   Applied while unconscious 
Place alongside nose    Placed on brow ridge and opposite ear 
In one location     In two nonvisible locations 
 
Rationale and implications 
Seminaturalistic laboratory    Highly controlled laboratory 
Mimic everyday acitivity    Controlled discovery of the mark 
Minimize distress     Dye cannot be felt or smelled 
High ecological validity    Marked under anesthesia 
Objective behaviour    Objective behaviour 
Locate mark on face = MSR    Locate mark on face = MSR 
One spot-generalized response   Two spots-touch specific places 
 
Note. MSR – mirror self-recognition. 
 
Chapter 1 
 27 
The young infants do not understand directly the correspondence between the world and 
the reflected world nor are they aware that they are the source of the reflected image. At 
first, from 3 months of age the young infants are attentive and positive towards their own 
reflection (see Courage & Howe, 2002). This interest towards their own image might be an 
important factor in the development of MSR (Nielsen et al., 2003). Typically around 8 
months of age the infants become aware of the contingencies between their own 
movements and the reflection (Courage & Howe, 2002). They then explore the mirror 
tactically (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978) and use these contingencies to play (Courage & 
Howe, 2002). Between 10 and 18 months, the infants explore further these contingencies 
and compare their hands movements to the reflected images (Zazzo, 1993). The infants 
start to understand the correspondence between the world and its reflection in the mirror as 
they can turn back towards objects placed above or behind them (Bertenthal & Fischer, 
1978).  
The explicit recognition – as attested by passing the mark test (i.e., objectivised by 
movements directed towards a rouge mark on the nose) – appears between 18 and 24 
months (Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Courage & Howe, 2002; Zazzo, 
1993). It is at this period that the infants show reactions of embarrassment, perplexity or 
avoidance in front of the mirror (Amsterdam, 1972; Courage & Howe, 2002; Zazzo, 1993). 
These reactions could be due to the ambiguity resulting from an incomplete understanding 
of the mirror (Courage & Howe, 2002; Zazzo, 1993) but they are also the first signs of 
children awareness of their appearance to other people (Rochat, 2003). In fact, it seems 
that children can recognize their own reflection before fully understanding the optical 
properties of mirrors. Children up to 5 years old can bypass the mirror trying to reach an 
object actually situated behind them (Courage & Howe, 2002; Zazzo, 1993).  
Finally, between 22 and 24 months, the children can correctly label their own reflection 
(Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Courage & Howe, 2002). Note however that children between 
1 and 2 years can use the personal pronoun “me” or their own first name when they see a 
video of themselves as well as when they see a video of a peer. This illustrates that cues of 
self-recognition must be carefully chosen (Johnson, 1983). 
Self-referential stimuli and self-consciousness 
 28 
Passing the mark test and correctly naming one’s own reflection are probably crucial 
indices of the construction of a sense of self and of one’s own identity during infancy. 
However, MSR is just a snapshot of one of all the abilities reflecting the construction of a 
sense of self and different levels of self-consciousness (see Rochat, 2003). The MSR would 
be based on perceptual cues and on early abilities to discriminate between oneself and the 
others (Legerstee, Anderson, & Schaffer, 1998) reflecting lower levels of self-
consciousness. Moreover, other stages must be reached after MSR before getting a more 
elaborated (i.e., coherent and extended in time) sense of self as described in the first 
section of this chapter. Other techniques and paradigms than the mark test have been used 
to investigate more precisely these other stages of self-recognition and corresponding 
levels of self-consciousness. 
3.2. Other levels of self-consciousness 
Infants are capable of discriminating between themselves and others and develop a 
(implicit) sense of self long before explicitly recognizing themselves in the mirror (Rochat & 
Striano, 2000). They are born with perceptual means to do so (Rochat, 1998). At least from 
2 months of age they engage in self-exploration and pick up unique visual and 
proprioceptive contingencies specific to their own body (Rochat, 1998; Rochat & Striano, 
2000). Video experiments have shown that at three months of age, infants show some 
abilities to discriminate their own body or face from those of other persons (see Courage & 
Howe, 2002) and to discriminate congruent from incongruent views of their legs (Rochat, 
1998) that manifest through looking preference. From 4-5 months of life, infants prefer 
looking at a video of a peer or a doll (Legerstee et al., 1998) or of an adult imitating them 
(Rochat & Striano, 2002) than at a video of their own face. This suggests a preference for 
novelty and therefore some familiarity with their own face. This familiarity would result from 
prior exposition to mirrors. Around 9 months, they perceived another person presented on a 
video as a social partner more than themselves (Rochat & Striano, 2002). Around 18 
months, appearance of MSR typically coincides with a looking preference towards their own 
face by comparison with a peer’s face (Nielsen et al., 2003).  
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This early sense of self (labelled ecological self, Rochat, 1998) which is present before 
explicit self-recognition is thus determined by direct perception and action. Early 
discrimination abilities constitute a perceptual basis necessary for the emergence of self-
recognition and to the elaboration of a higher level sense of self (Rochat & Striano, 2002). 
This perceptual basis apparently emerges from the processing of dynamic information of 
movements, of intermodal invariant information specifying the own body and also of facial 
features themselves (Legerstee et al., 1998; Rochat, 1998; Rochat & Striano, 2002). 
After the MSR is reached, one or two additional years will pass before children can develop 
a stable and spatio-temporal contingent independent representation of themselves. Studies 
adapted from the mark test have used online versus differed video sequences to investigate 
this topic (Miyazaki & Hiraki, 2006; Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996; Povinelli & Simon, 
1998; Suddendorf, 1999). It appears that video self-recognition is more difficult than mirror 
self-recognition as it develops about a year after mirror self-recognition (Suddendorf, 
Simcock, & Nielsen, 2007). Also, young children recognize themselves more easily with a 
live than with a delayed feedback. For instance, when a sticker has covertly been placed on 
children’s head while they were playing and videotaped, most 3-years-old children realize 
the presence of the sticker on their head and remove it if the tape is played live but do not if 
the tape is presented with a three minutes delay (Povinelli et al., 1996). At this age, children 
will also not remove the sticker if they are shown Polaroid pictures taken during and after 
the placement of the sticker. However, these same children can correctly label the video or 
Polaroid images and remove the sticker when facing a mirror. On the contrary, 4-years-old 
children can infer the presence of the sticker on their head when seeing delayed video 
feedback.  
All these studies show the existence of a developmental evolution of self-recognition going 
from lowest levels entailing a basic self-other differentiation to highest levels implying a 
more elaborated self-concept extended in time. Rochat (2003; see also Section 1 of the 
present chapter) has identified five steps in this progression, each corresponding to 
different levels of self-consciousness. At Level 1 (Differentiation) the infants differentiate 
themselves from the world. They possess a differentiated self. At Level 2 (Situation), infants 
go beyond this awareness and perform self-exploration. They express a situated self. Then 
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at Level 3 (Identification) they can recognize in the mirror and refer explicitly to the self. This 
is the manifestation of a conceptual self. At Level 4 (Permanence), they can identify 
themselves independently of the temporal simultaneity and spatial coincidence provided by 
mirrors. This is the expression of a permanent self. At a last level (Level 5, Meta self 
awareness) that we did not tackle here yet, individuals can also represent themselves from 
a third-person perspective. 
3.3. Context of self-recognition 
Visual self-recognition is of course not the only ability allowing the development of self-
consciousness. It emerges along with other important abilities such as language 
(Herschkowitz, 2000), memorisation of episodic events (Courage & Howe, 2002; 
Herschkowitz, 2000), object permanence (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978), auditory self-
recognition (i.e., investigated by the presentation of one’s own voice, Legerstee et al., 1998) 
or synchronic imitation (Asendorpf & Baudonnière, 1993). All these different abilities will 
participate in different aspects of self-consciousness. They will be unified to form a coherent 
self-concept long after two years old in consideration of increasing interconnections 
between both cerebral hemispheres and cortical and subcortical structures increasing 
between 1 and 2 years old (Herschkowitz, 2000). 
Moreover, the fact that results of video self-recognition task and results on another video 
task (i.e., locate an object in space) highly correlates might shed doubt on the assumption 
that “delayed video mark test” assesses development of self-consciousness. Indeed, 
children’s difficulties with videos are not specific to self-recognition tasks (Suddendorf, 
1999; see also Suddendorf et al., 2007). 
3.4. Conclusion 
The use of visual self-referential stimuli appears to be in most cases a satisfying index of 
the emergence of self-consciousness in humans. This is mostly of great help to test infants 
and children before they can use language unequivocally to express their self-
consciousness (Gouin-Decarie, Pouliot, & Poulin-Dubois, 1983). The mirror-mark test, and 
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more recently developed video-mark test, remains the subject of some debates and 
interpretation of the results should still be executed with caution (see for instance Mitchell, 
1993; Suddendorf, 1999). Moreover, it has often been used in less controlled (but more 
ecological and less distressful) settings than in comparative studies (see Bard et al., 2006). 
However, developmental researchers, at least when studying normal infants, probably 
conduct their studies with the a priori that their subjects are already or will be (once again 
depending of the definition of self-consciousness one adopts) self-conscious organisms. 
This might explain the differences between this approach and the comparative approach. In 
the latter, researchers try to detect self-consciousness in organisms that cannot (and will 
never) directly communicate it. Therefore, the danger is that they might adopt all-or-nothing 
point of views about self-consciousness. On the contrary, the developmental approach 
intrinsically focuses on the moment at which different abilities develop. This is probably the 
reason why researchers in this field seem in agreement with a more gradual vision of self-
consciousness and why developmental studies have abundantly contributed to theories of 
self-consciousness (see for instance Newen & Vogeley, 2003; Rochat, 2003; Zelazo, 2004). 
Of course, the presentation of visual self-referential stimuli allows the investigation of only a 
little portion (i.e., visual self-recognition) of all the aspects of self-consciousness occurring 
during the human development. Once the language is mastered, other aspects of self-
consciousness can in turn be more easily investigated. 
4. A way to find the self in the brain? 
Self-referential stimuli of various kinds (own face, own name, own voice, self-descriptive 
adjectives or sentences, one’s own personality traits, etc) and various tasks involving self-
reference (perspective taking, self-agency, episodic memory retrieval, evaluative 
judgments, decisions about food preference, etc) have been extensively used these last ten 
years (for reviews, see Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; see also Sugiura et 
al., 2005 for a review about visual self-recognition) with the more or less explicit aim of 
finding out the neural circuitry underlying self or self-consciousness. The title of papers by 
Craik and colleagues in 1999, “In search of the self: A positron emission tomography 
study”, or more recently in 2005 by Feinberg and Keenan, “Where in the brain is the self?” 
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on this topic are unequivocal. We will not develop the results of these studies in detail here; 
we will do so in the next chapter. In the present section, the rationale put behind these 
studies and the conclusion drawn from their results will be briefly examined.  
4.1. Rationale of neurocognitive studies 
Adults or sometimes children’s brain activity have been recorded with neuroimaging and 
electrophysiological techniques (i.e., positron emission tomography – PET, functional 
magnetic resonance imaging – fMRI, event-related potential – ERP, are the most commonly 
encountered) while they were engaged in self-referential processing of various kind (see 
Gusnard, 2005 for a review and a reminder about functional neuroimaging principles). 
Typically, this activity has been compared to that elicited by the processing of non-self-
referential stimuli. Another range of techniques has been occasionally used to temporarily 
disable specific brain regions (see Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; 
Théoret et al., 2004; Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacobini, 2006), in other words to 
create virtual lesions (i.e., transcranial magnetic stimulation – TMS), or to disable each 
cerebral hemisphere one at a time (intracarotid sodium amobarbital procedure – ISAP or 
WADA test). Deleterious effects of these manipulations on the realisation of tasks involving 
self-referential stimuli were then examined. Finally, differences of cerebral activity patterns 
between healthy subjects and subjects suffering from disorders implying alterations of some 
aspects of the self (i.e., schizophrenia, delusional misidentification syndrome, dementia, for 
example) have also been examined in order to understand the way in which the self is 
created by the brain (see Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; see also Section 5 of the present 
chapter for more details about this last point).  
Just as Kriegel (2007) has recently noted about studies investigating neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCC), two hypotheses are encountered in the literature investigating neural 
correlates of self-consciousness: descriptive and explanatory hypotheses. In the same way 
as with NCC, descriptive studies aim at localising the cerebral structures underlying various 
aspects of self-consciousness. The explanatory view makes hypothesis about why these 
specific regions are involved in self-consciousness.  
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4.2. Finding converging evidence? 
Northoff and Bermpohl (2004)’s approach is certainly of the second type (i.e., explanatory). 
They have gathered various imaging studies exploring self-processing and integrated their 
findings into a neuroanatomical explanatory model. First of all, they have noted that cortical 
midline structures (CMS) have been found to be implicated in various tasks going from 
perspective taking to self-face recognition. They claim that specific regions of the CMS are 
implied in different self-related subprocesses (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Subprocesses of self-referential processing and their associated regions - 
OMPFC, orbitomedial prefrontal cortex; DMPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; AC, 
anterior congulate cortex; PC, posterior cingulated cortex (from Northoff & Bermphol, 
2004). 
They identify four self-related functions: representation and evaluation of self-referential 
stimuli, a monitoring function associated with a preferential processing of self-related stimuli 
independently of the task or of the sensory modality, and finally an integration function of 
self-related information in the context of one’s own person. These four functions would 
imply most frontal to more posterior CMS. A similar view that different regions of the CMS 
are commonly activated during various self-related tasks is advocated in a more recent 
paper from the same group (Northoff et al., 2006). They have done a meta-analysis with 
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various studies implying self-processing and have performed cluster and factor analyses. 
They have found three (ventral, dorsal and posterior) clusters within the CMS but none of 
these were associated with a particular domain or modality (they had included studies 
implying visual, auditive, or mental tasks/presentations). 
4.3. Potential issues 
Beyond the limitations inherent to each technique (relative spatial and temporal resolution 
of fMRI and ERPs for instance) used to identify the neural correlates of self-consciousness, 
some fundamental issues should be considered when investigating neural correlates of 
self-consciousness. 
The first one concerns the tendency to presuppose that some specific self-referential 
processing is equivalent to self-consciousness. In this view, cerebral correlates of this 
specific processing are identified as the cerebral correlates of the self or of self-
consciousness whereas they are only demonstrated in really specific self-related tasks. 
This issue has been raised by Morin (2002, 2007) about Keenan and his collaborators’ work 
on visual self-recognition (see Keenan, et al., 2001; Keenan, Rubio, Racioppi, Johnson, & 
Barnacz, 2005; Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Platek, Keenan, Gallup, 
& Mohamed, 2004). According to Morin, Keenan and colleagues claim that self-recognition 
is equivalent to self-awareness and that since self-recognition mainly involves activity in the 
right hemisphere (specifically the prefrontal lobe), self-awareness is underlain by right 
hemispheric activity. Morin’s main objection is that access to one’s own thought or cognitive 
self-knowledge is not necessary for self-recognition to occur (see Section 2.3. of the 
present chapter for a similar argument). Rather, self-recognition could only be based on a 
(lower level) kinaesthetic self-knowledge. It thus appears dangerous to draw very general 
conclusions on the basis of one single (or even several few) self-related ability. 
The opposite problematic tendency might consist in assembling data obtained with various 
tasks each involving different kinds of self-processing and self-referential stimuli presented 
in different modalities (beyond the technical differences existing between each study) to 
determine the brain areas involved in self-consciousness and to elaborate a general theory 
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of self-consciousness. This approach might be misleading because one cerebral area 
involved in one specific self-related ability will not necessarily be involved in another self-
related ability. Taking all the previously identified brain areas into account in one single 
model would probably show that self-consciousness is entailed by (nearly) the whole brain 
(see Legrand, 2003, for a similar view). 
Finally, as already mentioned above, neural correlates of self-referential processing have 
been studied with various kinds of self-referential stimuli and tasks. These tasks actually 
entailed either a perceptual processing of self-referential stimuli (e.g., own name presented 
visually or auditorily, own face, own voice), or a more conceptual and mental processing 
(e.g. for example subjects are instructed to think intensely on how they would describe their 
own personality traits and physical appearance, see Kjaer, Nowak, & Lou, 2002; or to 
mentally identify a person depicted in a picture, see Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004). In that 
latter case resides the last obvious potential issue. Indeed, subjects are at best presented 
with equivalent stimuli (a picture of their own face) but this is not even the case when the 
task is purely mental. Since no behavioural response has to be made, little control on what 
the subject is actually doing during the brain activity recording is possible. Thus it seems 
extremely difficult to draw strict conclusions from such tasks. 
4.4. Conclusion 
The neurocognitive investigation of self-consciousness is very recent and still in its infancy. 
This section once again illustrates the importance of having a clear definition of self-
consciousness and above all to be aware of the aspect of self-consciousness put under 
investigation. Indeed, all the studies existing to date have in fact examined at best only few 
aspects of self and self-consciousness at the same time. Conclusions drawn from these 
studies should therefore stay humble. A paradigm allowing the study of the neural 
correlates of the self in its entirety, i.e. simultaneously involving all the aspects of self or at 
least various aspects of self in comparable conditions, remains to be built. A work of 
integration such as started by Northoff and his colleagues (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; 
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Northoff et al., 2006) is probably necessary. However, people should ensure that the results 
they use are generalisable in order to build accurate models of self-consciousness. 
In this section, we mainly tackled the neural correlates of self-consciousness in healthy 
subjects. The next section will focus on the use of self-referential stimuli in populations 
suffering from various alterations of self-consciousness. 
5. The cases of altered self-consciousness 
Self-referential stimuli (particularly one’s own name and one’s own face) have been used 
with a wide range of subjects suffering of various “alterations of self-consciousness”. As it is 
often the case with pathological population, research has been carried out according to two 
(non mutually-exclusive) general approaches. On the one hand, studies have investigated 
the pattern of information processing in patients compared to that normally observed in a 
healthy population in order to better understand the specific condition of the patients. On 
the other hand, pathological populations have been examined in order to understand self-
consciousness in healthy functioning individuals. In this section we will briefly mention some 
pathologies including alterations of self-consciousness that have been the most usually 
studied with self-referential stimuli. 
5.1. Self-processing and schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is probably among the most intriguing psychiatric disease. It has been 
suggested that some of its symptoms can be explained as disorders of different aspects of 
the self (Vogeley, 2003). Particularly, positive symptoms, hallucinations and delusions of 
control or of influence (i.e., consisting of experiencing actions, thoughts and feelings as 
control by a third part and in explaining these strange experiences in a delusional manner) 
seem due to deficits in self-monitoring (Jeannerod, 2003; Kircher & Leube, 2003; Lindner, 
Their, Kircher, Haarmeier, Leube, 2005; Vogeley, 2003). In other words, schizophrenic 
patients would have impaired abilities to recognize self- from other-generated actions or 
thoughts. This idea is supported by recent empirical evidence (Daprati et al., 1997; see 
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Jeannerod et al., 2003 for a review). For instance, in a task involving recognition of one’s 
own reproduced movements by a virtual hand, either identically or with some temporal or 
spatial deviations, performance of schizophrenic patients was impaired by comparison with 
performance of control subjects (Frank et al., 2001). 
Other studies have investigated self-face recognition in schizophrenia with the similar idea 
that this ability is linked to self-consciousness and that self-consciousness is altered in this 
disorder (Irani et al., 2006; Kircher, Seiferth, Plewnia, Baar, & Schwabe, 2007; Lee, Kwon, 
Shin, Lee, & Park, 2007). However, these studies have led to far less consistent outcomes 
than studies about self-monitoring and self-agency. In a face identification task, 
schizophrenic patients were slower and less accurate to identify their own face than control 
subjects. This deficit was related to deficit in a theory of mind task (i.e., another component 
of self-consciousness and effective social coordination), supporting the idea that these two 
abilities are linked (Irani et al., 2006). In another set of three experiments involving self-face 
recognition in different conditions of presentation time, response hand, and location of 
presentation (Kircher et al., 2007), schizophrenic patients showed only few alterations of 
performance by comparison with control subjects. They made more errors when their own 
face was presented to their right hemifield (i.e., to their left cerebral hemisphere) compared 
to when other familiar or unfamiliar faces were presented and when compared to 
performance of control subjects. The authors nonetheless concluded to a specific alteration 
of self-face recognition in schizophrenia. Finally, in another study using a visual search 
task, self-face recognition was spared in schizophrenic patients. Indeed, although their 
reaction times were slower overall than those of control subjects when looking for objects, 
famous faces or self-face, they found their self-face faster than famous faces (Lee et al., 
2007).  
All these findings suggest that alteration of self-processing in schizophrenia is task-
dependent (Lee et al., 2007). This is in line with Kircher and Leube (2003)’s conclusion that 
alterations of specific sub-systems (e.g., their function being for instance to represent the 
physical or mental outcomes of one’s actions and thoughts) composing a more general self-
system underlie the various symptoms found in schizophrenia, rather than a general 
disturbance of this self-system. The connections between these sub-systems would result 
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in the experience of being a self in healthy subjects and these connections might be 
disrupted in schizophrenia.  
This hypothesis is supported by neuroimaging studies showing that cerebral areas 
supposedly implied in self-consciousness show anomalous specificities in schizophrenic 
patients. This is the case of midline cortical regions showing abnormal pattern of activity 
(Harrison, Yücel, Pujol, & Pantelis, 2007) or of the prefrontal cortex presenting a smaller 
grey matter volume (Sapara et al., 2007) in schizophrenic patients by comparison with 
healthy subjects. Moreover, relations between the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and 
the medial frontal cortex, two regions playing important functional role in self-consciousness 
(see Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004), seem to be strongly lowered or even abolished in 
schizophrenic patients (Salgado-Pineda et al., 2007). 
Self-referential stimuli and tasks can therefore be of crucial importance to understand this 
intriguing illness further. The examination of performance of patients in tasks implying self-
processing seem a promising way to point out their specific difficulties ultimately allowing 
the establishment of targeted treatment strategies. 
5.2. Self-processing and disorders of consciousness 
After partially recovering from coma, some severely brain damaged patients are in a state 
characterized by wakefulness but without presenting any sign of explicit consciousness or 
self-consciousness. It is thus crucial from ethical and clinical points of view to find an 
efficient way to evaluate their state. Self-referential stimuli have sometimes been used to 
assess residual self-consciousness in these non-communicative patients. It seems that 
cerebral responses measured with electrophysiological and neuroimaging techniques 
during presentation of self-referential stimuli allow a more objective estimation of 
responsiveness in these patients than bedside observation (see Laureys, Perrin, & Brédart, 
2007, for a review).  
For thirty years, one’s own name has been shown to elicit differential brain response by 
comparison with other stimuli in healthy subjects, as measured by event-related potentials - 
ERPs (Fischler, Jin, Boaz, Perry, & Childers, 1987; see also Berlad & Pratt, 1995; Folmer & 
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Yingling, 1997; Perrin et al., 2005). More recently, it has been shown that the patient’s own 
name is also more efficient than other non-self-referential stimuli to elicit neuronal and 
behavioural responses in non-communicative patients (see Laureys et al., 2007), and even 
more if it is spoken by a familiar voice (Holeckova, Fischer, Giard, Delpuech, & Morlet, 
2006). In this context, the presentation of the own name is thus of particular interest to try to 
determine the seriousness of patient’s cerebral damage.  
In a recent study (Perrin et al., 2006), ERPs recorded during self-name presentation 
showed that some (i.e., 3 out of 5) vegetative state patients (VS, i.e., awake but unaware of 
the environment or of the self) can present the typical P300 wave observed during cognitive 
processing of deviant stimuli in healthy subjects. This P300 was observed in all those in a 
minimally conscious state (MCS, i.e., awake and presenting only minimal signs of 
awareness of the environment and of the self). However, with the difference between MSC 
and VS patients being non-significant, the authors concluded that this ERP component is 
not usable to discriminate VS and MCS patients efficiently. Moreover, this partially 
preserved P300 response is not necessarily a sign of self-consciousness since it does not 
demonstrate that these patients explicitly recognize their own name. Indeed it might be that 
this response only reflects a conditioned orienting response (Laureys et al., 2007). Self-
referential stimuli are thus useful stimuli to enhance chances of eliciting responsiveness in 
coma survivors but it is to date difficult to conclude about their efficiency to measure self-
consciousness per se in these patients. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that 
responsiveness to these stimuli by VS patients could also have a prognostic value for their 
evolution to MSC (see Di et al., 2007). 
5.3. Brain alterations and self-related misidentifications 
Some neurological conditions3 can generate specific disorders of the self (see Feinberg & 
Keenan, 2005 for a review). These conditions “alter the relationship between the individual 
and their body as seen directly or in a mirror, or their personal relationship to significant 
                                                          
3 Note that delusional misidentifications can actually have various origins ranging from psychiatric 
disorders to organic illnesses (e.g., Ellis & Lewis, 2001; Henriet, Haouzir, & Petit, 2008). 
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persons, places, or objects in their environment” (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005, p. 665) and 
have been labelled “delusional misidentification syndrome” (DMS). They would imply 
dissociation between recognition and identification processes (Ellis & Lewis, 2001; 
Papageorgiou, Lykouras, Ventouras, Uzunoglu, & Christodoulou, 2002).  
In the Capgras syndrome, patients correctly identify a familiar face but have the delusional 
belief that the person is actually an impostor that has taken the place of the familiar person 
(hypoidentification, see Ellis & Lewis, 2001 for a review). This syndrome would result from a 
lack of appropriate emotional reactions to the familiar persons even though facial 
information is processed adequately (Young, Reid, Wright, & Hellawell, 1993). These 
delusional misidentifications can also concern objects, places or parts of one’s own body - 
often the upper limb (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Paysant, Beis, Le Chapelain, & André, 
2004). This last case has been labelled asomatognosia. Conversely, in the Frégoli 
syndrome, the patient believes that a familiar person is taking the appearance of another 
unfamiliar person (hyperidentification). This delusional misidentification can also concern 
the patient him or herself (Feinberg, Eaton, Roane, & Giacino, 1999). These DMS often 
follow alterations of the right hemisphere, particularly of the frontal and also parietal 
cortices, which might therefore play an important role in self-consciousness (Feinberg & 
Keenan, 2005; see also Miller et al., 2001 for a similar claim following the observation of 
changes in self in patients with frontotemporal dementia). 
Difficulties with self-recognition can also be observed following neurodegenerative disease 
such as Alzheimer’s dementia (AD), concurrently with the disappearance of explicit self-
consciousness. Here the misidentification in the mirror rather results from a deficit in 
reasoning (Brédart & Young, 2004). Indeed, some patients lose the ability to recognize 
themselves in the mirror and identify their reflection as another person while they can still 
recognize other people (Bologna & Camp, 1997; Breen, Caine, & Coltheart, 2001). 
However, this “mirror sign” appears in a larger context of cognitive deterioration (and among 
other kinds of misidentification, see Nagaratnam, Irving, & Kalouche, 2003). It seems that 
this absence of self-recognition results from the fact that the patients become unable to 
understand the mirror spatial relations and unable to conceive that the mirror shows their 
own reflection (Breen et al., 2001; de Ajuriaguerra, Strejilevitch, & Tissot, 1963). They can 
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interact with their reflection as if it was another person or show paranoid reactions. Some 
authors have even suggested that so-called “delusional misidentification syndroms” should 
not be considered as a syndrome but rather as a symptom (Nagaratnam et al., 2003), which 
seem quite obvious in Alzheimer’s disease case. Some intervention can take place in order 
to help patients recover mirror self-recognition capacity but of course, due to the nature of 
the disease, its effect is temporary (Bologna & Camp, 1997). However, this last point maybe 
highlights the possibility of a residual self-consciousness in these patients in the absence of 
explicit spontaneous self-recognition and their responsiveness to self-referential stimuli 
might be assessed with electrophysiological measures (Folmer & Yingling, 1997). 
By contrast with what has been shown with mirror self-recognition, it seems that patients 
with moderate to severe AD have less difficulties to identify pictures of their own face or 
their written own names than pictures or names of other people (i.e. their fellow residents). 
However, they had less difficulties with their printed own name than with pictures of their 
own face (the same was true with stimuli related to their fellow residents, Gross et al., 
2004). The authors suggest that this might be because the own name is more stable across 
life than the own face. Accordingly, it has been shown recently that the deficit of self-
recognition from pictures at a late-stage of AD is temporally graded. Indeed, a study 
conducted on a patient with late-stage AD have shown that she had a residual ability to 
recognise pictures taken in her twenties whereas she could not recognise pictures taken 
recently (Hehman, German, & Klein, 2005). Of course, self-recognition deficit is linked to 
the evolution of the disease and increases as the disease progresses. It rather occurs at 
later stages of the disease (Bologna & Camp, 1997; Breen et al., 2001; de Ajuriaguerra et 
al., 1963; Grewal, 1994; Molchan, Martinez, Lawlor, Grafman, & Sunderland, 1990).  
By contrast with DMS, prosopagnosia is a specific facial recognition impairment. It is 
characterized by an inability to process facial information and to recognize familiar people. 
This inability extends to the patient’s own face (Brédart & Young, 2004). However, 
reasoning ability is intact and prosopagnosic patients remain able to identify familiar 
persons on basis of other clues such as gait, voice, or clothes. Similarly, when facing a 
mirror they understand without difficulty that they are the source of the mirror reflection (de 
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Ajuriaguerra et al., 1963). Even though self-face processing is altered in this condition, it is 
not a specific alteration of the self since it generalizes to all familiar faces. 
It is interesting to note here that these difficulties with face identification or recognition can 
sometimes exist in healthy subjects. Brédart and Young (2004) asked students to report 
cases in which they experienced transient difficulties to recognize themselves or felt a 
strange impression when seeing their own face. They found that these experiences could 
be related to some disorders described above. For instance, some participants reported 
that they did not recognize their own face on pictures or on videos but inferred that it was 
themselves because of the context or their memory of the event depicted. This recognition 
failure can be related to that experienced by prosopagnosic patients. Other participants 
reported having experienced a transitory mirror-sign in the sense that they misidentified 
their mirror reflection as another person. However, such experiences generally occurred 
when they did not notice the presence of a mirror. Finally some participants reported 
recognizing their own face but with a feeling of strangeness (i.e., because the image they 
were seeing did not match their representation of themselves, see also Section 2.1. of 
Chapter 2) as can be experienced by Capgras patients. None of those participants reported 
reality monitoring difficulties as can be found in patients with dementia or in some DMS. 
This study thus highlights the importance of decisional processes in conditions entailing 
impairments of face recognition and identification. 
Some authors claim that the examination of the neurobiology underlying all these conditions 
might represent ways to understand further the neurobiology of the self and self-
consciousness (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005). However, as we have seen in this section, self-
related deficits associated with these various neurological conditions are actually often 
parts of larger cognitive and/or emotional impairment. Moreover, “disruption to any given 
area is rarely an isolated event” (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005, p. 673). In most cases, it might 
therefore be difficult to strictly link self alterations with specific brain lesions. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
Through this section one has probably noted that disrupted processing of self-referential 
stimuli is often linked to disrupted self-consciousness or to an altered sense of self. These 
alterations of self-processing often found their origin in functional (e.g., in schizophrenia) 
and/or anatomical troubles of brain organization and architecture (e.g., in acute brain lesion 
or schizophrenia). This probably illustrates, as previous sections did, that self-
consciousness and its various levels of manifestation are related to the nature and level of 
encephalization of the human brain. However, each of the condition reviewed above has its 
own specificities. As a consequence, all self-referential stimuli are not as appropriate as 
each other to study impairment of self-processing in all these cases (for instance visual self-
recognition is certainly not the most impaired feature of self-consciousness and self-
processing alterations are often quite extended in the cases mentioned here) and they can 
be used with different purposes.  
Indeed, among all these conditions some only imply alterations of some aspects of self-
consciousness while other are intact (for instance visual self-face recognition can be 
relatively preserved while self-monitoring is more impaired in schizophrenia). Patient’s 
reactions (behavioural or neurophysiological response) to self-referential stimuli are then 
examined either to understand their condition and ultimately help them to cope with it, or to 
get new insights about the functions of self-consciousness and how it emerges in the brain. 
Conversely other conditions imply alterations of more if not all aspects of self-
consciousness (such as in vegetative state or dementia) but in a context of general 
cognitive impairment. In such cases of non-communicative patients, researchers take 
advantage of the salience of self-referential stimuli to try to find signs of self-consciousness 
(or at least of responsiveness) otherwise difficult to detect. 
6. Conclusion 
We have started this chapter by trying to define self-consciousness. We have seen that 
self-consciousness is a multi-faceted concept covering the simplest forms of self-world 
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differentiation to the most elaborate forms of knowledge about oneself as a part of a 
broader social environment. The lesson one should probably have learnt throughout this 
chapter is that having a clear definition of self-consciousness before starting to investigate it 
is crucial. Indeed a lack of precise definition and of positioning about the specific level of 
self-consciousness one is examining has probably been a main source of recurring debates 
in the literature. Self-consciousness encompasses so many aspects that it is difficult to 
study it in its entirety.  
In this chapter we asked whether self-referential stimuli could constitute an efficient way to 
study self-consciousness. An overall answer might be “yes, sometimes, but on the condition 
one knows exactly what one is studying”. Indeed, a result of the multiplicity of the concept 
of self-consciousness is that specific self-referential stimuli or self-referential processing 
can probably not allow studying it in its entirety. Depending on the type of stimulus and of 
the task at play, different aspects of self-consciousness will be examined. For instance, a 
self-face recognition task is of little use to understand how people define their own goals or 
values throughout their lives (Morin, 2002, 2007). 
In this thesis, we are mainly interested in visual presentation of self-referential stimuli (i.e., 
the own face or body). We have seen in the present chapter that these stimuli can be used 
to study some aspects of self-consciousness but certainly not the more elaborated and 
abstract ones as they mostly refer to one’s own physical appearance. Even if the physical 
appearance provides fundamental information about one’s own identity and may be crucial 
to build a united representation about oneself, only a kinaesthetic representation of one’s 
own body is necessary and sufficient for its self-conscious processing.  
Still we have seen throughout this chapter, that the use of visual self-referential stimuli is 
useful to test nonverbal or preverbal organisms (Bard et al., 2006). The fields of studies 
reviewed above have shown that the processing of self-referential stimuli can be used 
(more or less successfully) to detect self-consciousness in those cases in which the 
organism is not able to communicate explicitly about its own self-consciousness (animals 
and infants). By doing so, comparative studies have found that self-recognition (and 
therefore possibly an elaborated form of self-consciousness) is limited to animals with 
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sufficient levels of encephalization and corollary of cognitive abilities. Developmental 
studies have also abundantly used visual presentation of self-referential stimuli and have 
elaborated thoughtful theories of self-consciousness from children’s reactions to these 
stimuli. Salience of self-referential stimuli is also useful to assess severely brain damaged 
patients (Laureys et al., 2007) or patients with neurodegenerative diseases. However, in the 
context of general cognitive impairment, little can be inferred about self-consciousness. 
Finally, we have seen that presentation of self-related stimuli is a (the unique?) way to elicit 
self-related response in the brain. Researchers have investigated which regions of the brain 
are particularly involved during self-processing in healthy subjects or which regions are 
impaired in patients with a disorder implying some disruption of self-processing to infer the 
neural correlates of self-consciousness. 
Cautious researchers might therefore keep in mind the exact definition of what they are 
studying and avoid drawing over ambitious conclusions from their specific findings. Only 
after this step is achieved can an integrated work be possible. Neuroscientists have already 
embarked on this, specifically trying to extract common neural signatures of self-
consciousness from existing studies. But will this approach be successful, to date very little 
is known about functions of self-consciousness and how this subjective feeling can emerge 
from time to time in a more or less complex form from the organic matter of the brain. 
Now, after questioning the possibility of studying self-consciousness with self-referential 
stimuli, another legitimate question arises. This question concerns the specificity of these 
stimuli. Are they really special and different from other stimuli? This is an important question 
because if it is not the case, this would in turn question their use for a proper evaluation of 
self-consciousness. 
 
 Chapter 2 
DO SELF-REFERENTIAL STIMULI POSSESS 
SPECIFIC PROPERTIES? 
1. Origin of the question 
Another wave of research has studied self-referential stimuli, with the assumption that they 
constitute a special class of stimuli. Similar hypotheses have been formulated regarding 
other classes of stimuli such as faces (Bruce & Young, 1998; Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; but 
see Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998). In the case of self-referential stimuli, this claim 
probably results from the hypothesis that information pertaining to ourselves, with the 
privateness and subjectiveness that it implies (see previous chapter), is different and has 
unique properties in comparison with other kinds of information. However, it has been 
shown recently that evidence is to date insufficient to support such a claim (for a review, 
see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). In the present chapter, we will therefore examine whether self-
referential stimuli possess specific properties by comparison with non-self-referential stimuli 
and if they really are processed differently. We will approach this question with regard to 
three main topics. The first one will concern the memory domain and the way self-referential 
stimuli are represented. The second point will address the question of neural correlates 
subtending processing and representation of self-referential stimuli. Finally, in a last point, 
the attentional properties of self-referential stimuli will be examined. Throughout this 
chapter, our interest will mainly reside with the self-face but other kinds of self-referential 
stimuli will also be briefly discussed when appropriate. 
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2. Representations of self-referential stimuli in memory 
In their review examining whether the self is special, Gillihan and Farah (2005) distinguish 
physical and psychological aspects of self and self-related stimuli. As already mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the self-face and the physical appearance in general pertain to 
physical aspects of oneself. Other characteristics such as knowledge about oneself or 
autobiographical memory rather refer to psychological aspects. Contrary to Gillihan and 
Farah that mainly reported data relative to the psychological self, here we will particularly 
look at data relative to one’s physical aspects and how they are represented. 
2.1. Special representation of one’s own physical appearance? 
Representation of the self-face 
Even though our own face is a face just like any other to other people’s eyes, this is not the 
case from our own perspective. Indeed, unlike other faces, we cannot see our own face 
directly. Because our eyes are part of our face, we need a reflecting surface to see it 
(Gregory, 2001). Therefore, we mainly see ourselves through mirrors and also occasionally 
on pictures or on videos. This physical constraint implies that we do not access the same 
variety of viewpoints, luminosity conditions, facial configuration changes, emotional 
expressions and so on as for other faces. In other words, the experience we have of our 
own face is different from that we have of other faces. Several studies reviewed below have 
tried to investigate whether these unique physical constraints affect the way our own face is 
represented in memory and as a consequence the way it is recognized (in order to be able 
to recognize an object from memory, a mental representation of this object must first be 
constructed). 
Thirty years ago, Mita, Dermer, and Knight (1977) offered some of the first experimental 
evidence of the consequence of the perceptual constraints concerning our own face. They 
were interested in the generality of mere-exposure effects consisting in increasing one’s 
evaluation of a stimulus after having been repeatedly exposed to this stimulus. They 
presented their participants with pictures depicting their own face either in a normal or in a 
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mirror orientation. Participants were asked to judge which image they preferred. The same 
judgment has to be made by participants’ lover or friend. It appeared, in line with mere-
exposure hypothesis, that participants preferred the mirror image version of their own face 
while their friend and lover preferred the normal version. In another study (Rhodes, 1986) 
using a similar procedure and where participants had to indicate which picture (normal or 
mirror-reversed) was most representative of themselves, participants also chose the mirror-
oriented version more often than the normal picture. In a second experiment, participants 
had to make the same judgment between two face composites (one made up of the left half 
of the face, and another one made up of the right half of the face). This time, no difference 
was found between the two conditions.  
More recently however, a similar setting also including face composites showed that 
participants tended to choose a composite face made up of the right hemi-face as most 
representative of themselves but also of their friend (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 2004). 
However, the difference between both cases resides in the fact that in the first case (one’s 
own face) the right hemi-face lays in one’s right hemifield when looking in the mirror while 
the reverse is true for the latter case (i.e., the right hemi-face of someone else lays in one’s 
left hemifield when looking at him or her). This suggests the existence of a differential 
hemispheric bias for both types of faces (see Section 3 of the present chapter). Moreover, 
when asked to choose between a normal or a mirror-reversed picture the one that fit more 
with their representation of themselves, participants chose their own face as a mirrored-
image. 
This team conducted another study using a similar procedure including composite faces but 
replaced the judgment from memory by a matching task (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 
2005). Participants had to judge which composite looked more like an original picture 
presented simultaneously either in normal or mirror-reversed orientation. Choices for the 
self-face was at random level in both cases maybe reflecting the fact that we see our own 
face in the mirror but also on pictures. In agreement with their previous study, when the 
friend’s face was concerned and presented in its usual normal orientation, 80% of 
participants chose the composite made up of the right hemi-face (lying in the observer’s left 
hemifield). However, when the original face was presented in a mirror-reversed orientation, 
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this bias towards the hemi-face lying in the left hemifield was reduced to 62%, which 
indicates a competition occurring between the perceptual process and the memory 
representation. These findings suggest that information about configuration and global 
orientation of familiar faces is represented in memory.  
Taken together, most of these results indicate that the way we mainly see our own face 
directly influences the way it is represented in memory, i.e. with a mirror-reversed 
orientation. However, the same is true about other personally familiar faces that are also 
represented the way we see them when facing them. As such, it would appear premature to 
claim that the representation of the self-face in memory is special. We can imagine that 
similar physical constraints applied to other objects have comparable consequences. For 
instance, we can reasonably assume that Continental Europeans and Americans have a 
representation of dashboards with the steering wheel located on the left and the glove 
compartment on the right. By contrast, British people or Australians must have a reversed 
representation with the steering wheel on the right. Unfortunately, we have not found 
studies that have investigated this topic in the literature. 
In another study investigating more precisely the type of information used to judge the most 
usually encountered view of the self-face (i.e., mirror view) and of a friend’s face (i.e., 
normal view), it has been shown that this information is not the same in both cases 
(Brédart, 2003). Indeed, even though judgment accuracy was similar for both faces, 
participants tended to use asymmetrically located cues such as scars or moles for their own 
face. By contrast, they rather used the global configural information for the other familiar 
face. Other perceptual consequences of our main exposition to frontal view of our own face 
through mirrors have been reported. For instance, a study has shown that we tend to 
underestimate our own nose’s size (Thompson, 2002). Indeed, when asked to represent 
their nose length on a vertical line, participants drew it about 12% shorter than the actual 
size. Thompson explains this finding by the observation that the edge of noses forms a 
certain angle from the vertical but that noses are perceived as a vertical line when faces are 
viewed from a frontal viewpoint. This results in a perceived shortened size by comparison 
with the actual size. Participants also tended to overestimate the distance separating their 
two pupils by 32%. However, this finding could not be explained by the same account and 
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the reason for it is still unknown. Unfortunately, this experiment did not include other faces 
and these effects might apply to other faces as well. 
All the studies reported so far investigated representation of familiar faces as seen from a 
frontal viewpoint. However, as we already mentioned, the physical constraints pertaining to 
our own face result in a more restricted range of viewpoints (i.e. near-frontal view in most 
cases) by comparison with other faces that we can see all the way around. This also 
directly affects the canonical view (i.e., the position in which an object is the most easily 
identifiable) of our own face (Laeng & Rouw, 2001; Troje & Kersten, 1999). One study 
examined the time necessary to name one’s own face and colleagues’ faces presented in 
frontal and in profile views (Troje & Kersten, 1999). Results showed that participants were 
faster to name their own face than the other faces, presumably because their own name 
was more familiar than the other names. In addition, they were faster to name their face in 
the frontal view than in the profile view whereas this view effect was non-significant for the 
other familiar faces (even if the same trend than for the self-face was observed). According 
to the authors, this suggests that familiar faces and more generally familiar objects are 
represented in a viewer-centred way rather than in a viewpoint-independent or object-
centred way. 
In another study, the canonical view of familiar faces was investigated more precisely by 
including intermediate viewpoints (i.e., 22.5° and 45° deviations on a vertical axis from the 
frontal view) between frontal and profile views (Laeng & Rouw, 2001). Participants 
performed a face-name matching task on faces varying in their degree of familiarity (i.e. 
recently learned face, moderately familiar face, highly familiar face and self-face). Results 
showed that participants were the fastest with their own face presented frontally by 
comparisons with other orientations whereas they responded globally faster with the other 
familiar faces for views deviated by 22.5°. However, for highly familiar faces (i.e. a friend’s 
face) frontal and 22.5° views elicited similar performance. Consistently with Troje and 
Kersten (1999)’s conclusion, these results suggest that representation of faces is viewer-
centred (see also Ewbank, Smith, Hancock, & Andrews, 2008; but see Eger, 
Schweinberger, Dolan, & Henson, 2005; Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & 
Vuilleumier, 2005 that showed that this effect is modulated by familiarity) and that the 
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differences observed between the self-face and other faces reflect differential visual 
experience between those faces (here again we can imagine that people tend to represent 
dashboards rather from a frontal viewpoint just as the self-face). 
Another consequence of our eyes being part of our own face is that we do not access the 
same range of facial configurations resulting from various facial (emotional) expressions. 
This might also influence the representation we have of our own emotional facial 
expressions. Studies interested in familiar face processing have shown that facial 
expressions influence the recognition of familiar faces (Endo, Endo, Kirita, & Kinya, 1992; 
Gallegos & Tranel, 2005; Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2004; Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 
2004; Kirita & Endo, 2001). However, there are only a few studies regarding the self-face. 
Brédart and Young (2004) have examined the everyday difficulties people can experience 
with self-face recognition. They have reported that people sometimes recognized 
themselves but perceived some unusual aspects (e.g. when a picture of their own face did 
not correspond to the image they have of it). In most cases, this unusual aspect was due to 
the facial expression of the self-face and to the fact that people did not know that their face 
looked this way when showing a particular expression.  
In 1979, Yarmey conducted a study on self-recognition of facial poses. He assessed 
whether people are able to recognize certain facial configurations that they project to give a 
certain image of themselves to others as a function of the social situation (i.e., sociable, 
intelligent and trustworthy poses). He also hypothesized that by contrast to these changing 
representations we might have a representation of our “real self”, i.e. a prototypical 
representation of ourselves. He examined which facial pose better approximated the 
participants’ “real self” by asking them to pick up the best picture of their “real self” among 
the various self-pictures. Women mostly chose pictures where they projected a sociable 
self while men chose the sociable as well as the trustworthy poses. In a subsequent 
memory test, he found that people better recognized sociable poses (65% accuracy), then 
trustworthy poses (45%), and finally intelligent poses (42.5%). Moreover, women were 
better than men at recognizing their real self and their most sociable poses. These two 
studies furnish interesting insight about our knowledge of the way we look like when 
expressing specific facial poses or emotional expressions. They indicate that this 
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knowledge is not perfect. However, they do not give direct comparison about our capacity to 
accurately deal with other familiar people’s facial expressions and poses. 
In her study involving facial composites described above, Rhodes (1986) found that the 
participants’ preferential choice towards the mirror-reversed version of their own picture was 
no longer present for smiling faces. With regard to smiling pictures of other highly familiar 
persons, participants rather chose the normal-oriented pictures. This might also result from 
the specific experience related to one’s own face. On the one hand, we usually have a 
neutral expression in front of the mirror and we rarely see ourselves showing emotional 
facial expression but on the second hand, we usually smile on pictures. The two types of 
experience might thus compete when participants have to judge smiling pictures (Rhodes, 
1986).  
All the studies reviewed above thus indicate that the particular experience we have with our 
own face seems to affect the way it is represented in memory. Apparently, we just represent 
it the same way we usually perceive it. However, these studies do not really lead to the 
conclusion that the self-face is special and processed in a qualitatively different way from 
other faces. In addition, it is well documented in the literature that familiar faces elicit 
different patterns of performance by comparison with unfamiliar faces, at least on specific 
tasks (Ellis, Sheperd, & Davies, 1979; Megreya & Burton, 2006; Young, Hay, McWeeny, 
Flude, & Ellis, 1985), and that unfamiliar faces that become familiar will undergo changes in 
the way they are processed (Bonner, Burton, & Bruce, 2003). The self-face might just be a 
hyper-familiar face (e.g., just like our mother or partner’s faces) that we access in a 
particular way. Research on object perception has also brought some data in favour of 
viewer-centred representation of objects other than faces (Tarr & Pinker, 1990; Wilson & 
Farah, 2003) or scenes (Garsoffky, Schwan, & Hesse, 2002) in some situations. Therefore, 
at this point, we cannot conclude about the specificity of the self-face. Moreover, we have 
still only sparse information about the robustness and efficacy of the representation of our 
own face. 
That is what Tong and Nakayama (1999) investigated using visual search tasks. They 
introduced the concept of “robust representation” to define the representations 
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characterising highly familiar faces. They characterise robust representations according to 
five properties (p.1017): They “(1) mediate rapid asymptotic visual processing; (2) require 
extensive visual experience to develop; (3) contain some abstract or view-invariant 
information; (4) facilitate a variety of visual and decisional processes across tasks and 
contexts; and (5) demand less attentional resources”. Tong and Nakayama confirmed their 
view that the self-face benefits from a robust representation by showing that the self-face 
was found as target or rejected as distractor in a faces-array more quickly than stranger’s 
faces. This was true even after hundreds of trials (allowing the stranger’s face to get more 
and more familiar during the time course of the experiment) and when faces were 
presented in atypical orientations (i.e., three-quarter and profile views, or upside-down 
orientation). This study therefore shows that the physical constraints relative to our own 
face do not prevent it from benefiting of an efficient representation. However, as no other 
highly familiar faces were included as control in this study, it does not inform us whether 
this robust representation being specific to the self-face or not.  
Advantages in terms of reaction times for the self-face relative to other familiar faces have 
nonetheless been reported elsewhere in various situations (Keenan et al., 1999; Sui, Zhu, & 
Han, 2006; Troje & Kersten, 1999; but see Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Platek et al., 2006). 
However, previous researchers did not document the accuracy or the preciseness of the 
representation of the self-face that could be different from that of another familiar face 
(maybe Thompson, 2001’s study constitutes an exception to that point but it did not include 
other familiar faces). Determining accuracy of the representation of our own face will be one 
of the practical aims of this work (See Chapter 4). 
Studies presented above focused on visual recognition of one’s own face. Some 
researches have been conducted to examine the relationship between visual self-face 
recognition and other sensorial modalities. In a recent study, Casey and Newell (2005) have 
investigated whether robust visual representation and long-term familiarity characterising 
one’s own face can be shared across different sensorial modalities. They built plaster 
models of their participants’ faces and asked them to recognize their own face model from 
touch among seven other distractor model faces in a line-up procedure. Participants 
performed at chance and were unable to recognize their own face only tactically. However, 
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performance increased when they were allowed to touch their own face beforehand. The 
best performance however was found when participants had to visually recognise the model 
made up from their own face. In a second experiment, they used a different visual-tactile 
matching procedure employing recently learned and novel faces. They found better cross-
modal matching performance for familiar faces by comparison with unfamiliar faces. 
Authors conclude that the shape of one’s own face is not represented in memory and that 
high familiarity of one’s own face does not elicit multi-sensory recognition. They also posit 
that the representation of one’s own face might be qualitatively different from representation 
of other faces. However, their study does not allow such a conclusion since no direct 
comparison between participants’ ability to tactically recognise their own face and another 
familiar face was allowed by their design. Moreover, recognising one’s own face in such 
conditions is totally different from encoding conditions that can be found during a real-life 
tactile exploration of one’s own face since touching our own face is characterised by this 
unique double-touch condition (Rochat, 2003). 
Platek, Thomson, and Gallup (2004) adopted what could be qualified as a converse 
approach and examined whether the recognition of the self-face can be affected by other 
self-related information from other sensorial modalities. To do so, they exposed their 
participants with their own odour (versus another odour) and with their own name (versus 
other names; a familiar and an unfamiliar name) presented visually or aurally while they 
were performing a face identification task. They found that all three self-related kinds of 
information facilitated self-face recognition in terms of reaction times by comparison with a 
control situation with no prime. They did not find the same facilitation effect for either 
familiar or unfamiliar faces. They concluded that this particular cross-modal facilitation for 
the self-face argues in favour of a highly integrated cerebral network dedicated to the self. 
However, as Brédart (2004) has noted, this cross-modal facilitation is not specific to the 
self-face and has been demonstrated with other faces (see for instance Ellis, Jones, & 
Mosdell, 1997). Platek, Thomson, et al. (2004)’s results can therefore not advocate for a 
qualitative difference between the processing of one’s own face and the processing of other 
faces. Brédart (2004) posits that these results rather reflect a quantitative difference in the 
sense that this cross-modal facilitation could just be higher for self-face recognition than for 
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other face recognition. More precisely, the integration process might be more complete for 
ourselves than for other people due to our expertise on ourselves. 
Representation of the self-body 
Just as it is the case with our own face, we have a particular experience of our own body, 
but not in the same sense. Contrary to our own face, we can see our own body directly (at 
least most of its parts). Unlike other bodies however, we see it from above, in a kind of 
upside-down way (Gregory, 2001). On some occasion, we can see it from head to toe in 
mirrors or on photographs but probably less frequently than our own face. Only few studies 
have examined how our own body-shape or body parts other than the self-face are 
represented in memory (see Gillihan & Farah, 2005).  
One early study investigated the stability and accuracy of the body-image by means of a 
mechanically distortable mirror (Traub & Orbach, 1964). The authors noted that even if from 
a physical point of view our body is relatively stable during adulthood its representation 
might be quite plastic since body-perception changes can occur in various situations in 
healthy subjects (e.g., under influence of hallucinogenic drugs, in situations of sensory 
deprivation, fatigue, stress, and so on) or in pathological populations. They used a mirror 
deformable on the vertical and horizontal axis that participants had to adjust by means of 
four three-position switches until they obtain their undistorted reflection. They compared 
performance of healthy subjects and psychiatric inpatients and found that most of them 
were able to correctly adjust their reflection. Three psychiatric patients out of ten adjusted 
the mirror in a way their image was distorted and one left the room when he saw his 
distorted image. It appeared that participants who could not adjust the reflection accurately 
also had difficulties with other psychophysical tasks involving their body or other objects. 
The authors thus pertinently conclude that such cases do not constitute specific alteration 
of the body-image. Moreover, as no control task with other persons was included, it is 
difficult to conclude about the specificity of the representation of the self-body. 
Later, Collins (1981) tested the extent to which adolescents were able to identify their body 
accurately and which parts they judged important to identify themselves. He photographed 
his participants in three different positions, i.e., frontal, profile and rear orientations. One 
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month later he asked them to pick out their own full body (the head being occluded) or 
various body parts within arrays composed of several pictures. Results showed that 
females better recognized their full body than males, in all three orientations. Apart from the 
head that was the best recognized body part (100% accuracy except in the rear 
orientation), females made the most accurate judgments with their breasts and males with 
their genitals. The lower limbs were not important cues for identification. Moreover, males 
made their judgments quicker than females. Although interesting, this study did not include 
a familiarity control. Moreover, it did not report systematic analyses of the effect of the 
viewpoint. 
In a recent study Jokisch, Daum, and Troje (2006) addressed this question with dynamic 
stimuli. They were interested in the effect of the viewpoint on the recognition of one’s own 
body motions. They presented their participants with walking patterns represented as point-
light displays that had been acquired from a frontal, a half profile or a profile viewpoint. 
These walking patterns were their own or those of 11 other familiar persons (friends or 
colleagues) and participants were to identify and name the walker. First, it seems that the 
task was quite difficult since correct identification rates were around 25% but still above 
chance level. Nonetheless, it appeared that participants could identify themselves 
independently of the viewpoint while they better recognised other people from frontal and 
half profile views by comparison with the profile view. The authors suggest that these 
results may be due to our specific experience with our own movements and with others’ 
movements. Indeed, while we usually attend to others approaching us, increasing the 
exposure to frontal and half profile views, we might in our own case transfer our motor 
perceptions to visual representations. In other words, as in the case of the self-face, these 
differences of performance might just reflect a differential experience. 
In order to test whether the representation of one’s own body shape is reliable, Daury, 
Brooks, & Brédart (submitted) have used a psychophysical method involving pictures of the 
participants and their friends. In some pictures, the waist-to-hip ratio was modified by 
gradual steps of 2% up to 10%. Participants had to judge from memory whether the images 
were intact or altered. Results showed that the representation of one’s own body-shape is 
accurate but not very precise. Indeed, participants’ judgments on intact pictures were 
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similar in the recognition memory task and in a control perceptual discrimination task. 
However, they accepted as intact, bodies that had been altered to larger amplitude than 
participants from the perceptual discrimination task. Moreover, performance was similar for 
the own body shape and for the friend’s body shape. This study thus suggests that we 
represent our own body similarly to bodies of other familiar persons. 
In sum, to date the few existing studies do not allow a firm conclusion that the 
representation of one’s own body-shape is special by comparison with others. Also, 
unsurprisingly these data indicate that the identification from body-shapes and the memory 
representation of bodies is less reliable than the memory for faces. 
2.2. A word about other self-referential stimuli 
Contrary to the physical constraints touching our own face, we have a privileged access to 
psychological information about ourselves (e.g., our autobiographical memories, our 
personality traits, and so on). This can lead to increases of performance in tasks comparing 
self-referential information to non-self-referential information. The well known self-reference 
effect (SRE) illustrates this point. It consists in better memorising traits or other kinds of 
material when they have been encoded with reference to oneself than with other kinds of 
encoding (e.g., semantic encoding, for a review see Symons & Johnson, 1997). However, it 
has been shown that SRE is dramatically reduced or even eliminated when the self-
reference is compared to a reference to another familiar person (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; 
Kuiper, 1982). It seems that crucial factors for the emergence of SRE might be the 
elaboration and organization of the encoded information (Symons & Johnson, 1997) and 
these properties might not be specific to the self-reference (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). 
2.3. Conclusion 
We have seen throughout this chapter that we have special experience with self-related 
information. On the one hand, we clearly access our physical appearance in a different way 
than other people’s appearance (i.e., indirectly and mainly via mirrors for our own face, and 
directly but from above or via mirrors for our own body). However, this does not seem to 
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affect much the way we represent it in memory. When controls of familiarity are included 
(which is far from being systematically the case) allowing an accurate evaluation of the 
specificity of the self-face representation, the differences that are found between the self-
face and other faces clearly reflect the differential experience during encoding and 
construction of the representation. No data to date can really attest that these differences 
could not exist in other cases (as with the dashboards example).  
Moreover, we have seen that despite the particular way we access our own face its 
representation seems to be robust, at least in term of processing speed (Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999). Here again however, studies do not always allow us to disentangle 
simple familiarity effects from self-effects. In addition, existing data have not yet really 
tested the accuracy of the representation of one’s own face. In sum, we could say that 
particularities entailed by physical constraints related to our own physical appearance can 
have some consequences on the way it is represented. However, these consequences 
seem in line with more general characteristics of our visual system and could apply to other 
faces or objects. 
On the other hand, we have a privileged access to our own psychological aspects. This 
leads to good performance with self-related stimuli. However, the specificity of self-related 
stimuli is also questioned when adequate controls of familiarity effects are included (see 
Gillihan & Farah, 2005 for a review). 
Instead of examining the specificity of self-related representations, another way to address 
the question of the specificity of self-related information is to examine whether they involve 
specific brain areas by comparison with non-self-related information. 
3. Self-referential stimuli and the brain 
Now that we have examined the specificity of self-related information in the way they are 
represented, we will examine the neural correlates underlying the processing of these 
information and their representations. Indeed, even though we have seen that 
representations of self-referential stimuli do not seem qualitatively different from 
Specificities of self-referential stimuli 
 60 
representations of non-self-referential stimuli, it is still possible that both kinds of 
representations are subtended by different brain regions. Neural correlates of self-related 
processing have been examined in various ways such as behavioural experiments, event-
related brain potentials, PET scan, functional magnetic resonance imaging or examination 
of split-brain patients. This topic has recently benefited from a growing interest among the 
neuroscientific community. If one considers all the aspects and all kinds of information 
pertaining to the self, the increasing number of existing studies results in a huge literature. 
Therefore, we will not seek for exhaustiveness here and we will mainly remain focused on 
studies examining visual self-recognition. 
3.1. Neural correlates of visual self-recognition 
In recent years, brain regions involved in self-face recognition have been extensively 
studied. Controversies as to the hemispheric dominance of self-face recognition have 
emerged and a consensus about the precise anatomical locations implying this function has 
still to be found. A few studies interested in neural correlates of body-shape recognition 
have also been conducted. These studies are reviewed below. 
Behavioural data 
A first range of studies interested in the hemispheric dominance of self-face recognition 
have compared the performance of healthy participants with their right versus their left hand 
when responding to tasks implying the self-face. In a first study involving identification of 
three different faces (i.e., the self-face, another familiar face and a stranger’s face) 
presented upright or inverted, Keenan and colleagues (1999) found that participants 
responded faster to their own face with their left hand than in all other conditions that did not 
differ between each other (see also Keenan, Ganis, Freund, & Pascual-Leone, 2000). They 
concluded that self-referential stimuli could be processed differently in both hemispheres, 
preferentially in the right hemisphere. Indeed, because of a contralateral motor control, a 
better performance with one hand suggests the dominance of the opposite cerebral 
hemisphere in the task at hand (for a review see Brown & Marsden, 2001). According to 
Keenan et al., this effect could extend to other self-referential stimuli and reflect a “self-
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effect” rather than just a “self-face effect” (for reviews see also Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 
2003; Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000). The same right hemispheric bias 
was found by the same team in another study with another task involving categorisational 
judgments instead of reaction times (Keenan, Freund, Hamilton, Ganis, & Pascual-Leone, 
2000). In this study, participants were presented with movies showing two faces morphed 
together and gradually changing from the first face to the second face. Participants saw 
their own face or a co-worker’s face morphed with a famous face and had to push a button 
with their right or their left hand when they judged that the face became more famous than 
personally familiar (or the other way round when the movie started by a famous face). 
When participants responded with their left hand, they saw their own face earlier in the 
sequence when the movies began by a famous face and saw it longer when the movies 
began by their own face (and changed into a famous face) by comparison with other 
conditions involving their right hand or the co-worker’s face. In another study using a similar 
procedure with Chinese students (Ying, Jianli, & Jian, 2004) the same right hemispheric 
bias (or left-hand advantage) was found for the self-face but also for a friend’s face in some 
conditions (i.e., when the face changed from friend’s face to famous face but not in the 
reverse situation). This questions the specificity of this right hemispheric bias for the self-
face.  
This left-hand advantage for the self-face has nonetheless been replicated by others 
researchers from Keenan’s group (Platek & Gallup, 2002). They related the reaction times 
to a face identification task with scores on a questionnaire assessing schizotypal 
personality traits (i.e., the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire - SPQ) in a non-clinical 
population. The left-hand advantage for the self-face was found in individuals with a low 
score on the SPQ whereas a reversed right-hand advantage was found among individuals 
with a high score on the SPQ (i.e., individuals presenting schizotypal traits). According to 
Platek and Gallup, since the processing of self-related information presumably subtended 
by the right hemisphere is altered in schizophrenic patients, their study is an evidence of 
the relationship between self-face recognition, self-consciousness and the right 
hemisphere. Finally, in a study mentioned above (Platek, Thomson, et al., 2004, see 
Section 2.1. of this chapter), a left-hand advantage was found for the self-face during an 
identification task but no hand effect was found for other familiar or unfamiliar faces. 
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However, this effect was only observed in the control condition where no visual, auditory or 
olfactory primes were involved. 
This right hemispheric bias for the self-face has been questioned by other studies that have 
found the opposite bias or no hemispheric bias during self-face processing. In the study 
involving facial composites that we have already described above (see Section 2.1. of the 
present chapter), Brady and colleagues (2004) found that the self-face seems to be 
preferentially represented in the left hemisphere (the self-face’s most representative 
composite being made up of the hemi-face that lies in one’s right hemifield when looking in 
the mirror), while familiar faces would be represented in the right hemisphere (the friend’s 
face most representative composite being made up of the hemi-face that lies in the 
observer’s left hemifield when facing the person).  
In their study examining canonical views of familiar faces, Laeng and Rouw (2001, see 
Section 2.1.) were also interested in hemispheric dominances and presented the faces from 
each condition either in the observers’ right or left visual hemifield. They found that the left 
hemisphere processed canonical views of familiar faces (i.e., deviation of 22.5° from a 
frontal viewpoint) more efficiently than the right hemisphere whereas the right hemisphere 
was more efficient with non-canonical views. Conversely, no effect of visual field was found 
for the self-face (presented in canonical or non-canonical views) suggesting that it is 
processed similarly by both hemispheres. The Laeng and Rouw (2001)’s finding illustrates 
how variables such as degree of familiarity or orientation of the faces can dramatically 
affect results in terms of hemispheric dominance. Note that the studies showing 
hemispheric dominance during processing of familiar faces contrast with other studies that 
did not find such lateralisation (see for instance Kampf, Nachson, & Babkoff, 2002). 
Recently, using an adaptation paradigm, Rooney, Brady, and Benson (2007) found that 
viewing a highly distorted (i.e., compressed or expanded) stranger’s face for five minutes 
similarly impacted attractiveness ratings of the self-face and a friend’s face. Indeed, 
judgments of attractiveness on both altered familiar faces shifted in the direction of the 
adapting face. This indicates that the representation of the self-face and of other familiar 
faces is rapidly updated by visual experience. Even though this study does not give 
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information about hemispheric lateralisation, it nonetheless suggests that representations of 
the self-face and familiar faces are subtended by shared mechanisms and neural 
populations. 
Divided brain data 
Lateralisation of self-face processing have also been studied with other methods including 
examination of split-brain patients (Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, Lardi, & Lassonde, 2003; 
Sperry, Zaidel, & Zaidel, 1979; Turk et al., 2002; Uddin, Rayman, & Zaidel, 2005), Wada 
test (Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001) or repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation – rTMS (Théoret et al., 2004; Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & 
Iacoboni, 2006). The two first methods have in common the possibility to present the self-
face to one active cerebral hemisphere at a time and to examine its capacity to process the 
self-face efficiently. The third method offers the possibility to disable or on the contrary to 
stimulate a particular brain region and to examine the effect of this manipulation on the 
realisation of a task. Unfortunately, studies using these various techniques have also 
yielded contradictory results. 
Sperry and colleagues (1979) pioneered the area of hemispheric dominance with regard to 
self-information processing using split-brain patients. They have examined two of these 
patients and have shown that both hemispheres are capable of self-recognition when the 
self-face is presented unexpectedly. Moreover, they also found that both hemispheres 
could give similar responses to questions about preferences and knowledge concerning 
personal items, historical or political topics. More recently, Uddin, Rayman et al. (2005) also 
found that both hemispheres were capable of self-recognition. They presented a split-brain 
patient, NG, with morphed pictures. These morphs were either made up of NG’s face and 
an unfamiliar face or from another highly familiar face and an unfamiliar face. Twenty-one 
pictures were created for each pair of faces (i.e., 2 originals plus 19 intermediates). In a first 
condition, NG was asked to push a button if the picture looked more like herself and 
another if the picture looked more like an unknown face. In a second condition, she 
received similar instructions but with the other familiar face. Analysed data included 
sessions in which pictures were presented either on her right or on her left visual field and 
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where NG had to respond with the hand on the same side as that of the picture. Results 
showed no indication of a hemispheric specialisation for self-face recognition. By contrast, 
NG’s left hemisphere was unable to recognise the other familiar face and this face could 
only be recognised by the right hemisphere. 
In another study, Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, et al. (2003) have found a right hemisphere 
advantage for the self-face. They presented one patient, ML, with pictures depicting morphs 
of his own face with Bill Clinton’s face (11 gradations from 0 to 100%) or of another familiar 
face (i.e. a lab assistant) morphed with the same famous face (11 gradations). All 22 
pictures were presented in a random order at the centre of a monitor and ML had to look for 
his own face or for the other familiar face and to give his response either with his left or right 
hand. When he was instructed to judge whether parts of his own face were present in the 
morph, he recognised more pictures with his left hand than with his right hand and made 
more mistakes (i.e., chose a morph made up of the other familiar face) with his right hand. 
When he looked for the lab assistant’s face, he was more accurate with his right hand and 
made no mistakes. Keenan and colleagues concluded that the right hemisphere is more 
sensitive to self-face recognition than the left hemisphere. 
Keenan and colleagues drew the same conclusion from another study in which they used 
patients undergoing intracarotid amobarbital procedure (or Wada test). This test consists in 
anaesthetizing one cerebral hemisphere at a time to assess cerebral dominance of various 
cognitive functions before a surgical treatment of epilepsy. During this Wada test, 5 patients 
were shown a picture of their own face morphed with a celebrity’s face and asked to 
remember this picture. After they recovered from the anaesthetization they were shown the 
two original pictures (i.e., their own face and the famous face) and had to choose the one 
that has been presented beforehand. When the left hemisphere had been inactivated and 
that only the right hemisphere was still active, all 5 patients chose their own face. When the 
right hemisphere had been inactivated, 4 out of the 5 patients chose the famous face. In 
addition, similar results were found with healthy participants treated with TMS. The authors 
concluded that “it is conceivable that a right-hemisphere network gives rise to self-
awareness, which may be a hallmark of higher-order consciousness” (p. 305). 
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Finally, a study using another split-brain patient, JW, has however led to opposite 
conclusions (Turk et al., 2002). As in Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, et al. (2003)’s study, the 
patient face was morphed with other faces in order to obtain 11 morphs ranging from 0 to 
100 %. However, these other faces were those of two personally familiar people (one of the 
patient’s doctors - Michael Gazzaniga - and one of his associates). Here, the pictures were 
also presented in a random order but they were shown laterally to each hemisphere (the 
response hand however is not mentioned in the paper). JW was instructed to judge if the 
picture depicted himself in one condition or MG in the other condition. Results showed that 
both of JW’s hemispheres were capable of self-recognition. However, the right hemisphere 
preferentially recognised the other familiar face while the left hemisphere preferentially 
recognised the self-face. 
These studies involving split-brain patients reviewed above cannot bring consensus as to 
the lateralisation of self-face recognition. It is always difficult to generalise findings resulting 
from the examination of one or couples of patients, but it is even more puzzling when 
different studies lead to different conclusions. Moreover, one might have noted that the 
procedures used to present the stimuli to one cerebral hemisphere at a time, or to involve 
one cerebral hemisphere at a time during patients’ responses were different across all 
these studies. They have used various combinations of lateralised versus central 
presentation and different response-hands. This might not help in finding converging 
evidence. 
Hemispheric biases for self-face recognition have also been studied with rTMS. This 
technique allows the demonstration of causal relationships between neural regions and 
self-recognition. Indeed, virtual lesions can be created in chosen regions and effects of this 
manipulation can be compared to an absence of manipulation. Uddin et al. (2006) found 
that the right inferior parietal lobule is implicated during self-face recognition. They used a 
low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation to inhibit activity of this region 
and found that this manipulation decreased the sensitivity of participants to detect their own 
face among morphed images of themselves and another highly familiar person. This 
manipulation had no effect when it was applied on the same region on the left side.  
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Implication of the right hemisphere has been found in another study using TMS (Théoret et 
al., 2004). However, in this case, the presentation of the self-face was compared with the 
presentation of unfamiliar faces. 
Electrophysiological and functional neurorimaging data 
All the studies reviewed so far furnished information merely about lateralisation of self-face 
processing. Other techniques have been used to obtain more precise understanding of the 
anatomical location (e.g., with functional magnetic resonance imaging -fMRI-, positron 
emission tomography -PET scan-, or event-related potentials -ERPs- acquired with 
electroencephalography recording) or of the time course (e.g., with ERPs) of visual self-
recognition. 
Self-face – Keenan and Platek’s group has conducted two fMRI studies in order to directly 
specify regions of the right hemisphere that are implied during self-face recognition. In the 
first study (Platek, Keenan, Gallup, & Mohamed, 2004), participants were presented with 
their own face or with famous faces and were instructed to think about the person depicted 
on the pictures (in other words, no behavioural data was available, see Section 4.3. of 
Chapter 1, for a discussion of this point). This task elicited activity in the right superior, 
middle and inferior frontal gyri when the self-face was presented by comparison with a 
famous face. Moreover, in order to test their hypothesis that self-face recognition is linked 
to other higher-order capacities such as theory of mind (see Keenan, Gallup, et al., 2003; 
Keenan, Wheeler, et al., 2000), participants had to perform another task of mental state 
attribution. They were presented with individuals’ faces whose eyes expressed various 
mental states and had to think about the mental state of the person depicted. This task 
revealed activity in the medial superior frontal gyrus, in the right middle and superior frontal 
gyri. Activity was also found in the left hemisphere, more specifically in the middle frontal 
gyrus and in the superior temporal gyrus/pole. They concluded that right middle and 
superior frontal gyri are implicated in both tasks and therefore that self-awareness and 
theory of mind are subtended by the same neural network within the right hemisphere (but 
see objections raised by Morin, 2002, 2007, presented in Section 4.3. of Chapter 1). 
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In their second study carried out two years later (Platek et al., 2006), more rigorous control 
of familiarity effects was introduced by comparing the self-face both to unknown faces and 
personally familiar faces. Participants had to perform an identity judgment on these three 
kinds of faces. A baseline condition in which a scrambled face was presented was also 
included. When the self-face condition was compared to the familiar face condition, 
implications of the medial frontal and inferior parietal lobes, and superior frontal gyrus on 
the right, and of the middle temporal gyrus on the left were found. The familiar face elicited 
activation in the left anterior cingulate gyrus by comparison with the self-face. The authors 
acknowledge (p. 96) that their “results may be used to reconcile the left and right 
hemisphere models of self-awareness and supports a more complex bilateral network 
(Kircher et al., 2001) for both perceptual and executive aspects of self-face processing that 
cannot be reduced to a simplistic hemispheric dominance model”. 
This vision of a complex bilateral network subtending self-face recognition has at first been 
advocated by another group (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). This group conducted an fMRI 
study in order to determine the neural correlates of self-processing (Kircher et al., 2000; see 
also Kircher et al., 2001). More specifically, they examined whether distinct cerebral areas 
were involved in self versus non-self processing and whether these regions were implied 
independently of the material. They presented male participants with their own face 
morphed with an unfamiliar male face in a first experiment. In a second experiment, male 
participants saw their female partner’s faces morphed with an unfamiliar female face. In 
both cases, they were instructed to indicate whether the face was familiar (i.e., own face or 
partner’s face) or unfamiliar. The self versus unknown contrast showed activation mainly in 
the right limbic system reflecting an emotional response and in the left prefrontal cortex 
reflecting an integrative process. The left inferior parietal lobe and cerebellum were also 
implicated. The partner’s face elicited activity in the right anterior insula which might also 
reflect an emotional response. Finally, in a third experiment participants had to judge 
adjectives as self-descriptive or non-self-descriptive. Self-descriptive adjective were judged 
faster than non-self-descriptive adjectives, suggesting that the self-concept is stable and 
that a good self-knowledge allowed these quick answers. These self-descriptive adjectives 
triggered activity mainly in the left hemisphere (i.e., left parietal lobe, insula, inferior frontal 
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gyrus and anterior cingulate) and in the bilateral precuneus, corresponding to the 
processing of a verbal material and recourse to personal semantic knowledge. 
In addition, they have examined common regions implicated in both kinds of self-processes. 
These regions were the left fusiform gyrus and precuneus, as well as the right lingual gyrus 
and insula. The authors conclude that explicit self-recognition is subtended by a complex 
integrative neural network in which three components are active simultaneously:  sensorial 
inputs (to update one’s own face representation), memory (furnishing the feeling of 
continuity essential to the sense of self) and an emotional component (giving rise to feeling 
of familiarity and of coherence necessary to the sense of self). 
In a PET study, Sugiura et al. (2000) have also investigated self-recognition correlates. 
They used three different tasks each involving faces tilted to the right or to the left and 
participants had to judge the orientation of the faces. In the control task, faces were all 
unfamiliar. In the passive recognition task, the self-face was presented on some trials. 
Finally, in an active recognition task, participants had to indicate when their own face was 
presented in addition to the orientation task. Skin conductance was also measured and it 
appeared to be enhanced in both conditions where the self-face was presented. The left 
fusiform gyrus and the right supramarginal gyrus were activated during these two conditions 
of passive and active recognition of the self-face. According to the authors, this suggests 
that these regions subtend the representation of the self-face. The left putamen and the 
right hypothalamus were also implicated during both conditions. Moreover, regarding the 
active recognition condition by comparison with the two others, it elicited activity in the right 
anterior cingulate, the right presupplementary motor area, the prefrontal cortices and the left 
insula. The authors claim that this is an indication that these areas are involved in the 
sustained attention to the representation of the self-face. However, their study did not 
include familiar faces as control and it is possible that these areas are merely implicated in 
familiarity processing and not specifically in self-face processing. 
The same team corrected this flaw in a subsequent study (Sugiura et al., 2005). Indeed, 
they carried out an fMRI study aimed at identifying the cortical mechanisms of self-face 
recognition and controlled the selectivity of the activation for the self-face. They compared 
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the activity elicited by the self-face to that triggered by faces of different familiarity (i.e., a 
prelearned unfamiliar face, an experimenter’s face, and a friend’s face). They excluded 
activation that could be explained by these differences of familiarity. They found that the 
right occipito-temporo-parietal junction and frontal operculum, and that the left fusiform 
gyrus are selectively implied in self-face recognition. 
In a last (to date and to our knowledge) self-face recognition study using fMRI, Uddin, 
Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel and Iacoboni (2005) showed that a neural network in the 
right hemisphere including the inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule is 
implicated during self-face recognition. To demonstrate this, they used pictures of their 
participants’ own face that had been morphed by steps of 20% with another personally 
familiar face. There were thus 6 different pictures (two originals and 4 intermediate, so that 
there was no 50-50% morph) that were presented in random order. The pictures sequences 
also contained a scramble control picture. Participants were instructed to press a button if 
the picture looked like themselves and another one if it looked like another or scrambled 
face. The other highly familiar face elicited more activity than the self-face in the precuneus 
and medial prefrontal cortex. 
Finally, a couple of studies have used ERPs to investigate specificity of self-face 
processing. Ninomiya, Onitsuka, Chen, Sato and Tashiro (1998) have shown that one’s 
own face is an emotionally salient stimulus. Indeed, their participants presented a more 
ample P300 (at Cz electrode) when they were unexpectedly presented with their own face 
than when they saw other familiar faces or a red square. In another study, Sui et al. (2006) 
showed that the self-face and other faces were not yet differentiated on early components 
such as N170, reflecting structural encoding of faces. However, self-face was differentiated 
from familiar faces from latencies around 220 ms in that they elicited more ample positive 
wave in the frontocentral area whereas familiar faces did not differ from unfamiliar faces. 
Moreover, the self-face effect was independent of the task at hand (i.e., whether or not it 
had to be attended) which was not the case for familiar faces. According to Sui et al., this 
suggests that self-face recognition is subtended by unique mechanisms, contrary to other 
faces. These results contrast with those of another study (Keyes & Brady, 2007) showing 
that self-face can already be differentiated from other familiar or unfamiliar faces on N170 
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component. Marginal effects of the familiar face by comparison with the unfamiliar face 
were only observed later. The authors suggest that the brain could differentiate faces 
according to self versus non-self dimension before categorising them according to 
familiarity. 
All these studies thus bring various results. They do not all permit to firmly conclude that the 
reported activations are really self-face specific since some of them did not include familiar 
faces as control for simple familiarity effect. It is only quite recently that these controls begin 
to be more systematically included. As Gillihan and Farah (2005) argued in their review (p. 
80), “a clear pattern of anatomical localization has yet to emerge for self-face recognition”. 
They carefully (and wisely) concluded that “at the present time the most one can say with 
confidence is that both hemispheres probably participate to some degree but that right 
prefrontal areas may be particularly important”. 
Self-body – Only very recently, some studies started to examine the neural correlates of 
one’s own body-shape recognition. Previous studies had already examined various 
questions related to the self-body processing (e.g., agency and perspective taking, see 
Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer, Passingham, & Frith, 2002; Newen & 
Vogeley, 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Vogeley & Fink, 2003) but not directly as regard with 
its shape representation. 
In one study using fMRI, Kurosaki, Shirao, Yamashita, Okamoto, & Yamawaki (2006) 
investigated gender differences during processing of pictures showing distorted self-body. 
The distortions consisted in enlarging (fat-body-image) or reducing (thin-body-image) the 
width of the whole body (including the head). Participants were presented with pairs of 
pictures (one original and one distorted) and were instructed to select the more unpleasant 
one. Each kind of distortion was presented in a separate block (fat-body-image task versus 
thin-body-image task). In a control condition (real-image task), the two same original 
pictures were presented but one of them was marked with a red cross. In that case, 
participants had to design on which side the marked picture had been presented. When 
they compared patterns of brain activation during altered-image tasks and real-image task, 
they found some brain activation differences between men and women. When seeing an 
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altered version of the own-body, women presented activity in bilateral prefrontal cortices 
and in the left limbic (including amygdala, cingulate gyrus and insula) areas. Men rather 
showed activity in the right occipital cortex. According to the authors, this indicates that 
women seem to perceive distorted images of themselves by complex cognitivo-emotional 
processing. Attentional and self-monitoring processes would be implied when they perceive 
their distorted body (specifically the thin version). By contrast, a more visuo-spatial 
processing seems involved in men. However, these authors were interested in the 
processing of distorted images of oneself and they did not report data related to intact 
items. Moreover, self-body distorted pictures were compared to self-body intact pictures. So 
it is impossible to know whether these activations and gender differences really reflect self-
body processing per se or just more general body-shape evaluative judgments. Finally, 
their body stimuli included the heads. So it is also difficult to know whether the observed 
effects are really body specific or if they are partly due to faces. 
In another study, Sugiura et al. (2006) were interested in the question of whether different 
neural networks subtend different forms of visual self-recognition. They hypothesised that a 
first network including the left fusiform gyrus might be involved during processing of self-
image as a symbol and as a consequence should be implied during the presentation of 
static pictures of the self-face. A second network formed by the right frontal and parietal 
cortices might be implied during the processing of motion-action contingencies. This 
network should thus be sensitive to presentation of movies showing the whole self-body. To 
test their hypothesis, they presented their participants with four types of stimuli: static 
images depicting faces or whole bodies presenting various configurations, and movies 
showing faces or bodies performing various actions. Moreover, each of these stimulus 
types showed either the participant him/herself, another familiar person (i.e. a friend), or an 
unfamiliar person. Participants had to perform a familiarity judgments on these stimuli (i.e., 
categorise self and friend as “familiar” and the unknown person as “unfamiliar”). Self versus 
friend contrast collapsed across the four conditions revealed implication of a bilateral 
ventral occipito-temporal region extending over the fusiform gyrus and of the right parietal 
and frontal cortices. Consistent with their hypothesis, the left ventral occipito-temporal 
cortex was more active during self-face than during self-body perception (however, this was 
only true for pictures). The hypothesis that the fusiform gyrus processes the self-face as a 
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symbol was thus confirmed. However, their second hypothesis was not supported by the 
results showing right parietal and frontal cortices implication but no preferential activation in 
these regions for movies of bodies. The results nonetheless support the idea of the 
existence of multiple brain networks for visual self-recognition. 
Finally, two other studies interested in the effect of viewpoints and perspective on body 
representation have to be mentioned even if they are a bit more removed from our specific 
field of interest (Chan, Peelen, & Downing, 2004; Saxe, Jamal, & Powell, 2006). They were 
both examining whether the extrastriate body area (EBA) that has been shown to be 
specifically involved during processing of bodily stimuli can differentiate egocentric and 
allocentric views of bodies. In the first study (Chan et al., 2004), various body parts 
(excluding the head) of participants were photographed both from an allocentric (i.e. as 
seen by other people) and from an egocentric perspective (i.e., as seen by oneself; these 
pictures were taken by placing the camera in front of participants’ eyes). Each participant 
was presented with the pictures of his/her own body and with those of four other personally 
familiar persons. Participants had to perform a 1-back repetition-detection task (report 
whenever two identical images appeared consecutively). Results showed that the right EBA 
was more active during presentation of allocentric than during egocentric views while there 
was no difference in the left EBA. This suggests that the right EBA might be tuned towards 
the processing of others. By contrast, the identity had no effect on the activation of the EBA, 
suggesting that this structure is involved in early stages of social vision. The authors report 
that other bilateral regions (anterior superior temporal sulcus among others) were more 
active during processing of others than during processing of the self. Unfortunately they do 
not report results as to the reverse contrast. The left superior parietal cortex was more 
implicated in processing of egocentric than of allocentric views, but irrespectively of the 
identity. 
In the second study (Saxe et al., 2006), participants saw pictures of hands, arms, legs and 
feet that had been photographed from an egocentric and from an allocentric view (here 
defined as a view inaccessible from the body’s owner viewpoint). However, these pictures 
were taken from a model unfamiliar to the participants. As in the previous experiment, 
participants performed a 1-back repetition-detection task. Consistently with Chan and 
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colleagues (2004)’ results, the right EBA was more active when viewing allocentric views 
than when viewing egocentric views. By contrast, the left post-central gyrus and the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were more active when viewing egocentric view by 
comparison with allocentric views. 
In sum, neural correlates of one’s own body-shape representation per se have not yet been 
documented much. Only a couple of studies have begun to examine various processing in 
direct relation with one’s own body appearance. Sugiura et al. (2006)’s study suggest that 
different self-related features are processed by different cerebral networks. However, neural 
correlates of self-body shape still have to be defined. At present, very little can be 
concluded from specific activations found for egocentric viewpoints since they were 
independent of body identity (Chan et al., 2004). These activations might in fact have more 
to do with ownership and other kind of self-processing than with visual self-recognition. 
To date, it seems that no study has simultaneously examined neural correlates of self-face 
and self-body recognition except Sugiura et al. (2006)’s study. However, these authors 
examined whether different neural correlates could be identified depending of the kind of 
visual self-related stimulus that was presented. Apparently, it has not yet been assessed 
whether some integrative cerebral areas could differentiate self-recognition from other 
person recognition independently of the type of visual stimulus presented. This is what we 
will attempt to do in Chapter 5. 
3.2. Other self-referential stimuli 
A high number of studies have examined neural correlates subtending the processing of 
other kind of self-referential stimuli. We do not have sufficient space to detail all these 
studies here. Therefore we will only describe briefly some of these studies and see whether 
some trends can be extracted as to the neural correlates subtending processing of self-
related stimuli (for more exhaustive reviews, see Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Gusnard, 2005; 
Northoff & Bermphol, 2004). 
The own name has often been used as stimulus in electrophysiological or functional 
neuroimaging studies. For instance, a recent fMRi (Carmody & Lewis, 2006) study has 
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shown that hearing one’s own name elicited activation mainly in the left hemisphere (middle 
frontal cortex, cuneus and superior and middle temporal cortex by comparison with hearing 
four other names (Dan, Saul, Jay and Mike)). However, as the names with which the own 
names were contrasted were unspecified in terms of familiarity, it is impossible to conclude 
whether these activations are self-specific or rather due to the familiarity of one’s own 
name. In a combined PET and ERPs study, Perrin et al. (2005) found that the amplitude of 
the P3 component was more correlated with cerebral blood changes in the medial prefrontal 
cortex when participants heard their own name than when they heard other names. 
However, the PET data alone did not reveal any difference between the brain activity 
elicited by the presentation of the own name and that elicited by the presentation of other 
names. Moreover, the control names had been selected not to be the same as relatives and 
friends of participants. As a consequence, here also it is not possible to disentangle self 
effects from familiarity effects. Note that this is often the case that familiar control names 
are not used in studies using one’s own name, especially in non-communicative patient 
studies. Indeed, the own name is used as a salient stimulus to enhance chances of eliciting 
responses in these patients (see for instance Perrin et al., 2006; for a review see Laureys, 
Perrin, & Brédart, 2007; see also Section 5.2. of Chapter 1). 
Recently, Miyakoshi, Nomura, and Ohira (2007) investigated processing time course and 
neural correlates of self-related objects recognition using ERPs. They presented 
participants with pictures of 4 objects (bag, shoes, cup and umbrella) that were either their 
own, either familiar (i.e. public or disposable) or unfamiliar (belonging to other persons). The 
objects were not differentiated according to their relative familiarity before 250 ms after 
stimulus onset. The N250 component differentiated self and familiar from unfamiliar objects 
in left occipitotemporal area. Self-related objects were differentiated from familiar objects 
later, from 300 ms in frontal, parietal and temporal sites without clear lateralization. This 
indicates that self-relevance is processed by higher cognitive functions during object 
recognition. 
Most studies interested in neural correlates of self-processing have used psychological self-
referential stimuli. In these studies, neural activity of participants was examined while they 
were judging items in reference with their own traits (for instance adjectives, see Craik et 
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al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002; Kircher et al., 2002; or sentences, Johnson et al., 2002) or 
preferences (Seger, Stone, & Keenan, 2004). Various neural regions in both hemispheres 
have been found to play a role during these processes. An fMRI study contrasting self-
referential judgments of adjectives and semantic judments of adjectives revealed 
implication of the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Fossati et al., 2003). In a similar 
study, the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices were implicated during 
judgment of sentence as self-descriptive by comparison with judgment of sentences as 
semantically accurate (Johnson et al., 2002). In another fMRI study implicating trait 
adjectives (Kircher el al., 2002), participants judged these adjectives as self- or non-self-
descriptive in one experiment (intentional self processing) or performed a semantic 
judgment on these adjectives that had been classified according to their self 
descriptiveness (incidental self processing). Two regions of the left hemisphere (superior 
parietal lobule and fusiform gyrus) were commonly implicated in both types of self-
processing. In these three studies however, there was no adequate control situation 
allowing the conclusion that activated brain regions are specifically recruited by the self-
referential component of the processing.  
In another study, specific activation of the right anterior cingulate has been found when 
comparing self-referential encoding to semantic encoding. However, in line with our 
previous comment, no differential activation was found when contrasting self-referential 
encoding to other-referential (i.e. pertaining to a famous person) encoding (Craik et al., 
1999). Implication of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was nonetheless found in a study 
where participants were asked to reflect on their own traits when this task was contrasted 
with a situation where participants reflected on other persons (i.e. celebrities)’ traits 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2005). Moreover, this region was also implicated in a resting state 
situation suggesting that self-referential reflective activity might be an important component 
of the resting state. The medial prefrontal cortex was also implied when comparing self-
referential judgment to other-referential (i.e., pertaining to George Bush) judgment in 
another fMRI study (Kelley et al., 2002). Finally, it has been shown that medial parietal 
areas seem recruited during judgments about one’s own food preferences versus 
judgments about someone else’s (a roommate or a friend) preferences (Seger et al., 2004).  
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As the brief overview of these studies shows, it is still difficult to interpret data to date in 
favour of the existence of a specific neural network devoted to the processing of self-
referential stimuli. Self-referential processing has often been compared to other kind of 
processing differing in various dimensions other than just the self aspect (semantic 
judgment for instance). When control conditions implied other persons, they were 
commonly celebrities. Therefore differing brain responses might reflect differing amount of 
knowledge about the self and these persons or differential affective responses to these two 
types of stimulus (see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). 
3.4. Conclusion 
We have seen throughout this section that interest of the neuroscientific community in 
neural correlates of self-referential processing is growing exponentially. This realm of 
research is still in its infancy and it appears difficult to date to extract clear invariant 
conclusions from existing data. A trend that could be extracted from visual self-face 
recognition is that both hemispheres are implied but with the right prefrontal cortex being 
preferentially involved (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Data relative to visual self-body processing 
is still insufficient to conclude much except that this type of processing might involve a 
different cerebral network by comparison with self-face processing (Sugiura et al., 2006).  
It has also been suggested from existing data implicating various kinds of self-referential 
stimuli that both hemispheres (see Morin, 2003) and more particularly medial regions 
(specifically the medial prefrontal cortex) might play a crucial role in their processing 
(Gusnard, 2005; Northoff & Bermphol, 2004) along with the parietal cortices (Gusnard, 
2005). However, differential regions seem implicated as a function of the task at hand and 
of the type of self-referential stimulus involved. Figure 1 illustrates how much too drastic 
conclusions should not be drawn about specific and precise neural correlates of self-
processing since areas covering almost the whole brain have been found to be implicated 
during various types of self-processing. 
The question we asked in this chapter concerned the specificity of self-referential stimuli by 
comparison with other types of stimuli. As others (Gillihan & Farah, 2005), we think that a 
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positive answer to this question in terms of neural correlates would be premature. Indeed, 
existing studies only rarely used adequate controls of confounding factors such as 
familiarity, emotional salience and so on when comparing self-processing to other kinds of 
processing (see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Hopefully, people are more and more sensitive to 
these aspects and a clearer answer to that fascinating question should emerge in a near 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary figure of all brain areas implicated during self-processing (From 
Gillihan & Farah, 2005). 
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4. Attentional properties 
After having questioned specificity of self-referential stimuli as regard with their 
representations in memory and their neural correlates, we will examine whether they 
possess special properties favouring their selection by attention. Before going further and 
examine results of studies using self-referential stimuli, we need to describe the context in 
which they have been conducted. 
4.1. Important stimuli and theories of attention 
Once we are awake we are constantly receiving an incessant flow of external and internal 
perceptual information. In order to perceive our environment coherently and to behave in an 
adapted way, we need to sort all these incoming sensory information. This is accomplished 
thanks to the mechanism of selective attention. Because our attentional abilities are limited 
(see Pashler & Johnston, 1998), this mechanism selects high-priority stimuli to be 
processed in accordance with our current goals while in the meantime ignores other goal-
irrelevant stimuli (for a review see Driver, 2001). Psychologists and more recently 
neuroscientists have investigated for a long time the extent to which certain salient and 
significant stimuli possess the property of being preferentially selected by attention by 
comparison with less important stimuli. Typically, researchers have investigated whether 
such stimuli are processed when they are supposedly unattended (e.g., when they are 
presented outside the focus of attention) by measuring their reportability or the interference 
they produced on the processing of other target stimuli. Self-referential stimuli such as 
one’s own name have often been used in order to examine these questions. This was a 
clear-cut way to have an important, personally relevant and easily constructible stimulus 
tailored to each individual subject. 
The impact of the outcomes of these studies would be significant for the theorisation of 
attention because of the lengthy debate between the defenders of an early selection of 
attention and the defenders of a late selection theory of attention. For the former, the 
attentional selection concerns the gross stimulus features at an early stage of processing 
(Broadbent, 1958). This view therefore implies severe limitations in perceptual processing 
Chapter 2 
 79 
(Pashler & Johnston, 1998). For instance, Broadbent (1958)’s Filter Theory assumed that 
we are only able to identify one spoken word at a time. By contrast, the latter theory of late 
selection of attention argues that the attentional selection takes place after a complete 
semantic processing of all incoming information (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). This view thus 
presupposes virtually no limitation in sensory and perceptual processes. It is based on 
evidence showing that some stimuli have been analysed semantically whereas participants 
had made some effort to ignore them (see Pashler & Johnston, 1998). 
As a consequence, evidence of interference created by supposedly unattended self-
referential stimuli on the performance on the ongoing task would rather support the late 
selection theory of attention, whereas an absence of interference would rather be in support 
of the early selection theory. However, things are not that simple4, since to date these 
studies have brought different outcomes and some discrepancies appeared in their 
respective conclusions. These studies and their results are overviewed below. 
4.2. Evidence in favour of an attentional specificity of self-referential 
stimuli 
Since the late fifties, self-referential stimuli have been described as particularly prone to 
grab attention by comparison with other stimuli. This claim emerged from the famous study 
by Moray (1959) using the method of shadowing (see Cherry, 1953) during a dichotic 
listening task. This method involves the presentation of two different messages to each ear 
by means of earphones. Participants are instructed to focus on the message presented to 
one ear and to repeat it aloud (i.e., shadow) while ignoring the message presented to the 
other ear. While a short list of neutral words presented many times to the unattended ear 
showed no trace of being remembered (replicating Cherry’s findings), Moray (1959) found 
that 4 participants out of 12 (33%) remembered that they had heard their own name at its 
first presentation to the unattended ear. Moray called this effect the “identification paradox” 
                                                          
4 Corollary, there are intermediate theories in between the two extreme views defended by the late 
selection and early selection theories of attention - see for instance the Treisman (1960)’s attenuation 
theory or the Treisman and Gelade (1980)’ feature integration theory. 
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since the own name, because of its importance, appeared to be able to pass through the 
attentional filter whereas the verbal content of the other less important to-be-rejected stimuli 
was blocked. To Moray, his findings indicated that “the block in dichotic shadowing occurs 
at quite high level” (p. 59) and his findings are probably one of the first in favour of the late 
selection theory. However, these results have later been questioned as there was no way to 
exclude the possibility that subjects shifted their attention from time to time to the to-be-
ignored message, hence actually attending to it and therefore perceiving it (see Lachter, 
Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004, that confirmed this criticism using a priming paradigm). 
Nonetheless, Wood and Cowan (1995) recently replicated Moray’s results with more careful 
control of temporal lapses of attention. 
Since then, evidence for some “own name effects” has also been found in other studies 
using various procedures. Wolford and Morrison (1980) designed what they called a visual 
analogous of the Moray’s procedure. In their task, they presented their participants with two 
peripheral digits flanking a central to-be-ignored word. Participants were instructed to make 
a parity judgment on the two digits. On most trials (i.e. 116 out of 120), the central words 
were neutral words and on four time-spaced trials they were the participant’s own name. 
Neutral words did not cause distraction as they produced similar reaction times and 
accuracy by comparison with a control situation where no word was presented centrally 
between the two target digits. However, results showed that the presence of participant’s 
own name affected response times (but not the accuracy) by comparison with neutral 
words. Moreover, 80% of participants reported subsequently that they had seen their own 
name whereas they recognized only 68% of words presented the same number of times 
during the experiment. According to the authors, their results argue in favour of a robust 
name effect (but see Bundesen, Kyllingsbaek, Houmann, & Jensen, 1997; Harris & Pashler, 
2004). However, given the central position of the to-be-ignored stimuli they were located 
within the focus of attention and were presumably attended preventing any strong 
conclusion in favour of a late selection theory of attention. 
In two studies involving rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) Shapiro’s group presented 
evidence in favour of a late selection theory by showing that the own name was more 
resistant than other words to two attentional limitation effects (i.e. attentional blink and 
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repetition blindness). The attentional blink (AB) arises when after having identified a first 
target (target 1, e.g. a white letter) in a RSVP (e.g. composed of black letter) participants fail 
to detect the presence of a probe (target 2, e.g. the black letter “x”) that has been presented 
within a certain temporal window after target 1 (i.e., up to 500 ms). In a set of experiments 
aimed at accounting for AB effects, Shapiro and colleagues (Shapiro, Caldwell, & 
Sorensen, 1997) found that when the probe was the participant’s own name and that it was 
presented in a stream of names, it resisted more to AB than other names or nouns. This 
suggests that certain stimuli have a lower detection/activation threshold and thus a higher 
salience than others. As a consequence they would suffer less interference when 
competing with other stimuli. However, when the target and the probe were presented in a 
stream of nouns, other names were also more resistant to AB than nouns. This suggests 
that the salience of certain stimuli such as other names might be dependent upon the 
distractor stream whereas one’s own name is even more salient, which allows its detection 
regardless of the distractor stream. 
In another study, this same team (Arnell, Shapiro, & Sorensen, 1999) investigated repetition 
blindness (RB). When two identical stimuli are presented in a RSVP paradigm, RB is said to 
occur if participants that accurately detected the first instance of the stimulus fail to detect 
the second occurrence of the stimulus. This seems to be a robust effect occurring as far as 
the two stimuli share similar properties as regard with their visual identity, phonology or 
even possibly meaning. Arnell et al. thus compared RB for one’s own name and other 
names to examine whether RB can be modulated by the lexical/conceptual (i.e. processed 
at a relatively late stages) representation of a stimulus. They found RB in the “other name” 
condition as well as in the “own name condition”. RB however was reduced for the own 
name. 
In 1998, Mack and Rock designed a paradigm aimed at assessing whether a stimulus can 
be perceived without attention. In this paradigm, an unexpected stimulus is presented in the 
visual field of an observer while his attention is focused on another task. Observers are 
instructed to perform a length judgment task on a cross presented very briefly. This 
procedure is used during two or three trials (i.e., non-critical trials). Then, on the third or 
fourth trial (i.e., critical trial), a critical stimulus is unexpectedly presented besides the big 
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cross. Immediately after the length judgment, observers are asked whether they have seen 
something besides the big cross that was not present before. Then they are asked to 
describe it or to pick it up in a set of alternatives.  
Inattentional blindness (IB) occurs when observers fail to detect the critical stimulus. Simple 
geometrical shapes produce IB rates up to 85%. According to Mack and Rock, this 
suggests that perception requires attention and that attention must first be captured before 
perception can occur. They then examined whether certain important stimuli are particularly 
prone to capture attention. They found that the own name was more resistant to IB than 
other stimuli (another name or some of the most frequent words in the English language 
such as “House” or “Time”) and concluded that the own name does capture attention 
because of its importance (rather than because of its lexicality or familiarity). To support 
their claim, they carried out further experiments in which an alteration was made to the 
participant’s name by replacing the first vowel with another and found that the detection 
rates were then highly reduced. They argued that these results were in favour of a late 
selection theory (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963) in which attention is captured at a late stage of 
the visual processing when the meaning is already available. Indeed, their results indicate 
that the own name does not capture attention because of its gross perceptual features (as 
an early selection of attention theory would have predicted, see Broadbent, 1958) since a 
modest alteration of its features has such a huge effect on its attention-grabbing capacity. 
In other experiments, they found similar results with other salient stimuli such as happy face 
icons. 
Later, Shelley-Tremblay and Mack (1999) showed that the own name and happy face icons 
were more resistant to backward metacontrast masking than other stimuli (i.e. scrambled 
own name, the word “time”; or scrambled and inverted faces, respectively). This 
phenomenon consists in a reduced or even eliminated visibility of a briefly presented 
stimulus when it is followed by a surrounding or flanking other stimulus (i.e. mask). The own 
name was also a more potent mask than a scramble variant or the word “time”. More 
recently, Mack, Pappas, Silverman, and Gay (2002) confirmed the finding that one’s own 
name or a happy face icon capture attention because of their importance and high signal 
value using three different paradigms (IB, attentional blink, and stimulus crowding). 
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Moreover, using a visual search task Mack and Rock (1998) also showed that, contrary to 
other names, the own name pops out of a display of up to 12 items (but see Harris, Pashler, 
& Coburn, 2004). 
In sum, all these results seem in favour of a late selection theory of attention (Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963), since they suggest that the meaning and significance of some stimuli can 
determine their selection by attention. However, all of these studies used the own name as 
the example of a highly salient stimulus. Yet our name (our first name as well as our last 
name) is a property that we usually share with other people. It is thus possible that the 
abovementioned effects are mediated by some lower level effects (i.e., merely due to one’s 
own name high familiarity) calling into question the conclusion of these studies. 
The self-face has the advantage that it is a unique self-referential characteristic (with the 
exception of twins). Therefore, it constitutes an ideal way to investigate the attentional 
specificity of self-referential stimuli and more generally of significant stimuli. However, only 
few studies to date (Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006; Laarni et al., 2000; Ninomiya et 
al., 1998; Tong & Nakayama, 1999) have used it in this context. Note however that here 
again an adequate stimulus of comparison is mandatory to allow the claim that possible 
effects are due to the self aspect (in other words to its significance and meaning) of the self-
face. 
 Recently, Brédart et al. (2006) used a face-name interference paradigm in order to assess 
whether the self-face is harder to ignore than other familiar faces. They presented their 
participants with central names flanked by a face. The names were either the participant’s 
own name or name of another familiar person (i.e. a classmate). The flanking faces were 
three different familiar faces: the self-face, the classmate’s face or the face of a participants’ 
professor. Participants were instructed to classify the names as their own or as their 
classmate’s name and to ignore the faces (that presentations were congruent or 
incongruent as regard with the to-be-processed names). Results showed that the self-face 
flanking a classmate’s name produced a stronger interference on the processing of this 
name than classmate’s face flanking the participant’s own name. This effect was not due to 
a particular resistance of the own name to facial interference since both the own name and 
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the classmate’s name were subjects to a similar interference resulting from the presentation 
of the professor’s face. This suggests that the self-face has some attention-grabbing 
capacity resulting from its particular emotional value or its high familiarity. 
In a visual search task that we already mentioned (see Section 2.1. above), Tong and 
Nakayama (1999) demonstrated that the self-face was more quickly detected among 
distractors than strangers’ faces even when presented in atypical orientations and after 
hundreds of trials. Moreover, participants were quicker at rejecting their own face as 
distractor than other faces. All these findings thus suggest that important stimuli benefit 
from specific attention-grabbing capacities, which is in favour of a late selection theory of 
attention (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). However, this last study as many others presented 
above (with the exception of the Brédart et al. 2006’s study that purposely used highly 
familiar control faces and of Mack and Rock’s huge work attempting at rejecting familiarity 
accounts of their own name effects) used neutral and unfamiliar control items. For this 
reason many of these results may just reflect some familiarity effects rather than genuine 
“self-effects”. This is an important limitation because it might in turn suggest that the 
selection of attention does not occur at a so late stage of processing as had been thought. 
4.3. Evidence against an attentional specificity of self-referential 
stimuli 
Other researches have seriously questioned this view of the specificity of the own name 
and face by suggesting that self-referential stimuli do not benefit from particular attention-
grabbing capacities. Ten years ago, a study by Bundesen, Kyllingsbæk, Houmann, and 
Jensen (1997) challenged previous findings by showing that one’s own name does not 
attract attention more than other stimuli. Their study was based on work by Schneider and 
Shiffrin in late seventies (see Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) 
showing that an automatic attention attraction by alphanumeric characters can develop in 
some conditions. In Shiffrin and Schneider (1977)’s study (Experiment 4d), participants 
underwent an extensive training phase in which they had to detect target digits while 
ignoring distractor letters. Then, in a subsequent task, they had to judge whether two 
targets letters were presented among a display composed of a 4 letters-matrix. The two 
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target letters always appeared on the same diagonal line and so the two other distractor 
letters were to be ignored as they always appeared on an irrelevant location. Nonetheless, 
participants were distracted by the presentation of two digits (i.e., previous targets) at these 
irrelevant locations.  
In order to assess whether more complex stimuli such as words can also automatically 
attract attention, Bundesen et al. (1997) used briefly (i.e. 150 ms) presented masked 
displays composed of four names, two red-coloured (targets to be reported) and two white-
coloured (distractors to be ignored). The participant’s name was presented on some trials, 
either as target or as distractor. They found that participants were more accurate in 
reporting their own name presented as targets (i.e. 67% of correct reports) than in reporting 
targets from display without their own name (i.e. 57% of correct reports). However, the own 
name presented as distractor did not cause more interference than other distractor names 
since the reports of the targets were virtually the same in both cases (i.e. 56% and 57% of 
correct reports respectively). This suggests that the own name does not automatically 
attract attention. Moreover, Bundesen et al. hypothesised that the advantage found for the 
own name when it was a target by comparison with other target names was not attentional 
but merely reflect a sensitivity effect. They thus conducted a control experiment in which 
participants had to identify single names presented very briefly (i.e. 83 ms). They found that 
participants identified their own name more accurately (i.e. 73%) than other names (i.e. 
46%) indicating that participants were simply better at identifying their own name than other 
names. Finally Bundesen et al. explain the contrast between their findings with multi-letter 
words and those with single alphanumeric characters by the relative complexity of these 
stimuli and argue that complex stimuli cannot attract visual attention. 
Consistently, in another study using faces, Laarni et al. (2000) presented their participants 
with pairs of faces that they had to match. The background was composed of a matrix of 
faces that they had to ignore. Participants’ own face or a celebrity face (the Finnish 
President) was presented on some trials (i.e. critical trials). Results showed that only 18% 
of participants reported that they had seen their own face during the task and the 
performance was similar for both familiar faces. 
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These results could be interpreted in terms of an early selection of attention occurring at an 
early stage of processing (Broadbent, 1958). Indeed they suggest that significant stimuli are 
not processed further when they have already been discarded from the perceptual process 
by the properties of their low level features (e.g. irrelevant colour or irrelevant background 
location). 
4.4. Compromise evidence 
Finally, some studies using the own name moderated findings presented here above by 
showing that some “self-effect” can occur but only when specific conditions are fulfilled. For 
instance, Kawahara and Yamada (2004) replicated Bundesen et al. (1997)’s findings with 
Japanese participants in a first experiment and addressed other interesting points in four 
other experiments. In two experiments, they assessed two possible explanations raised by 
Bundesen et al. (1997) for their null effect. In one of these experiments, they reduced the 
difference of colour between targets (now pink instead of red) and distractors in order to 
reduce the efficiency of target selection. In the other experiment, they recruited participants 
whose name consisted in a single Japanese Kanji character in order to assess Bundesen et 
al. (1997)’s hypothesis that attention can only be attracted by individual characters. In both 
cases, they could not find evidence that the own name attracts attention.  
In two subsequent experiments, they examined a potential explanation in terms of 
observer’s set to this null effect. They hypothesised that the input filter the observer 
prepares to optimise his/her performance to a task could determine whether a specific 
feature of a stimulus will attract attention or not. For instance, in Bundesen et al.’s study 
and in their three previous experiments, it is possible that the own name did not attract 
attention because participants tuned their input filters to pass target red items explaining 
that the white items (and therefore the own name as distractor) were not processed. In 
these two subsequent experiments, they used an adapted version of the attentional blink 
paradigm and showed, in line with the input filter hypothesis, that the own name only 
attracted attention when participants were set to identify target names whereas it did not 
when participants were set to find a target colour.  
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In another study, Gronau, Cohen, and Ben-Shakhar (2003) showed that the location of the 
own name within or outside the observer’s focus of attention is also an important factor 
determining attention attraction. In a first experiment, they used a Stroop-like task in which 
participants were to name the colour of words presented centrally within the participant’s 
attentional focus. On some trials, the coloured-word was a personally significant word 
tailored to each participant (i.e. his/her first name, his/her last name, his/her mother’s name, 
his/her field of study). Results showed that in such a situation, the significant words 
attracted attention by comparison with neutral words (i.e. items from the same category but 
pertaining to another person). In a second experiment, the words were presented at 
periphery above or below a central coloured square. In this case, the interference caused 
by significant words was abolished. In a third experiment, the displays were identical to 
those of Experiment 2 but now the participants had to associate a significant word to each 
colour and had to utter this word in response to the coloured-square. Now, the peripheral 
words were processed as attested by a congruency effect. In other words, this suggests 
that when they were presented peripherally significant words attracted attention only when 
they were task relevant but not when they were task irrelevant. This is in line with the input 
filter hypothesis advanced by Kawahara and Yamada (2004). 
Harris, Pashler, and Coburn (2004) also called Mack and Rock (1998)’s visual search 
findings into question by showing, in a set of 9 experiments, that even if the participant’s 
own name was detected more rapidly than other names, it appeared to be subject to 
perceptual capacity limitations. Indeed, the search slopes they obtained were substantial 
and not flat enough to claim that the own name pops out and capture attention. Moreover, 
the own name had no more distractive power than other names. In other words, it was not a 
particularly powerful distractor as it did not hold participants’ attention. Harris et al. note that 
their results actually echo those of Tong and Nakayama (1999) with the self-face. They 
interpret their results as a consequence of people’s experience for searching their own 
name (see the notion of automatic attention attraction acquired through training developed 
by Schneider and Shiffrin and described above). Interestingly, they also showed that 
emotionally charged words did not particularly attract attention. However, this does not 
mean that the own name attracts attention more since it might just benefit from a training 
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effect and that words might be weaker emotional stimuli than for instance emotionally 
charged pictures. 
In another experiment based on the paradigm designed by Wolford and Morrison (1980, 
see Section 4.2. above), Harris and Pashler (2004) showed that the presentation of the own 
name could cause a distraction and slow down reaction times on a digit-parity task in 
comparison with neutral words, but only on condition that enough capacity is available. In 
this case however the distraction was only present during the first occurrences of the own 
name and the response quickly habituated. Moreover, the own name did not show special 
attention grabbing property anymore when display loads were more substantial and that the 
own name was presented among 6 other name stimuli. In addition, the surprise effect 
elicited by the own name was also found with emotionally charged words but to a lesser 
extent and only at their first occurrence. Taken together, this set of results suggests that the 
first occurrences of one’s own name may provoke an involuntarily shift of attention when 
the perceptual load of one’s ongoing activity is low and enough capacity is available for 
one’s name to be perceived. However it rapidly loses its attention grabbing character. 
Hence, one’s own name is not a more potent distractor than other significant words. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In the realm of attention, self-referential stimuli have generally been used to assess 
divergent hypotheses and to elaborate theories of attention. In this context, researchers 
have mostly used the own name (and only recently the self-face) on basis of the 
assumption that it is a particularly salient stimulus because of its importance and 
significance for the participants. In other words, from the beginning and until lately, 
researchers have not really assessed whether self-referential stimuli are special but rather 
have used them as a tool to test different theories of attention. Only gradually has the 
interest in the specificity of self-referential stimuli emerged. At first glance, in this context it 
appeared logical to compare the own name (or face) to neutral, unfamiliar or unimportant 
stimuli. However, a lot of factors differentiate one’s own name or one’s own face from other 
types of neutral stimuli. They differ in their relative frequency of presentation and corollary 
in their familiarity but also in their emotional valence. These differences between self-
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referential stimuli and others thus concern low level as well as higher level properties of 
these stimuli. In order to build comprehensive theories of attention, it is therefore actually 
crucial to precisely identify factors driving attentional effects and to determine whether self-
referential possible specific attentional properties are due to their “self” component or to 
other lower level components such as their familiarity.  
To date, it is still difficult to conclude that self-referential stimuli are particularly prone to 
attract attention. Studies that have shown self-effects in attention often lacked really 
appropriate control in order to disentangle self-effects from lower level familiarity effects. 
Their results have been called into question and sometimes reinterpreted by other studies. 
Actually, most existing data does not seem in favour of a late selection theory of attention 
assuming that we process semantically all incoming information before a selection occurs. 
Rather, as Harris et al. (2004) wrote, there is an “emerging consensus favouring a modified 
version of early selection theory” and it seems that “late selection theorists greatly 
overestimated the capacity for parallel perceptual analysis of complex stimuli” (p. 28). In 
Chapters 6 to 8 we will attempt to answer this question of self specificity in attention more 
precisely using the self-face. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at examining whether self-referential stimuli are special. We overviewed 
three different topics in which self-referential stimuli have been assessed regarding their 
specificity. First, we have seen that previous research seems to indicate that self-referential 
stimuli do not benefit from qualitatively different representation by comparison with 
comparable other stimuli. So, even if we access self-referential stimuli in a particular way 
(i.e. on the one hand the access to our own physical appearance is quite restricted; on the 
other hand we have a privileged access to our psychological traits and knowledge) by 
comparison with non-self-referential stimuli, this does not seem to largely affect their 
representation in memory. 
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Secondly, we have reviewed literature on the neural correlates subtending representation of 
self-referential stimuli. Since the range of this literature is huge, we focused on neural 
correlates of one’s own physical appearance. We have seen that specific cerebral regions 
seem preferentially implicated during processing of the self-face and other self-referential 
stimuli. Contrary to some drastic claims, complex cerebral network(s) distributed across 
both cerebral hemispheres probably play a role in the processing of such stimuli. 
Apparently, the right frontal cortex, the medial regions and the parietal cortices seem to 
have important implications within this or these networks. Nonetheless, we have also noted 
that a consensus has still to be found. Indeed, regions across virtually the whole brain have 
been activated somehow by self-referential processing, depending on the type of stimuli 
that were presented, of the task at hand, or of the way participants had to give their 
responses. 
Finally, we reviewed part of the attention literature in which the own name has been 
extensively used in order to assess opposing theories of attention. Whereas earlier studies 
seemed in favour of a late selection theory of attention, in that they indicated that the own 
name was particularly prone to capture attention, later data rather seem to support early 
selection theories by showing that the own name does not automatically attract attention. 
Precise conditions determining the ability of self-referential stimuli to attract attention are yet 
to be defined. 
In sum, this review calls into question the intuitive claim that self-referential stimuli must be 
special. We have seen that it is not necessarily true that they must elicit special responses 
or trigger special processing because they pertain to our most private, subjective and 
intimate aspects. We have seen that within these three different areas of research, 
methodological limitations often prevent the forming of firm conclusions about a specific 
status of self-referential stimuli. Often, self-referential stimuli have been compared to 
neutral and/or unfamiliar stimuli that differ not only according to their self aspect but also 
according to other factors such as their familiarity or emotional valence (for a review see 
Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Only recently researchers are taking more and more seriously this 
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need for adequate control into account. We will of course do so in the present work and will 
try to contribute towards an answer to this still unresolved question. 
 
 Chapter 3 
AN OUTLINE OF PRESENT STUDIES 
Self-referential stimuli have been extensively studied. We have seen throughout previous 
chapters that their use can aim at two main purposes. On the one hand, processing of self-
referential stimuli can be examined in order to understand the way an organism is (or is not) 
conscious of various aspects of its own Self (self-consciousness). Chapter 1 has illustrated 
how important it is to clearly define self-consciousness before beginning such an enterprise. 
Also, we have seen that as a consequence, self-referential stimuli must be carefully chosen 
in relation with the specific facet of self-consciousness one wants to investigate.  
On the other hand, self-referential stimuli have been studied for themselves in order to 
examine whether they are special. The ultimate goal of this approach is to know whether 
the Self is special by comparison with non-self. Chapter 2 has shown that in this context, 
self-referential stimuli have been presented in various tasks to assess whether they elicit 
specific pattern of behaviour or brain activation by comparison with non-self-referential 
stimuli. There is some indication that self-referential stimuli might be processed by specific 
neural regions. However, systematic studies using adequate control of confound variable 
such as familiarity are only beginning to be conducted. Up to now, the answer to that 
question is still unknown and it would be premature to claim that the Self is indeed special. 
Note that these two views are not mutually exclusive. Remind also that on some occasion 
self-referential stimuli have been used just as tool in various fields. In a third kind of 
approach, their salience and high-relevance for their owners have been used to enhance 
chances of eliciting responses by comparison with less salient stimuli. The present work 
definitively comes within the context of the second approach. It is aimed at assessing 
whether the self-face (and the self-body) is special by comparison with other faces (and 
bodies). 
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We chose the self-face among the range of possible self-referential stimuli for several 
reasons. First, it is probably the only self-referential stimulus that is unique and different for 
each individual (with the exception of identical twins). Indeed, even if the combination of all 
self-related information contributes to the formation of a unique entity (i.e., the Self), almost 
each individual self-related information can be shared with other people (the voice being an 
obvious exception). People share their last name at least with their family members and 
their first name with hundreds to millions of people (depending on their parents’ will and 
imagination). People’s own traits, knowledge, goals, occupations, beliefs and even 
memories can also be shared by their close relative as well as by complete strangers. The 
self-face therefore constitutes a unique and really distinctive self-referential stimulus. 
Second, faces in general have been described as a special class of stimuli. Therefore if the 
Self and all its components are really special, the self-face should be distinguished from 
other faces by the cognitive system even if it is a member of the face category and 
differential responses should be observed between the self-face and other faces. Finally, 
the self-face being part of one’s own physical appearance (unlike traits or more abstract 
self-related information), it can be studied in various paradigms involving vision. This 
perceptual modality is certainly the one that has been the most intensively studied. This 
offers a huge range of possibilities based on acknowledged existing paradigms to engage 
in a systematic and controlled examination of self-referential stimuli. 
For all these reasons, we thought that the self-face would be an ideal candidate to partially 
answer the question of whether self-referential stimuli are special. However, something is 
not special per se. It is by comparison with something else. We thus needed to compare 
responses to the self-face to other kind of responses. An obvious point of comparison was 
the use of other faces. However, it could not be any face because a lot of factors 
differentiate the self-face from an unfamiliar face. The self-face is very familiar since we 
regularly see it from birth. We have encoded it over a long period of time in which we have 
encountered it across various configurations. Even if we cannot see it directly, we regularly 
perceive it in dynamic “real life” conditions (contrary to famous face that we only see 
through screens or pictures for instance). In order to estimate self-effects at best and to 
prevent other factors such as familiarity to create confound, we chose to compare 
responses to the self-face to responses to another personally and highly familiar face. In all 
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the experiments presented below, we recruited pairs of gender-matched participants. They 
were friends or fellow students (i.e., involved in a positive relationship), had approximately 
the same age and encountered each other on a regular basis. This way, each of them 
served as control familiar face for the other one. Moreover, as each individual participant’s 
face had both status of self-face and other familiar face, possible differences between the 
two kinds of faces could not be explained by particular and distinctive facial features one 
could have. 
In this work, we have examined the specificity of the self-face (and of the self-body) in the 
same three main topics as presented in Chapter 2: representation in memory, neural 
correlates and attentional properties. The present account begins with Chapter 4 that 
describes a study examining the accuracy of the representation of the self-face in memory. 
Section 2 of Chapter 2 illustrated how the physical constraints pertaining to our own face 
affect the way it is represented in memory. However, previous studies mainly investigated 
the self-face representation in regards with its orientation (i.e., mirror versus normal view, 
canonical view) or efficiency (i.e., processing advantage in terms of reaction times) and little 
is known about its precision and accuracy. We filled this gap using a psychophysics method 
involving gradual facial transformations. These transformations were applied on the self-
face or on the other familiar face and consisted in incrementally moving the eyes inwards or 
outwards by steps of two pixels (up to 18 pixels). The resulting pictures were presented in a 
random order and participants were asked to judge from memory whether each picture was 
intact or altered. In order to determine the extent to which the representation of the familiar 
faces is precise in memory, participants’ performance was compared to that of other 
participants involved in a perceptual discrimination task.  
In Section 3 of Chapter 2, we have seen that neural correlates underlying self-face 
representation and recognition are not clearly established yet. Moreover, we have also 
noted that the self-recognition from body shape and its neural correlates has been a little 
neglected in the literature to date. Chapter 5 describes an fMRI study aimed at investigating 
further these questions. The paired presentation of self-face and self-body also allowed 
examining the important question of common neural regions involved in the processing of 
self-referential stimuli independently of the stimulus domain. We used similar facial 
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alterations than in the preceding study and designed an equivalent waist-hip ratio alteration 
for bodies. Participants’ brain responses were recorded while they were judging whether 
pictures of themselves and of a close friend were intact or altered. 
In following chapters studies investigating the third main topic related with attentional 
properties of the self-face are presented. Section 4 of Chapter 2 showed that self-referential 
stimuli might not have an unconditional attention-grabbing capacity. Previous studies 
claiming that self-referential stimuli have particular attentional properties often lacked 
adequate controls allowing such a claim. Therefore, circumstances allowing important 
stimuli such as the self-face to be preferentially selected by attention are still unclear. 
Chapter 6 describes a set of two experiments aimed at determining whether the self-face 
has a specific and enduring distractive power by comparison with other familiar and 
unfamiliar faces when it is presented irrelevantly with the task at hand. Moreover, precise 
conditions in which the self-face produces distraction are examined in regards with its 
spatial location within or outside the participant’s presumed focus of attention. By contrast 
with Chapter 6 only investigating whether the self-face has some distractive power, Chapter 
7 presents three experiments examining more precisely whether the self-face is particularly 
able to capture attention and whether a face per se captures attention by comparison with 
other stimuli. In this study, we used an inattentional blindness paradigm in which the 
participant’s own face or another familiar or unfamiliar face was unexpectedly presented 
while participants were engaged in an unrelated demanding task. Finally, Chapter 8 
presents an eye-tracking experiment simultaneously studying the self-face’s ability to 
capture and hold attention compared with other faces. Participants’ eye-movements were 
recorded while they were engaged in a visual search task implying faces but in which the 
facial identity or familiarity was irrelevant. Moreover, the effect of the status of the self-face 
as target or distractor was also assessed. 
In the ninth and last chapter, results of all above-mentioned studies will be discussed in 
relation with previous literature. We will try to give an update on the question of the self-face 
specificity in regards with our three main topics. We will also propose some perspectives for 
future work that should be done. 
 Chapter 4 
THE ACCURACY OF MEMORY FOR 
PERSONALLY KNOWN INDIVIDUALS’ FACES 
Reprinted from “Serge Brédart and Christel Devue (2006). The accuracy of memory for 
personally known individuals’ faces. Perception, 35, 101-106, Copyright 2006” with 
permission from Pion. 
Abstract 
The present study was aimed at evaluating whether the very high accuracy of memory for 
familiar faces demonstrated by Ge, Luo, Nishimura and Lee (2003) with a very familiar 
famous person may generalises to faces of personally known individuals. The accuracy of 
participants’ perceptual memory for a close colleague’s face and for their own face was 
evaluated by presenting original and manipulated pictures of these two target persons. The 
manipulation consisted of increasing or decreasing the interocular distance. As in Ge et 
al.’s study, results indicated that proportions of correct recognition of the original faces, and 
Just Noticeable Differences for the detection of alterations in the recognition task, were not 
significantly different from the corresponding measures in a perceptual discrimination task 
performed by a sample of participants who did not know the target persons at all. High 
accuracy of memory generalises to faces of personally known individuals. 
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Introduction 
Recently, Ge, Luo, Nishimura and Lee (2003) have proposed an interesting experimental 
procedure to examine the accuracy of our memory for highly familiar faces. Instead of 
presenting faces of different individuals, they presented the original and manipulated 
pictures of one target face: Mao Tse-Toung’s face that was particularly familiar to their 
Chinese participants. The original face was slightly altered on only a single dimension: the 
interocular distance was either increased or decreased. The participants’ task was to judge 
whether each seen face was that of Mao or an altered version of Mao’s face. By presenting 
one face stimulus at a time to the participants and asking them to judge whether the seen 
face is the same as, or different from, the image of Mao that they have in memory, the 
minimal change needed for a face stimulus to be judged as an altered picture of Mao was 
determined. This Just Noticeable Difference (JND) provided a threshold level estimation of 
the accuracy of participants’ memory for Mao’s face. Ge et al. showed that this memory 
threshold approximated the perceptual discrimination threshold of participants who were not 
familiar with Mao’s face. Using the procedure proposed by Ge et al. it was possible to study 
the recognition of familiar faces in a more precise fashion. More than the ability to identify 
an individual among others, this procedure enables the investigation of the ability to detect 
changes in a familiar face from memory. 
Ge et al. showed a remarkably accurate recognition of a famous individual’s face who was 
mainly known from his standard portrait. The important question of whether such accuracy 
occurs for very familiar faces in general or only for those famous people who are mainly 
known from a particular iconic portrait (e.g. Mao, Che Guevara, etc.) cannot be answered 
from the Ge et al. study. From their study, it is unclear whether people have an excellent 
memory for Mao’s face, or an excellent memory for the particularly famous portrait that was 
used as the stimulus. To address this point we examined the accuracy of memory for highly 
familiar faces of personally known individuals such as a close colleague’s face and one’s 
own face. We do not know personally familiar people from a particular standard portrait. 
Instead, we have experienced a variety of exemplars both of our own face and of close 
colleagues’ faces. We have seen each of these faces in different views, showing different 
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facial expressions, and possibly with different hairstyles, make up, and so on. However, 
several authors have stressed that the distribution of views seen from one’s own face is 
more restricted than the distribution of views from other familiar faces (Laeng & Rouw, 
2001; Troje & Kersten, 1999). Because this difference could be relevant to the formation of 
robust representations for faces (Tong & Nakayama, 1999), in the present study the 
recognition of one’s own face was systematically compared with the recognition of a close 
colleague’s face. JNDs in the self-recognition task were compared with JNDs in the 
colleague’s face recognition task (within-subjects comparison). Like in the Ge et al. study, 
these JNDs were respectively compared with JNDs from another group of participants 
involved in a perceptual discrimination task (between-subjects comparison). However, the 
ease of detection of alterations is not the only aspect of accuracy. The ability to recognize 
the original, non-altered, version of the target face also seems important. Hence the 
proportion of correct responses to the original version of the target face was also used as a 
dependent measure. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four volunteers (12 women) aged between 17 and 29 years participated. Twelve of 
them (6 women) participated in a recognition task. They had known their same gender 
colleague for between 2 and 5 years (mean 3.7 years). The other twelve participants were 
recruited as controls and took part in a perceptual discrimination task. Participants in the 
recognition task were totally unfamiliar to participants in the discrimination task. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Materials 
The twelve experimental participants were photographed in front of the same beige wall and 
were depicted with a neutral facial expression. A full face, frontal view colour photograph of 
each experimental participant was taken at a distance of 150 cm with a digital camera 
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(Nikon Coolpix 2500). None of these participants had facial hair or wore glasses. Each 
image has a width of 16 cm and height of 21 cm (450 by 587 pixels) with a resolution of 
0.035 cm per pixel or 2.41 min of arc per pixel. The image manipulation software GIMP was 
used to increase or decrease the distance between each target face’s eyes, two pixels at a 
time (one pixel for each eye). The resultant images were then retouched to create natural-
looking shadings (see Figure 1). From each target face, 9 new versions with a wider 
interocular distance were created for the eye-out condition, and 9 new versions with a 
smaller interocular distance were created for the eye-in condition. Hereafter, these new 
versions will be referred to as “Target + X” or “Target – X”, where X indicated the number of 
pixels (from 2 to 18) by which the distance between the eyes of the new version differed 
from that of the original target face. The original face will be referred to as “Target”.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch monitor at a 
viewing distance of 50 cm. The stimulus presentation and data recording were controlled by 
the E-prime software. Each participant in the recognition task saw 19 different pictures of 
her/his own face and 19 different pictures of their same gender colleague (the 9 versions of 
the eye-out condition, the 9 versions of the eye-in condition and the original face, for each 
target person). Each picture was presented a total of 20 times. Thus, during the experiment 
itself, the participants saw a total of 760 stimuli (i.e. 20 trials x 19 different pictures per 
target face x 2 target faces). Trials were grouped into two main blocks: trials on the own 
face / trials on the colleague’s face. Half of the participants saw the 380 pictures of their 
own face first. The remaining participants saw the 380 pictures of their colleague’s face 
first. Within each block, trials were presented in a random order. There was a 2 min break 
every 190 trials. Each picture was presented until the participant responded, or until a 
maximum of 10 s had elapsed. Participants were told that they were going to see pictures of 
their own face and pictures of a colleague (the name of the colleague was given), and that 
some of these pictures had been manipulated so that the interocular distance was either 
increased or decreased while some of them were intact (non-manipulated). Participants 
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w
ere instructed to judge w
hether each presented picture w
as intact (“Y
es” response) or 
m
anipulated (“N
o” response). 
                
Figure 1. An example of stimuli used in the experiment. The original target was manipulated on one single 
dimension: the inter-ocular distance was either decreased (Target - X) or increased (Target + X). 
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Participants responded by pressing a response key on a computer keyboard. No feedback 
was given. The experiment took about 70 min. Before each of the two main blocks of items, 
the participants were shown the complete set of the 19 pictures that were to be presented in 
the block, once and in a random order. No response was required during this pre-
experimental phase.  
Since people are usually more familiar with the mirror-reversed view of their own face than 
with the normal view, and conversely, more familiar with the normal view of other people’s 
face than with the mirror view, participants were shown their own face in a mirror orientation 
and their colleague’s face in a normal orientation. 
In the discrimination task, each participant was shown pairs of pictures of a same gender 
unfamiliar face (i.e., the face of an individual who participated in the recognition task). Each 
pair of pictures consisted of the target face’s original picture and one manipulated picture of 
the same face (from Target – 18 to Target + 18), or two copies of Target. Pictures had the 
same size as those presented in the recognition task. Participants were asked to judge 
whether the pairs of pictures were identical or different from each other in any way. As in 
the recognition task, they were told that the interocular distance had been manipulated on 
some pictures. Moreover, before starting the experimental trials, they were shown the 19 
pictures to be seen later in the experiment. During the experiment itself, each participant 
saw a total of 380 pairs of pictures (i.e., 20 trials x 19 different pairs). The face of each 
participant in the recognition task was showed to one participant in the discrimination task. 
Results 
The rate of absence of response within the allowed 10 s was very low (0.12% in the 
recognition task and 0.57% in the perceptual discrimination task, i.e., less than 1% in both 
tasks). Figure 2 shows the mean proportions of trials in which participants judged that the 
presented face was altered in the recognition task. This figure also shows the mean 
proportion of trials in which participants judged that the two presented pictures of a face 
were different, in the discrimination task. 
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As in the Ge et al. study, each participant’s threshold value in pixels was determined by 
interpolating the 75% correct response point. In the recognition task, the threshold value 
was calculated separately for each target face (own face or colleague’s face).  
In the recognition task, the proportions of correct responses to the original target pictures 
were similar for the person’s own face (mean = 0.82; sd = 0.15) and for the colleague’s face 
(mean = 0.85; sd = 0.15), t(11) < 1. In addition, a 2 (Target face: self vs colleague) X 2 
(Condition: eye-in vs eye-out) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors was carried 
out on the JNDs. This analysis revealed no main effect of the target face, no main effect of 
the condition, and no interaction effect (all ps > .10). In other words, the participants’ 
performance was similar for their own face and for the colleague’s face, on the one hand, 
and for increases and decreases in the interocular distance on the other hand. Descriptive 
data are presented in Table 1. 
 
Condition Eye-in    Eye-out 
 
Recognition task 
Own face  7.22 (2.78) 17.40 (6.71) 9.59 (4.08)  23.10 (9.84) 
Colleague’s face  7.23 (2.61) 17.43 (6.29) 8.65 (2.95) 20.86 (7.12) 
 
Discrimination task 7.42 (3.40) 17.89 (8.20) 7.71 (3.76) 18.58 (9.08) 
 
Table 1. Means (standard deviations) of just noticeable differences in pixels (JNDs in 
min of arc are presented in italics) in the eye-in and eye-out conditions, for the own 
face and the close colleague’s face (recognition task) and unfamiliar faces 
(perceptual discrimination task). 
A 2 (Target face) X 9 (Decreasing distance) ANOVA with repeated measures on both 
factors showed no main effect of the target face (F < 1) and no interaction effect (F < 1) but 
revealed a significant effect of decreasing distance (F(8,88) = 79.64; p < .001): as the 
deviation from the Target increased, participants’ detection of alteration increased (see 
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Figure 2). Similarly, a 2 (Target face) X 9 (Increasing distance) ANOVA showed no main 
effect of the target face (F < 1), no interaction effect (F(8,88) = 1.85; p > .05), but revealed a 
significant effect of increasing distance (F(8,88) = 63.46; p < .001): again, as the deviation 
from the Target increased, participants’ detection of alteration increased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean rates of “altered” responses as a function of face alteration (from 
Target -18 to Target +18) for the own face and the close colleague’s face (recognition 
task), and unfamiliar faces (perceptual discrimination task). 
Performance on the perceptual discrimination task was compared with performance on the 
recognition tasks. Independent t-tests showed that the proportion of correct “same” 
responses on the perceptual discrimination task (mean = 0.89; sd = 0.16) was not 
significantly different from the proportion of correct responses to the original version of the 
target faces in the recognition tasks (t(22) = 1.12; p = 0.27 for the own face; t(22) < 1 for the 
colleague’s face; see Figure 2). Similar comparisons were performed on the JNDs by 
conducting two mixed two-way 2 (Task) X 2 (Condition: eye-in vs eye-out) ANOVAs with 
repeated measures on the last factor. In the first analysis, JNDs from participants involved 
in the own-face recognition task were compared with JNDs from control participants, i.e., 
participants judging the same faces (unknown to them) in the perceptual discrimination 
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task. This analysis revealed no effect of the task, no effect of the condition, and no 
interaction (all ps > .20). In the second analysis, JNDs from the participants’ responses to 
the colleague’s face in the recognition task were compared with JNDs from control 
participants’ responses in the perceptual discrimination task. This analysis revealed no 
effect of the task, no effect of the condition, and no interaction (all ps > .30).  
Discussion 
Our aim was to evaluate whether the highly accurate recognition of very familiar faces that 
Ge et al. (2003) found while using the standard portrait of a famous person (Mao) 
generalises to faces of personally known individuals. In the present study, Ge et al.’s 
procedure was used both with faces of the participants, and a close colleague of theirs. 
Results indicated that the mean proportion of correct recognition of the original face 
(whether it be one’s own face or the colleague’s face) in the recognition task was similar to 
the mean proportion of “same” responses in a perceptual discrimination task performed by 
control participants to whom the target faces were unknown. In addition, for both faces, 
JNDs in the recognition task were not significantly different from JNDs measured in the 
perceptual identification task. This pattern of results is identical to that reported by Ge et al. 
(2003). Moreover, the values of the JNDs are rather similar across Ge et al.’s first 
experiment and the present experiment: their values were around 20 minutes of arc while 
those reported here were a little bit smaller. 
Results also showed that, in the recognition task, participants’ performance was similar for 
the own face and the colleague’s face whether the dependent measure was the proportion 
of correct identification of the original face or the JNDs. Therefore, the fact that the 
distribution of views from one’s own face was restricted relative to other very familiar faces 
had no significant influence on the participants’ performance. This is perhaps not so 
surprising since the task required participants to process pictures that presented faces in a 
full frontal view, i.e., a view that is easily available for one’s own face as well as for other 
faces. On the other hand, no advantage for self-recognition was observed. This lack of 
advantage for the processing of self-face is consistent with previous work (e.g., Kircher et 
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al., 2001, 2002). It seems that self-face recognition does not comply to the idea that people 
should be especially good at recognising stimuli that are relevant to themselves 
(Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004). 
It has been shown that the eyes are particularly important for the recognition of familiar 
faces (e.g. O’Donnell & Bruce, 2001). In future work, the Ge et al. (2003) procedure should 
be used to evaluate whether the high accuracy in detecting alterations holds even when 
other distances (e.g. the distance between the nose and the mouth) are manipulated. 
In conclusion, the present results support the idea that high accuracy of memory for familiar 
faces is not limited to the recognition of famous individuals, or to their iconic portraits. It 
generalises to personally known individuals for whom we have a varied visual experience in 
that we encounter such faces under a variety of stimulus conditions and contexts. 
Acknowledgements  
This research was supported by a grant from the Belgian Fonds de la Recherche 
Fondamentale Collective (Grant n° 8.4506.05 – 2.4539.05) to S.B. Thanks to Sarah 
Stevenage and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. 
 
 Chapter 5 
HERE I AM: THE CORTICAL CORRELATES OF 
VISUAL SELF-RECOGNITION 
Reprinted from “Christel Devue, Fabienne Collette, Evelyne Balteau, Christian Degueldre, André 
Luxen, Pierre Maquet, and Serge Brédart (2007). Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual 
self-recognition. Brain Research, 1143, 169-182, Copyright 2007” with permission from Elsevier. 
Abstract 
Recently, interest in the neural correlates of self-recognition has grown. Most studies 
concentrate on self-face recognition. However, there is a lack of convergence as to precise 
neuroanatomical locations underlying self-face recognition. In addition, recognition of familiar 
persons from bodies has been relatively neglected. In the present study, cerebral activity while 
participants performed a task in which they had to indicate the real appearance of themselves 
and of a gender-matched close colleague among intact and altered pictures of faces and bodies 
was measured. The right frontal cortex and the insula were found to be the main regions 
specifically implicated in visual self-recognition compared with visual processing of other highly 
familiar persons. Moreover, the right anterior insula along with the right anterior cingulate, 
seemed to play a role in the integration of information about oneself independently of the 
stimulus domain. The processing of self-related pictures was also compared to scrambled 
versions of these pictures. Results showed that different areas of the occipito-temporal cortex 
were more or less recruited depending on whether a face or a body was perceived, as it has 
already been reported by several recent studies. The implication of present findings for a 
general framework of person identification is discussed. 
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Introduction 
The face is a physical characteristic that is critical to the identification of people we meet. 
The recognition of one’s own face is also important. The ability to recognise one’s own face 
appears to participate in maintaining a sense of self (Platek, Thomson, & Gallup, 2004). To 
recognise oneself, one must have the ability to build and retrieve a representation of one’s 
physical appearance, and to regard the self as a different entity from others. Hence, many 
researchers view self-recognition as an indicator of self-awareness (see Gallup, Anderson, 
& Platek, 2003). Recently, the question of whether there are neural mechanisms which are 
distinctively related to the process of self-recognition (as compared with the recognition of 
other familiar people) has drawn the attention of a growing number of cognitive 
neuroscientists (for recent reviews see Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Keenan, Wheeler & Ewers, 
2003; Keenan, Gallup, et al., 2003).  
The examination of split-brain patients has demonstrated that both hemispheres are 
capable of self-recognition (Sperry, Zaidel, & Zaidel, 1979; Uddin, Rayman, & Zaidel, 2005). 
However, evidence that self-recognition preferentially involves the right hemisphere has 
been reported. Several studies have indicated a left-hand advantage in self-face recognition 
tasks in healthy participants (Keenan et al., 1999; Keenan, Freund, Hamilton, Ganis, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2000; Keenan, Ganis, Freund, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Platek & Gallup, 
2002; Platek, Thomson, et al., 2004; Zhu, Qi, & Zhang, 2004). Because of contralateral 
motor control, this left-hand advantage supports the view that the right hemisphere is 
predominant in self-recognition. A right hemispheric advantage for self-face recognition in a 
callosotomy patient has also been reported (Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, Lardi, & Lassonde, 
2003; but see Turk et al., 2002, for a left hemisphere advantage in another split-brain 
patient). In addition, patients who were undergoing Wada tests were shown images of 
themselves morphed with a famous face during right and left hemispheric anaesthetization. 
After the anaesthesia has subsided, patients were asked about the face they were shown. 
They were more likely to report having seen themselves after the anaesthetization of the 
left hemisphere than after the anaesthetization of the right hemisphere (Keenan, Nelson, 
O’Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001). Finally, healthy participants showed greater right 
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hemispheric activity, as measured by evoked potentials induced by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, while presented with morphed or masked pictures of their own face as opposed 
to pictures of another person (Keenan et al., 2001; Théoret et al., 2004).  
However, there are studies that support the opposite view that the left hemisphere has a 
dominant role in self-recognition. In one study, already mentioned here above, a split-brain 
patient was presented with morphed images blending his own face with a familiar person’s 
face (Turk et al., 2002). These images were presented separately to the left and to the right 
hemispheres. In one condition the patient’s task was to determine whether a presented 
image was himself while in another condition his task was to determine whether the image 
was the familiar person. The rate of self-detection was higher when the images were 
presented to the left than to the right hemisphere. On the opposite, detection of the familiar 
person was better when the images were presented to the right than to the left hemisphere. 
More recently, healthy participants were asked to choose which of two chimeric faces (one 
made from the left half and one made from the right half of their face) looked more like 
themselves (Brady, Campbell,& Flaherty, 2004). They showed a bias for the composite 
made from the half face that lies in their right visual field when they look at themselves in 
the mirror. When asked to make the same choice for similar images of a friend, they 
showed the opposite bias, i.e. they preferentially chose the composite made from the half 
face that lies in their left visual field when they look at their friend. Such results suggest that 
the left hemisphere is dominant for self-recognition and the right hemisphere is dominant for 
the recognition of others. 
Results from functional neuroimaging studies of self-recognition using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and PET are also controversial. Some studies concluded that the 
right prefrontal regions are critical for self-face recognition (Platek, Keenan, Gallup, & 
Mohammed, 2004; Keenan, Wheeler, & Ewers, 2003). More recently, Uddin, Kaplan, 
Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel and Iacoboni (2005) reported that a neural network in the right 
hemisphere including the inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule is activated by 
the recognition of the self-face. In another experiment, Uddin et al. (2006) also confirmed 
the implication of the right inferior parietal lobule during self-face recognition and 
demonstrated for the first time the existence of a causal relationship between this region 
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and self-recognition. To do so, they used a low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation to induce a virtual lesion in this region. This manipulation decreased the 
sensitivity of participants to detect their own face among morphed images of themselves 
and another highly familiar person while this manipulation had no effect when it was applied 
on the same region on the left side. However, there is also evidence suggesting bilateral 
involvement in self-face recognition. Kircher et al. (2000, 2001) reported activation in the 
right limbic system, left prefrontal cortex and temporal cortex during self-face processing. In 
a PET study Sugiura et al. (2000) found an implication of a large bilateral network involving 
the bilateral prefrontal cortex, the fusiform gyrus, the insula and the putamen on the left 
side, the supramarginal gyrus, the anterior cingulate, the presupplementary motor area and 
the hypothalamus on the right side during self-face recognition. More recently, Sugiura et 
al. (2005) conducted an fMRI study aimed at identifying the cortical mechanisms of self-
face recognition by controlling the selectivity of the activation for the self-face. To do so, 
they compared the activity elicited for the self-face to that found with faces of different 
degrees of familiarity (i.e., a friend, an experimenter and a prelearned unfamiliar face) and 
excluded activation that could be explained by these differences of familiarity. They 
observed selective activation of the right occipito-temporo-parietal junction and frontal 
operculum, as well as in the left fusiform gyrus during self-face recognition. Platek et al. 
(2006) contrasted cerebral responses to self-face and another personally familiar face and 
also found an implication of both hemispheres (superior frontal gyrus, medial frontal and 
inferior parietal lobes on the right, and middle temporal gyrus on the left) during self-face 
identification. 
Our first aim was to examine the cortical mechanisms of visual self-face recognition. The 
lack of convergence as to precise anatomical locations underlying self-face recognition 
motivated the present study. Moreover, previous studies considerably differed between 
each others with regard to the familiarity of the control face compared with the self-face. 
Depending on the studies and on the contrasts formally used in these studies, the control 
face was unfamiliar (Sugiura et al., 2000), recently learned (Sugiura et al., 2005), famous 
(Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004), or personally known to the participant (Kircher et al., 2000, 
2001; Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2005; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005). Since control of 
familiarity is more efficient when the self-face is compared with a highly familiar face, we 
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used a personally known, gender-matched, person as the control face in the current study. 
Because distinguishing two highly familiar persons from each other is presumably very 
easy, we designed a task in which participants would have to identify their real facial 
appearance and that of their colleague among intact and altered pictures presented during 
a first event-related scanning session. In addition, the use of altered pictures allowed to 
increase stimulus variability and helped to decrease repetition suppression of the BOLD 
signal (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). However, we were mainly interested in the processing of 
intact stimuli because responses to altered views of these faces might not reflect usual 
processing of such familiar stimuli (Platek et al., 2004). In other words, participants’ task 
consisted in an “intact – altered” judgment both on pictures of themselves or of a close 
colleague, all these pictures being presented at random. The facial alterations consisted in 
moving the eyes inwards or outwards. To increase the statistical power of our analysis, we 
used a priori regions of interest found to be elicited in studies using similar contrasts (i.e., 
self-face minus other familiar face). These regions were the right inferior frontal gyrus 
(Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005), the left inferior frontal gyrus 
(Kircher et al., 2000), the right superior frontal gyrus (Platek et al., 2006), the right middle 
frontal gyrus (Platek et al., 2006), the right medial frontal gyrus (Platek et al., 2006), the left 
middle temporal gyrus (Platek et al., 2006), the left fusiform gyrus (Kircher et al., 2001), and 
the right inferior parietal lobule (Platek et al., 2006; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005). 
In addition, Gillihan and Farah (2005) recently noticed that there is a lack of studies of self-
recognition from the body shape or body parts. Hence, the second aim of the current study 
was to investigate the cortical correlates of visual self-body recognition by assessing 
whether specific cortical regions underlie the own body recognition compared with the 
recognition of another familiar person’s body. In a second event-related scanning session 
we asked participants to identify their real body-shape appearance and that of their 
colleague among intact and altered pictures. The body alterations consisted in increasing or 
decreasing the waist-to-hip ratio by changing the width of the hips. Again, the alterations 
were introduced to increase the difficulty of the task and to induce some variability in the 
stimuli. Due to the explorative nature of this comparison and to the lack of studies 
investigating this specific topic, we tentatively r
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between the processing of the self-body and the processing of another highly familiar 
person’s body were examined. 
Importantly, the use of body shapes as stimuli was also motivated by the third aim of 
determining which cerebral regions are selectively activated by self-processing regardless 
of the domain of presented stimulus (body or face). In some previous studies, the neural 
correlates of self-processing was explored using auditory presentations of the own name 
(e.g. Holeckova, et al., 2006; Perrin et al., 1999, 2005). However, contrary to the self-face 
or body, the own name is not an exclusively self-referential stimulus since it can be shared 
with other people. The self-voice is another type of auditory self-referential stimulus. It has 
the advantage of not being shared with other people. However, the use of such a stimulus 
may also be problematic. Indeed, hearing our own voice played back does not account for 
bone conductance and therefore a recording of our voice rarely sounds like our own voice 
heard from inside. Moreover, manipulating voices and faces is hardly comparable5. Hence, 
in addition to the self-face, the self-body was used instead of the own name or voice. Thus, 
for that purpose, data related to the self-face and data related to the self-body were 
collapsed and compared with the data related to the processing of the colleague’s face and 
body. To increase the statistical power of our analysis on this contrast, we used a priori 
regions of interest found to be activated in studies investigating different tasks associated 
with auto-referential processing such as judgment of adjectives/sentences as self-
descriptive or judgment of actions as self generated. These regions were the right/medial 
prefrontal cortex (Fossati et al., 2003; Kelley et al., 2002), the right anterior cingulate gyrus 
(Craik et al., 1999), the anterior insula (Farrer & Frith, 2002), the bilateral precuneus 
(Kircher et al., 2000, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001), the left inferior frontal gyrus (Craik et al., 
1999; Kircher et al. 2002), and the left superior frontal gyrus (Ruby & Decety, 2001; Seger, 
Stone, & Keenan, 2004).  
To summarize, in order to answer our three main questions, we used an event-related 
paradigm in which we examined cerebral activity elicited by the presentation of pictures 
depicting the face and the body of the participant and those of a close colleague. The 
                                                          
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
Chapter 5 
 113 
participants’ task was to discriminate between intact and altered pictures of themselves and 
of another highly familiar person. The alterations were used to prevent a fast habituation by 
inducing some variability among the stimuli and also to increase the difficulty of the task, 
the main interest being the participant’s ability to correctly identify intact bodies or faces. 
The intact self minus intact colleague contrasts presented below thus reflected the BOLD 
signal changes found when participants processed their real physical appearance 
compared to that of another personally familiar individual. 
Finally, as it has been suggested by several recent previous studies (Downing, Chan, 
Peelen, Dodds & Kanwisher, 2006; Downing, Jiang, Shuman & Kanwisher, 2001; Peelen & 
Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose, Baker & Kanwisher, 2005; see also Gliga & Dehaene-
Lambertz, 2005 for an ERP study) that faces and bodies are associated with distinct neural 
correlates we included two event-related control sessions in which participants passively 
viewed intact and scrambled pictures of their face (within one of these control sessions) or 
of their body (within the other control session). These two sessions would allow to 
determine the cerebral areas associated respectively with general face and body shape 
processing and would also allow to compare the neural substrates associated with the 
processing of these two kinds of stimuli. We used a priori regions of interest found to be 
elicited in studies comparing object or face processing to other kinds of stimuli (i.e., tools, 
letters or textures, scrambled pictures) processing. Regarding face recognition, these 
regions were the bilateral fusiform gyrus (Peelen & Downing, 2005, Puce, Allison, Asgari, 
Gore, & McCarthy, 1996), the right ventral occipital cortex (Peelen & Downing, 2005), the 
right occipitotemporal/inferior occipital sulci (Puce et al., 1996), and the bilateral lateral 
neocortex (Puce et al., 1996). Regarding body recognition, these regions were the right 
fusiform gyrus (Peelen & Downing, 2005) and the bilateral inferior temporal sulcus (Peelen 
& Downing, 2005). 
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Results 
Behavioral data 
The data from one participant whose response accuracy was more than 2.5 SD under the 
mean of the sample were discarded. 
Accuracy. A 2 (Stimulus domain: face/body) X 2 (Identity: self/colleague) X 2 (Stimulus 
appearance: intact/altered) repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on proportions of 
correct responses and did not reveal any significant main effect, all Fs < 2, p > 0.05. In 
addition, no interaction was significant except the Stimulus domain X Stimulus appearance 
interaction, F(1,18) = 13.16, p < 0.01. HSD Tukey post-hoc comparisons indicated that 
intact faces were better recognized than intact bodies (p < 0.05) and that altered bodies 
were better recognized than intact bodies (p < 0.05). No other difference reached 
significance. Descriptive data are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Mean median reaction times in milliseconds and mean proportion of correct 
responses (in italics) as a function of the Identity and of the Stimulus domain 
(standard deviations are between parentheses). 
Reaction times. Reaction times below 300 ms were excluded from the analyses. A 2 
(Stimulus domain: face/body) X 2 (Identity: self/colleague) X 2 (Stimulus appearance: 
Chapter 5 
 115 
intact/altered) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on median correct reaction times 
and showed a main effect of Stimulus domain, F(1,18) = 14.37, p < 0.01, participants being 
faster for faces (M = 840, SD = 240) than for bodies (M = 949, SD = 279), and a main effect 
of Identity, F(1,18) = 9.84, p < 0.01, participants being faster for themselves (M = 879, SD = 
230) than for their colleague (M = 910, SD = 234). There was also a main effect of Stimulus 
appearance, F(1,18) = 10.53, p < 0.01, intact stimuli (M = 923, SD = 267) being recognized 
more slowly than altered ones (M = 866, SD = 211). No interaction was significant (all ps > 
0.05) except the Stimulus domain X Stimulus appearance interaction, F(1,18) = 14.67, p < 
0.01. 
Tukey post-hoc comparisons indicated that intact faces were identified faster than intact 
bodies (p < 0.001), altered faces were identified faster than altered bodies (p < 0.001), 
altered bodies were identified faster than intact bodies (p < 0.001) and finally intact faces 
were identified faster than altered bodies (p < 0.01). No other comparison reached 
significance (see Table 1 for descriptive data). 
These results showed that processing faces was faster than processing bodies, and that 
processing self-relevant stimuli was faster than processing stimuli depicting a colleague. 
However, Identity and Stimulus domain did not significantly impact the proportions of 
accurate responses. The effect of Stimulus appearance was not of first importance here 
since we were interested in the analysis of BOLD signals elicited by intact pictures. 
Imaging data 
First, intact faces and bodies were compared with, respectively, scrambled faces and 
bodies in order to check whether the same cerebral areas associated respectively with face 
and body processing as those reported earlier (Downing et al., 2001, 2005; Peelen & 
Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 2005) were activated. Faces and bodies elicited 
responses in close but segregated regions of the occipital cortex (Figure 1). Perception of 
faces was associated with a bilateral cerebral activity in the middle occipital gyrus, 
extending to the fusiform gyrus on the right and to the cerebellum on the left, as well as with 
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activation of a large frontal area on the right side (middle and inferior frontal gyrus, and 
medial/superior frontal gyrus) (see Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Significant BOLD signal changes in relevant contrasts. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of brain activity observed when intact pictures (faces and bodies) 
were compared to scrambled pictures. Regions that showed activity associated with 
the processing of faces are boxed in black; Regions that showed activity associated 
with the processing of bodies are circled in white. (A) Regions with significant rCBF 
increase (corrected p value < .05) are superimposed upon a T1-weighted magnetic 
resonance imaging slice normalized into the MNI space. Coordinates of all significant 
regions are given in Table 2. Coronal sections are shown respectively 80 and 55 mm 
posterior to the anterior commissure. (B) Mean parameter estimates (arbitrary units) 
in the regions detected in the contrast Face - Scrambled are displayed for, from left to 
right, Intact own face, Scrambled own face, Intact own body and Scrambled own 
body. (C) Mean parameter estimates (arbitrary units) in the regions detected in the 
contrast Body – Scrambled are displayed for, from left to right, Intact own face, 
Scrambled own face, Intact own body and Scrambled own body. Error bars represent 
SEM. 
Perception of bodies was associated with activity in the fusiform and lateral occipital 
complex bilaterally, and with activity in the left middle occipital gyrus (see Table 2). These 
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findings are consistent with previous literature (Downing et al., 2001, 2005; Peelen & 
Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 2005). Direct comparisons between faces and bodies 
are reported in Table 2 (contrasts (3) and (4)). 
After having identified the regions implicated in the processing of faces and bodies, we 
examined the contrasts of central interest in this study, i.e. the contrasts that assessed 
which cortical areas are specifically implicated in the processing of self related pictures and 
in the processing of pictures depicting another highly familiar person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of brain activation elicited in the right inferior frontal gyrus by the 
recognition of the intact own face in comparison with the recognition of another highly 
familiar face. Coordinates of all significant regions are given in Table 2. Left. Region 
with significant rCBF increase (corrected at p<0.05 after applying small volume 
corrections) is superimposed upon a T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging slice 
normalized into MNI. Coronal section is shown 32 mm anterior to the anterior 
commissure. Right. Mean parameter estimates (arbitrary units) in the right inferior 
frontal gyrus for Intact own face and Intact colleague’s face. Error bars represent 
SEM. 
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Intact own face > Intact colleague’s face. A significant response was identified in the right 
inferior frontal gyrus (Figure 2), consistent with literature (Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2000; Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004; Platek et al., 
2006; Sugiura et al., 2000; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005), as well as in the right insula. 
Contrary to previous studies (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Sugiura et al., 2000, 2005), no 
significant implication of the left fusiform was found. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of brain deactivation in the right superior temporal gyrus 
observed with the comparison of a familiar face to the own face. Coordinates of the 
region is given in Table 2. Left. Region with significant rCBF decrease (corrected at 
p<0.05) are superimposed upon a T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging slice 
normalized into MNI. Coronal section is shown 28 mm posterior to the anterior 
commissure. Right. Mean parameter estimates (arbitrary units) in the right superior 
temporal gyrus for Intact own face and Intact colleague’s face. Error bars represent 
SEM. 
Intact colleague’s face > Intact own face. The processing of the colleague’s face elicited 
activity in the right superior temporal gyrus. With a priori locations of interest defined from 
studies that reported a contrast as close as possible as the present one (other highly 
familiar face minus own face, Platek et al., 2006; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005), a significant 
differential response was observed in the left precuneus and in the left superior temporal 
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gyrus. However, parameter estimates showed that these areas were actually differently 
deactivated for the colleague’s face and for the self-face (see Figure 3 for an example). 
Intact own body > Intact colleague’s body. Significant responses were detected at a 
threshold of Puncorrected = 0.001 in the right superior frontal sulcus, right cingulate cortex, left 
inferior frontal gyrus, as well as in the anterior insula bilaterally. None of these results 
survived correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of brain (de)activation in the right anterior insula (top) and right 
anterior cingulate (bottom) observed for the processing of oneself by comparison to 
the processing of another person regardless of the Stimulus domain. Coordinates of 
the regions are given in Table 2. Left. Regions with significant rCBF 
increase/decrease (corrected at p<0.05 after applying small volume corrections) are 
superimposed upon a T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging slice normalized into 
MNI. Coronal section is shown 32 mm anterior to the anterior commissure. Right. 
Mean parameter estimates (arbitrary units) in the right anterior insula and in the right 
anterior cingulate for, from left to right, Intact own face, Intact colleague’s face, Intact 
own body and Intact colleague’s body. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Intact colleague’s body > Intact own body. Significant responses were detected at a 
threshold of Puncorrected = 0.001 in the left parietal opercule and in a right medial temporal 
structure close of the lateral part of the hippocampus. None of these results survived 
correction for multiple comparisons. 
Finally, we examined whether specific regions were implicated in the processing of self-
related pictures independently of the Stimulus domain. 
Intact self > Intact colleague. This analysis was based on a priori locations from previous 
literature related to self-processing. Interestingly, when activation associated with seeing 
intact stimuli depicting the colleague (faces and bodies) was substracted from activation 
due to seeing stimuli depicting the participant herself, a significant response was found in 
the right anterior insula, consistent with literature (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Fink et al., 1996; 
Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). The response in the right dorsal anterior cingulate also tended to 
be significant (Z = 3.78, p = 0.058), consistent with previous findings (Craik et al., 1999; for 
a review, see Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004) (see Figure 4). 
Discussion 
The present study had three main objectives. First, it was aimed at clarifying the specific 
neural correlates associated with the recognition of the self-face compared with the 
recognition of another highly familiar and personally known person. Second, we wanted to 
test whether specific neural substrates are implicated in the recognition of the self-body in 
comparison with the recognition of another highly familiar body. Finally, it was tested 
whether there are specific regions implicated in self-processing independently of the 
stimulus domain. In order to answer these three questions, we measured BOLD responses 
elicited while the participants’ task was to discriminate between intact and altered pictures 
of themselves and of a close colleague. An additional objective of that study was to verify, 
from our two control sessions, whether the areas of the cortex activated by faces and 
bodies were similar to those that have been recently reported (Downing et al., 2001, 2005; 
Peelen & Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 2005).  
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As far as the first objective was concerned, our data indicated that the processing of the 
own-face involved specific activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus and of the right insula 
in comparison with the processing of another highly familiar person’s face. This implication 
of the right inferior frontal gyrus is consistent with previous studies reporting that this region 
is involved in the distinction between self and others (Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005) or in the 
attentive processing of the own-face (Sugiura et al., 2000). The implication of the right 
(Kircher et al., 2000, 2001) and the left insula (Sugiura et al., 2000) in visual self-face 
recognition has also been reported earlier. This structure was also attributed a role in the 
sustained attention to the representation of the own-face (Sugiura et al., 2000). These 
results are consistent with a right hemispheric dominance model of self-recognition and 
self-awareness (Keenan, Wheeler, et al., 2000, Keenan, Wheeler, & Ewers, 2003; Platek, 
Keenan, et al., 2004; Platek et al., 2006). We did not find any implication of the left fusiform 
although it has occasionally been previously reported. However, studies that reported 
activation in this region compared the self-face with an unfamiliar face (Kircher et al., 2000, 
2001; Sugiura et al., 2005). Hence results of these studies could reflect a mere familiarity 
effect instead of a genuine self-effect. The processing of the colleague’s face, compared 
with that of the self-face, showed differential activation in the superior temporal gyrus in 
both hemispheres and in the left precuneus. Activation was more reduced for the self-face 
than for the other familiar face in these regions. This result is consistent with several 
previous studies having reported that the activation is actually more reduced in the 
temporoparietal junction (Sugiura et al., 2005), in the left superior temporal gyrus and 
precuneus (Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005) for the self-face than for another familiar face. 
Sugiura and colleagues argued that these regions contain the representation of people’s 
names and explained the greater deactivation in these regions when perceiving the self-
face by covert naming that is more likely to occur when seeing familiar faces than when 
seeing one’s face. 
As for the recognition of the familiar bodies, we tentatively reported activation in the right 
cingulate gyrus and in a large frontal area on the right side when perceiving the self-body. 
This is quite consistent with results that we reported here above and with previous findings 
related to self-face processing (Keenan, Wheeler, & Ewers, 2003, Kircher et al., 2000; 
Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004; Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2000; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 
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2005). It is also interesting that, as it was the case for faces, the insula was implicated in 
self-body perception but on the left side. In order to prevent an identification based on other 
cues than the body shape itself, our participants’ garment was standardized and it could be 
that the lack of strong activation for this contrast was due to the fact that person 
identification is less easy or less reliable from bodies than from faces leading to less 
sensible activation. Consistently with this hypothesis, reaction times indicated that 
participants were faster for faces than for bodies. However, the fact that our participants 
were all females may limit the generalisation of our results. Indeed, a recent study by 
Kurosaki et al. (2006) showed that some differences can be found between men and 
women when they are discriminating altered from intact versions of their own-body. They 
showed that, for women, the confrontation to an altered version of the own-body elicited 
activity in prefrontal and limbic areas (a parallel can be done with present observations) and 
for men, it rather elicited activity in the right occipital cortex. For the authors, this suggests 
that women would perceive distorted images of themselves by complex cognitivo-emotional 
processing whereas for men a more visuo-spatial processing is involved. However, contrary 
to us, these authors were interested in the processing of distorted images of oneself and 
they did not report data related to intact items. This makes hazardous any comparison 
between their study and the present one. Nevertheless, their findings related to gender 
differences should encourage further studies about familiar and self-body processing 
including males as well as females. 
The last aim of this study was to investigate whether cerebral regions are activated by self-
processing independently of the stimulus domain, i.e. regardless of whether a face or a 
body was processed. A comparison of the processing of self-related pictures with the 
processing of pictures related to another highly familiar person revealed an implication of 
the right anterior insula and of the right dorsal anterior cingulate. This implication of the 
anterior cingulate is in line with findings of a recent study by Platek et al. (2005). They 
showed that this region is at play during processing of self facial resemblance. Since this 
region is also implicated during the processing of face familiarity or self-referent information, 
they suggested that this region might be generally involved when making decisions about 
self-referential information. Our findings are also consistent with Northoff and Bermpohl 
(2004)’s thesis that the cingulate gyrus could play a role in abstract self-processing, that is, 
Cortical correlates of visual self-recognition 
 124 
independent of the stimulus domain or of the sensorial modality. The activity found in the 
right anterior insula is also in line with previous studies investigating different aspects of 
self-processing and indicating that this structure is implicated in self-agency (Farrer & Frith, 
2002), autobiographical episodic memory retrieval (Fink et al., 1996), self-face recognition 
or self-descriptive judgments (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). The specific role of this structure 
remains to be investigated but present results as well as those of previous studies suggest 
that, like the anterior cingulate, the right anterior insula could play a general role in making 
decisions about oneself. The right hemispheric implication is also in agreement with 
patients studies showing that the condition of persons suffering from an alteration of the 
sense of self is principally underlain by brain damages localised in the right frontal lobe (for 
a review see Feinberg and Keenan, 2005). 
A secondary aim of this study was to check which regions are implicated during face or 
during body processing. Comparisons of body shape or face processing with seeing a 
scrambled image indicated that faces and bodies seemed to recruit close but segregated 
areas of the occipital cortex (see Figure 1). This is in agreement with previous studies that 
identified distinct regions of the extrastriate cortex that are specifically devoted to faces 
(ventral occipital face area, OFA, Puce et al., 1996; Peelen & Downing, 2005) and bodies 
(extrastriate body area, EBA, Downing et al., 2001; Peelen & Downing, 2005). Visual 
analysis of Figure 1 also indicated a common implication of the right fusiform gyrus for 
faces and bodies. This is also consistent with recent studies (Peelen & Downing, 2005; 
Schwarzlose et al., 2005) which found such overlapping although distinct regions of the 
fusiform gyrus were associated with presentation of faces and bodies. In addition, as it has 
already been shown previously (Spiridon, Fischl & Kanwisher, 2006), although left and right 
hemispheres showed a similar pattern of activation with faces and bodies (FFA and EBA), 
the implicated areas seemed less extended on the left than on the right. However, these 
results have to be taken cautiously because the two stimulus domains were presented in 
two different sessions which certainly gave rise to a poor sensitivity. 
From these results, it appears that after a partly segregated structural processing of the 
shape of faces and bodies in posterior areas, the distinction between self and others might 
be processed in more anterior regions. Self-related stimuli were specifically processed 
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mainly in the right frontal gyrus and in the anterior insula compared with stimuli depicting 
another highly familiar person. In agreement with previous studies (for a review, see 
Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004), we found that specific areas in the right anterior insula and in 
the right dorsal cingulate gyrus are also devoted to integrative self-processing regardless of 
the stimulus domain. 
Thus, our results suggest that posterior and anterior regions play different roles in person 
identification. Posterior regions (i.e., occipito-temporal cortex) seem to be involved, at a first 
level of processing, in the distinction of different aspects of persons (i.e., a rough 
classification as face or body). Indeed, our results indicated that these regions were 
differently recruited to process different body parts (i.e., the face alone vs. the headless 
body). The fusiform gyrus could then perform a more detailed structural encoding of stimuli 
(i.e., here the different body parts) and give a first assessment of the seen person’s 
familiarity (see Rossion, Schiltz, & Crommelinck, 2003) before further processing. That 
could explain why we did not find activity in this region when we compared the processing 
of two highly familiar persons (and corollary why other studies comparing self-face 
recognition with unfamiliar face recognition did so). Regarding person identification from 
faces, the present hypothesis represents an intermediate view (see also Grill-Spector, 
Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004) between the hypothesis that FFA simply allows to classify a 
stimulus as a face (detection hypothesis, see Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997), and 
the other hypothesis that this area is involved in individual identification of faces (see 
Gauthier et al., 2000; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). In addition, our results are in 
agreement with studies that show that the FFA is involved in face processing but also 
during identification/sub-categorization of different classes of objects by experts (Xu, 2005; 
for reviews, see Tarr & Cheng, 2003; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). Indeed, the fusiform gyrus 
was recruited during face as well as body processing, i.e. two different classes of “objects” 
that humans process with a relative expertise. At a later level of processing, anterior 
regions (i.e., mainly the frontal and superior temporal cortices, the anterior cingulate cortex 
and the anterior insula) may serve to distinguish different persons from each other and to 
access more abstract information about identity of familiar individuals (for instance people’s 
names and semantic information about these persons). More specifically, the anterior insula 
and the anterior cingulate cortex would permit to distinguish oneself from others and give 
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rise to an abstract representation of oneself that could possibly participate in maintaining a 
sense of self. 
To conclude, this study showed that specific cortical regions, mainly the right frontal cortex 
and the insula, are implicated in visual self-recognition compared with visual processing of 
highly familiar and personally known persons. These results support the view (Keenan, 
Wheeler, et al., 2000, 2001; Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004) that the right frontal cortex is 
preferentially recruited during self-recognition. In addition, our data indicated, in agreement 
with the findings of several new recent studies (Downing et al., 2001, 2005; Peelen & 
Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 2005), that the occipito-temporal cortex is more or less 
recruited depending on whether a face or a body is perceived. Finally, our study indicated 
that posterior regions would be involved in an increasingly detailed structural representation 
of different aspects of a person, whereas anterior regions within the right hemisphere (i.e., 
the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate) would be implicated in distinguishing 
between the self and others and in a more abstract representation of the self. 
Experimental procedure 
Participants 
Twenty right-handed female students from the University of Liège aged between 18 to 27 
years (M = 22.1, SD = 2.3) participated. Participants were recruited by pairs so that each 
participant served as a colleague for another participant. Each participant had known her 
colleague for between 2 and 6.5 years (M = 4 years, SD = 1.3). They had no history of 
psychological or neurological disorders and had a normal or corrected-to-normal (with 
contact lens) vision. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Medicine and of the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Liège, and was performed in 
accordance with the ethical standards described in the Declaration of Helsinki (1964). All 
participants gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. 
Chapter 5 
 127 
Materials 
Each participant’s face was photographed, in a frontal position, and with a neutral 
expression. The pictures were then cropped and resized to be 450 pixels wide X 600 pixels 
high (10° X 13.4° at a viewing distance of 90 cm) with the image manipulation software 
Gimp 2. We made two alterations of the face of each participant: the eyes were moved 16 
pixels (0.35°) inwards or outwards (see Figure 5). These alterations were chosen to be 
plausible but easily detectable (Brédart & Devue, 2006). We also took a picture of each 
participant’s body wearing the same white t-shirt and a pair of blue jeans. Shoes were 
digitally re-colored in black. These pictures were cropped and resized to be 350 pixels wide 
X 600 pixels high (7.8° X 13.4°). The face was hidden by a 100 X 100 pixels black square 
and the background wall was light grey. We also made two alterations on the body of each 
participant (using Morph Man 2000): the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) was decreased or 
increased of 10% respectively by enlarging or reducing the width of the hips (see Figure 6). 
These alterations were chosen to fit face alterations (i.e., affecting the horizontal dimension 
of a relevant part of the stimulus and giving rise to easily detectable but plausible novel 
configuration). Such alterations were thus performed on female bodies exclusively. Indeed, 
men’s WHR is typically between 0.85 and 0.95 (Singh, 1995) and increasing this ratio would 
have produced stimuli showing grotesque body shapes with a WHR higher than 1. Each 
participant was presented with the mirror-reversed versions of her 6 pictures (one intact and 
two altered faces, one intact and two altered bodies) and the normal-oriented versions of 
the 6 pictures of her colleague. For each pair, the luminance of the 12 resulting pictures 
was equated with Matlab 6 to prevent any low-level differences among these pictures. In 
addition, the pictures of the intact face and body of each participant were scrambled (with 
Matlab 6, see Figure 5d and Figure 6d). 
Procedure 
Before being installed in the scanner, participants were presented 12 pictures: 3 pictures of 
their own face (the original one and the two altered versions), 3 pictures of their colleague’s 
face, 3 pictures of their own body and 3 pictures of their colleague’s body. The 
experimenter indicated whether each stimulus was intact or altered. The ‘Stimulus 
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appearance’ factor hereafter refers to the intact vs. altered aspect of the stimulus while the 
‘Stimulus domain’ factor defines whether a face or a body was presented. A pre-training (16 
trials with faces and 16 trials with bodies) was administrated to illustrate the task to be 
performed in the scanner. The participants were then installed in the scanner. They hold a 
small keyboard in their right hand and stimuli were displayed on a black screen positioned 
at the back of the scanner, which the participant could comfortably see through a mirror 
fixed on the standard head coil. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample of face stimuli from one participant. From the original picture (b) the 
eyes were moved inwards to decrease the interocular distance of 16 px (a) or 
outwards to increase the interocular distance of 16 px (c). For one of the two control 
sessions, the intact face was scrambled (d). 
We used an event-related paradigm within four different sessions. The two first sessions 
were the experimental sessions. Each one consisted of the presentation of the intact and 
altered versions of the pictures of the two members of the pair. In one of them, only faces 
were presented, and in the other, only bodies were presented (the presentation order of the 
two sessions being counterbalanced across participants). Within one session, each intact 
picture was presented 40 times and each altered picture was presented 20 times (for a total 
of 40, as there were two alterations per original picture). An experimental session was then 
composed of 160 trials presented at random. Null events consisted in random presentation 
of a white cross identical to the fixation cross (40 occurrences) during the session. The 
participants were instructed to press a key with their index finger if the picture was intact 
and another key with their middle finger if the picture was altered. Performing such an 
‘intact-altered’ judgment implied that participants had first to identify the owner of the 
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face/body to be able to give their response. They were allowed 2000 ms to respond. The 
picture stimulus disappeared immediately after pressing the response key (allowing some 
random variation between the successive presentation of two trials), followed by the 
presentation of a fixation cross for 1500 ms. When they did not respond in the imparted 
2000 ms, a no-response was recorded. Before each of the two scanning sessions started, 
participants were again presented with all the corresponding pictures and performed a 
training of 16 trials. In the two first sessions, we were interested in directly contrasting self-
processing from the processing of another highly familiar person. So, control items taking 
into account low level perceptual processes (such as scrambled figures) were not used, 
these low level processes being similar regardless of the kind of items presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Sample of body stimuli from one participant. From the original picture (b) the 
hips were made thinner to increase the WHR of 10% (a) or wider to decrease the 
WHR of 10% (c). For one of the two control sessions, the intact body was scrambled 
(d). 
The two last sessions were the control ones. During each of these sessions, participants 
saw the intact picture (of their own face in one session, of their own body in the other one, 
the order being the same than that of the experimental sessions) 40 times and the 
scrambled version of this picture 40 times, in a random order. Each control session was 
thus composed of 80 trials. The pictures were presented for 2000 ms and were preceded by 
a red fixation cross for 750 ms. The participants’ task was to attend to this fixation cross 
and to report an infrequent color change (the cross was yellow in 12.5% of the cases) by 
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pressing a key. This procedure was used to maintain the participants’ attention while they 
passively viewed the stimuli of interest. Here, self-referential items were compared with 
scrambled items in order to suppress low-level perceptual processes that are not specific to 
face or body identification. 
MRI acquisition 
Data were acquired on a 3Tesla scanner (Siemens, Allegra, Erlangen, Germany) using a 
T2* sensitive gradient echo EPI sequence (TR = 2,130 ms, TE = 40 ms, FA 90°, matrix size 
64 X 64 X 32, voxel size 3.4 X 3.4 X 3.4 mm³). Thirty-two 3-mm thick transverse slices 
(FOV 22 X 22 cm²) were acquired, with a distance factor of 30%, covering the whole brain. 
Structural images were obtained using a T1-weighted 3D MP-RAGE sequence (TR = 1,960 
ms, TE = 4.4 ms, FOV 23 X 23 cm², matrix size 256 X 256 X 176, voxel size 0.9 X 0.9 X 0.9 
mm). In each experimental session, between 177 and 292 functional volumes were 
obtained. In each control session between 112 and 122 functional volumes were obtained. 
The first three volumes were discarded to account for T1 saturation. Head movement was 
minimized by restraining the participant’s head using a vacuum cushion.  
fMRI analyses 
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM2 software (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience). Preprocessing included motion correction, spatial normalization in 
MNI space and spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at half 
maximum. 
For each participant, brain responses were estimated at each voxel, using a general linear 
model. In each experimental session (face and body), events modeled transient responses 
to the two identities (self and colleague) and to the two stimulus appearances (intact or 
altered). Only brain responses for correct responses were entered in the matrix design. 
In each control session (face and body), events modeled transient cerebral responses to 
the self identity for intact or scrambled items. 
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Delta functions representative of these trials types were convolved with the canonical 
hemodynamic response. The design matrix also included the realignment parameters to 
account for any residual movement-related effect. Two contrasts were performed in order to 
explore the main effect of the presented picture (intact vs. scrambled) in each of the two 
control sessions (face vs. body, contrasts 1 and 2). In experimental sessions, we were 
interested in cerebral areas involved in the processing of original self-related pictures in 
comparison with that of pictures depicting another highly familiar person. Seven linear 
contrasts were performed by using intact items only. These included two contrasts 
assessing the effect of the Stimulus domain  (face vs. body): the first explored the effect of 
intact face processing in comparison with the processing of intact bodies (contrast 3), and 
the second contrast assessed the effect of intact body processing in comparison with intact 
face processing (contrast 4). The next four contrasts were carried out to compare (i) the 
effect of self-face processing relative to the processing of another highly familiar face (self 
minus other, contrast 5, and other minus self, contrast 6), and (ii) the effect of own-body 
processing relative to the processing of another highly familiar body (self minus other, 
contrast 7, and other minus self, contrast 8). Finally, the effect of self-processing regardless 
of the Stimulus domain (face and body) in comparison with another familiar person was 
determined (contrast 9). No statistical inference was made at this level (fixed effects). 
Summary statistic images were thresholded at p < 0.9 (uncorrected) and these images 
were further smoothed (6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel). They were then entered in a 
second-level analysis, corresponding to a random effects model, in order to account for 
inter-subjects variance in each contrast of interest. One-sample t tests assessed the 
significance of the effects. The resulting SPM{T} maps were thresholded at p < 0.001. 
Statistical inferences were performed at the voxel or cluster level at p < 0.05 corrected for 
multiple comparisons (Bonferroni corrections) across the entire brain volume. Alternatively, 
when previous studies led us to expect that changes in brain responses would occur in 
certain specified areas, a small volume correction (Worsley, 1996) was computed on a 20 
mm maximum radius sphere around the average coordinates published for the 
corresponding relevant location. However, for contrasts about which there was no clear a 
priori hypothesis because of a lack of previous literature (this is particularly true for the 
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visual recognition of familiar bodies), we tentatively reported activation at a threshold of p < 
0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. 
A priori locations of interest  
The following a priori locations of interest were used for small volume corrections, based on 
published coordinates in the literature about self-face recognition and self-processing 
(judgment of adjectives/sentences as self-descriptive and judgment of actions as self 
generated). Regarding the general self-processing, independently of the Stimulus domain, 
these regions concerned mainly the medial/right prefrontal cortex, the right anterior 
cingulate, the bilateral insula and the bilateral precuneus. As for self-face recognition, the a 
priori locations of interest were chosen from literature using contrasts as comparable to 
ours as possible (own face minus other highly familiar face and conversely for the reversed 
contrast). These regions concerned primarily the right inferior frontal cortex and the left 
fusiform gyrus. Concerning the a priori locations of interest related to the processing of 
faces and bodies during the control session, they referred to studies comparing the 
processing of faces and bodies, respectively, to that of other kind of materials (i.e., tools, 
Peelen & Downing, experiment 1, 2005; scrambled controls, Peelen & Downing, experiment 
2, 2005; letters or textures, Puce, et al., 1996). All stereotactic coordinates refer to the MNI 
space. When a single coordinate refers to several studies, it corresponds to the centroïd of 
all the coordinates reported in these studies. The a priori locations of interest were the 
following ones: 
General effect of self-processing: right/medial prefrontal cortex [10, 50, 20; 10, 53, 5] 
(Fossati et al., 2003; Kelley et al., 2002), right anterior cingulate gyrus [6, 35, 6] (Craik et al., 
1999), anterior insula [-36, -2, 2; 40, 8, 3] (Farrer & Frith, 2002), precuneus [-4, -56, 34; 6, -
63, 36] (Kircher et al., 2000, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001), left inferior frontal gyrus [-39, 9, 
16] (Craik et al., 1999; Kircher et al. 2002), left superior frontal gyrus [-11, 21, 59] (Ruby & 
Decety, 2001; Seger et al., 2004). 
Effect of self-face recognition (self-face minus other familiar face processing): right inferior 
frontal gyrus [45, 25, 14] (Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005), left 
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inferior frontal gyrus [-38, 25, 23] (Kircher et al., 2000), right superior frontal gyrus [26, 34, 
34; 20, 16, 56] (Platek et al., 2006), right middle frontal gyrus [26, -12, 46] (Platek et al., 
2006), right medial frontal gyrus [6, 48, -12] (Platek et al., 2006), left middle temporal gyrus 
[-52, 4, -16; -58, -6, -4] (Platek et al., 2006), left fusiform gyrus [-14, -83, -18] (Kircher et al., 
2001), right inferior parietal lobule [50, -62, 40; 64, -24, 50; 42, -34, 38] (Platek et al., 2006; 
Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005). 
Effect of other familiar face recognition (other familiar face minus self-face processing): left 
anterior cingulate [-2, 24, -2] (Platek et al., 2006), left superior temporal gyrus [-54, -42, 12] 
(Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005), right middle temporal gyrus [70, -12, -16] (Uddin, Kaplan, et 
al., 2005), precuneus [0, -48, 38] (Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005). 
General effect of face recognition (face minus other material processing): right fusiform 
gyrus [39, -44, -22; 30, -55, -24; 31, -55, -24] (Peelen & Downing, 2005, Puce et al., 1996), 
left fusiform gyrus [-38, -60, -26; -39, -54, -28] (Puce et al., 1996), right ventral occipital 
cortex [39, -65, -25] (Peelen & Downing, 2005), right occipitotemporal/inferior occipital sulci 
[36, -67, -22; 38, -63, -23] (Puce et al., 1996), bilateral lateral neocortex [47, -66, -4; 43, -67, 
-8; -40, -76, -7] (Puce et al., 1996). 
General effect of body recognition (body minus other material processing): right fusiform 
gyrus [40, -43, -21; 41, -38, -25] (Peelen & Downing, 2005), bilateral inferior temporal 
sulcus [45, -67, -1; 47, -64, 3; -49, -77, 6] (Peelen & Downing, 2005). 
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 Chapter 6 
ATTENTION TO SELF-REFERENTIAL STIMULI: 
CAN I IGNORE MY OWN FACE? 
Christel Devue and Serge Brédart (in press). Acta Psychologica. 
Abstract 
Auto-referential materials (i.e., the own name) have been described as particularly prone to 
capture attention. Some recent studies have questioned this view and showed that these 
own name effects are temporary and appear only in specific conditions: when enough 
resources are available (Harris & Pashler, 2004) or when the own name is presented within 
the focus of attention if it is a task-irrelevant stimulus (Gronau et al., 2003). In the present 
study, a stimulus that is unique to each individual was used: the self-face. In Experiment 1, 
the self-face produced a temporary distraction when presented at fixation during a digit-
parity task. However, this distraction was not different from that triggered by another highly 
familiar face. In Experiment 2, the self-face failed to produce interference when presented 
outside the focus of attention. These results confirm recent findings showing that auto-
referential materials do not automatically summon attention and have a distractive power 
only in specific conditions. 
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Introduction 
Since the late fifties, self-referential stimuli have been described as particularly important 
with regard to their capacity to grab attention by comparison with other stimuli. This claim 
emerged from a famous study by Moray (1959). Using the method of shadowing during a 
dichotic listening task, Moray (1959) found that 4 participants out of 12 (33%) remembered 
that they had heard their own name at its first presentation to the unattended ear while they 
were shadowing (i.e., repeating aloud) a message presented to the other ear. On the 
contrary, a short list of neutral words presented many times to the unattended ear showed 
no trace of being remembered. This suggested that some high-priority important stimuli can 
capture attention because of their meaning. However, there was no way to exclude the 
possibility that subjects from time to time shifted their attention to the to-be-ignored 
message (see Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004). More evidence for some “own name 
effects” has also been found in various studies using different procedures. For instance, in 
a visual analogy of the Moray’s procedure, Wolford and Morrison (1980) showed that when 
instructed to make a parity judgment on two digits flanking a to-be-ignored word, a higher 
proportion of participants subsequently reported that they had seen their own name in 
comparison with words presented the same number of times during the experiment. 
Shapiro’s team later showed that the own name is particularly resistant to the attentional 
blink (Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) and to repetition blindness (Arnell, Shapiro, & 
Sorensen, 1999). In addition, Mack and Rock (1998) found that almost all of their 
participants (88%) detected their own name when presented under conditions of inattention 
in the inattentional blindness paradigm. By comparison, only 65% of participants detected 
another first name and 50% of participants detected very frequent words in the English 
language (e.g., “house”). Using a visual search task, Mack and Rock (1998) also showed 
that, contrary to other names, the own name pops out of a display of up to 12 items. 
All these studies investigated the attentional properties of the own name. However, the 
name (i.e., the first name as well as the last name) is a property that we may share with 
other people. By contrast, the face is a unique self-referential characteristic (with the 
exception of twins) and hence constitutes a better way to investigate the specificity of self-
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referential stimuli. However, few studies (Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006; Laarni, 
Koljonen, Kuistio, Kyröläinen, Lempiäinen, & Lepistö, 2000; Ninomiya, Onitsuka, Chen, 
Sato, & Tashiro, 1998; Tong & Nakayama, 1999) investigated the attentional properties of 
the self-face. Recently, using a face-name interference paradigm, Brédart et al. (2006) 
found that the self-face flanking a classmate’s name produced a stronger interference on 
the processing of this name than in the reverse situation where a classmate’s face flanked 
the participant’s own name. This suggests that the self-face also has some attention-
grabbing capacity. Tong and Nakayama (1999), in a visual search task, demonstrated that 
the self-face was more quickly detected among distractors than strangers’ faces even when 
presented in atypical orientations and after hundreds of trials. Several ERP or PET studies 
also found specific electrophysiological and neuronal responses associated with attention to 
the self-face by comparison with other unfamiliar faces (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & 
Deldin, 2004; Ninomiya et al., 1998; Sugiura et al., 2000; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006; Tanaka, 
Curran, Porterfield, & Collins, 2006) or familiar faces (Sui et al., 2006). All these findings 
suggest that important stimuli may benefit from specific attention-grabbing capacities. 
Taken together, these results seem in favour of a late selection theory of attention (Deutsch 
& Deutsch, 1963) because they suggest that the meaning and significance of some stimuli 
can determine their selection by attention. However, many studies used neutral words, 
unfamiliar faces or names as control stimuli. Hence, these results might just reflect a 
familiarity effect rather than a genuine “self-effect”. That might weaken the argument in 
favour of a late selection theory of attention because this could indicate that familiarity 
rather than meaning determines the attentional selection. 
In addition, recent research has seriously questioned the specificity of self-referential stimuli 
by suggesting that such stimuli are not really special and do not benefit from particular 
attention-grabbing capacities. A study by Bundesen, Killingsbæk, Houmann, and Jensen 
(1997) challenged previous findings with respect to the attention-grabbing capacities of the 
own name. They used displays composed of four names, two written in red (targets to be 
reported) and two written in white (distractors to be ignored). The participant’s name 
appeared on some trials either as target either as distractor. Results showed that the own 
name did not cause more interference than other names when it was a distractor 
suggesting that it does not automatically grab attention. Laarni et al. (2000) found that when 
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participants had to perform a matching task on two faces presented at foreground while 
ignoring the background composed of a matrix of faces among which the participant’s own 
face or a celebrity face (the Finnish President) was presented on some trials (i.e., critical 
trials), only 18% of participants reported that they had seen their own face during the task 
and the performance was similar for both familiar faces. These results could be interpreted 
in terms of an early selection of attention occurring at an early stage of processing 
(Broadbent, 1958) preventing the processing of significant stimuli when they were already 
discarded from the perceptual process by the properties of their low level features (e.g., 
irrelevant colour, irrelevant background location, see also Bundesen et al., 1997). 
Finally, some studies using the own name moderated findings presented here above by 
showing that some “self-effect” can occur but only when specific conditions are fulfilled. For 
instance, Kawahara and Yamada (2004) replicated Bundesen et al. (1997)’s findings but 
additionally showed, using an adapted version of the attentional blink paradigm, that the 
own name only attracted attention when participants were set to identify target names 
whereas it did not when participants were set to find a target colour. Similarly, using a 
Stroop-like task Gronau, Cohen, and Ben-Shakhar (2003) found that the own name 
attracted attention when it was presented centrally within the participant’s attentional focus. 
However, when it was presented peripherally it attracted attention only when it was task 
relevant but not when it was task irrelevant. Harris, Pashler, and Coburn (2004) also call 
Mack and Rock (1998)’s visual search findings into question by showing that even if the 
participant’s own name is detected more rapidly than other names, the search slopes they 
obtained were not flat enough to claim that the own name pops out. In another experiment 
based on the paradigm designed by Wolford and Morrison (1980), Harris and Pashler 
(2004) showed that the presentation of the own name can cause a distraction and slow 
down reaction times on a digit-parity task by comparison with neutral words on condition 
that enough capacity is available. In this case, however, the distraction is only present 
during the first occurrences of the own name and the response quickly habituates. 
Moreover, the own name did not show special attention grabbing property when display 
loads were more substantial. Taken together, this set of results suggests that the first 
occurrences of one’s own name may provoke an involuntarily shift of attention when the 
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perceptual load of one’s ongoing activity is low and enough capacity is available for one’s 
name to be perceived, but that it rapidly loses its attention grabbing character.  
From this overview of the literature, it remains unclear whether or not self-referential 
materials have specific attention-grabbing capacity. Moreover, controls used to determine 
whether these stimuli have special attention-grabbing capacities were not always the most 
appropriate ones and some confounding factors such as familiarity, frequency of use or 
emotional valence could have interfered. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the 
distractive potency of an extremely distinctive self-significant stimulus, i.e. the self-face, and 
in the meantime disentangling the potential effect of stimulus familiarity. In Experiment 1, 
we tested whether one’s own face is harder to ignore as a distractor than other unfamiliar 
faces. If results found in the Harris and Pashler (2004) study can be generalised from the 
own name to other self-significant stimuli, it was expected that the first presentation of the 
participants’ face would produce a momentary distraction. To determine how much such 
effect was specific to one’s own face, distraction due to the presentation of another 
personally familiar face (the face of a participant’s classmate) was also evaluated. 
In the Harris and Pashler (2004) study, distractors were presented centrally, i.e. between 
the items to be processed for the primary task. Gronau et al. (2003) demonstrated that the 
presentation of one’s name outside the focus of attention did not interfere with a primary 
task if one’s name was not relevant to this primary task. Hence, it was predicted that the 
presentation of the participant’s own face as an irrelevant flanking distractor would produce 
no disruption of the primary task at all. This point was addressed in Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The experiment used the digit-parity task described by Wolford and Morrison (1980) and 
Harris and Pashler (2004), i.e. a task in which participants indicated whether two 
simultaneously presented digits had the same parity or not. By analogy with the Harris and 
Pashler study, during the first block of trials, familiar faces (either one’s face or a 
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classmate’s face) were presented infrequently. In the second block of trials familiar faces 
were presented on half of the trials. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 48 undergraduate students (mean age = 20; 30 women) volunteered. They had all 
known their same-gender classmate for at least 2 years. Participants were recruited by 
pairs so that each participant served as the classmate for the other participant. 
Materials and stimuli 
Displays were presented on a monitor controlled by a PC computer. They consisted of two 
digits flanking a face and were viewed at a distance of 56 cm controlled by means of a chin 
rest. The digits subtended 0.7° by 0.5° of visual angle, were spaced 4° apart, and located 
2° from fixation each. They were written in black against a grey background. All face stimuli 
were greyscales images of full-frontal views of faces without facial hair or glasses. The 
picture of the participant’s own face was presented in a mirror-reversed orientation, i.e. the 
view in which we typically see our own face. The pictures were centred at fixation and 
subtended 4.1° by 3.3° of visual angle (see Fig.1b). 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two blocks of 48 trials each. In Block 1, the participant’s own 
face and the face of the participant’s classmate were presented once each. Half of the 
participants saw their own face on Trial 29 and their classmate’s face on Trial 39, the other 
half saw these two familiar faces in the reverse order. Pictures of unfamiliar faces were 
shown on the other trials. Each unfamiliar face appeared once only. In Block 2, the 
participant’s face appeared on 12 trials, the classmate’s face appeared on 12 trials and 24 
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new unfamiliar faces appeared on the remaining 24 trials. Faces were presented randomly 
except that the same face could not be shown twice successively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. (a) Illustration of the time course of a single trial in the two experiments (the 
stimulus display represented here corresponds to displays in Experiment 1); (b) in 
Experiment 1, faces were presented at fixation between two digits; (c) in Experiment 
2, faces were presented at periphery, randomly on the left or on the right (here on the 
left) of two digits. 
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Participants were instructed to focus on the digit-parity task and ignore the faces. Each trial 
began with a fixation point (diameter = 0.2 degrees) presented in the centre of fixation for 1 
s. The point was followed, after 500 ms, by a 200-ms (unmasked) exposure of the digits 
and face. Half of the participants pressed the “C” key of a computer keyboard if the digit 
parity matched, and otherwise pressed the “N” key. These keys were reversed for the other 
participants. A 1-s interval separated successive trials (see Fig.1a). 
Results 
Reactions times 
Data of 15 participants who made errors on Trial 29 or 39 were discarded. 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate -self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 
29, 30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted on reaction times (RTs). There was a significant effect of Trial, F(4,124) = 8.32, 
p = 0.00001. HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated a significant elevation on the first two trials in 
which a familiar face was presented by comparison with preceding and following trials, all 
ps < 0.05. There was no significant effect of Order, F(1,31) < 1, and no significant 
interaction, F(4,124) < 1 (see Fig.2a). 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unfamiliar) as within-subject 
factor was conducted on RTs. There was a significant effect of Identity, F(2,64) = 3.28, p = 
0.04. HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated that the difference between the RTs in the ‘self-face’ 
condition (M = 1070 ms) and the RTs in the ‘unfamiliar face’ condition (M = 1002 ms) was 
marginally significant, p = 0.058. In addition, RTs when the classmate was presented (M = 
1062 ms) tended to be slower than RTs when an unfamiliar face was presented, p = 0.10. 
Finally, there was no significant difference between the ‘self-face’ condition and the 
‘classmate’s face’ condition, p = 0.96 (see Fig.2b). Data of Block 2 were then split in 2 parts 
to examine separately the pattern of performance on the first and second halves of trials 
(see Fig.2c).  
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1: (a) Mean reaction times (RTs) and (d) mean error 
rates to the digit-parity task as a function of the order of presentation of the familiar 
faces in Block 1; familiar distractor faces appeared on trials 29 and 39. (b) Mean RTs 
and (e) mean error rates as a function of the Identity of the distractor face presented 
in Block 2. (c) Mean RTs as a function of the distractor face’s Identity presented on 
the first and the second halves of Block 2. Error bars represent the standard error of 
the mean. 
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The analysis of RTs during the first half of Block 2 confirmed the above effect of the 
Identity, even if the difference was only marginally significant, F(2,64) = 2.99, p = 0.058. 
Conversely, the analysis of RTs during the second half of Block 2, did not reveal any effect 
of the Identity, F(2,64) < 1. 
Error rates 
Data of one participant who misunderstood the instructions were discarded (this participant 
responded to 26 out of 96 trials only). 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate -self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 
29, 30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted on error rates. There was a significant effect of Trial, F(4,180) = 4.97, p = 
0.0008. HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated that when a familiar face was presented for the 
second time (M = 25.4% on trial 39), error rates were higher by comparison with preceding 
(M = 8.3% for trials 20 to 28 and M = 7.1% for trials 30 to 38) and following trials (M = 8.5% 
for trials 40 to 48) and by comparison with trial 29 (M = 10.6%), all ps <0.02. There was no 
significant effect of Order, F(1,45) = 1.22; p = 0.27, and no interaction, F(4,180) < 1 (see 
Fig.2d). 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unknown) as within-subject factor 
was conducted on error rates and showed no significant effect, F(2,92) < 1 (see Fig.2e). 
Discussion 
Present results indicate that the self-face, like the own name, can produce a distraction. 
Like the own name, however, the self-face has no enduring attention grabbing capacity as 
the response habituates after a few presentations. In addition, the pattern of interference 
produced by the self-face and by the other highly familiar face was similar both in Block 1 
and Block 2. The distraction produced by the two familiar faces impacted both dependent 
measures but was stronger on reaction times than on error rates. This suggests that the 
irrelevant presence of a familiar face mainly slows down the processing of the task-relevant 
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items (i.e., the digits) but has a more limited effect on response accuracy. The second 
experiment examined the effect of the presentation of a familiar face (i.e., the self-face or 
the classmate’s face) outside the focus of attention. It was predicted that the presentation of 
the self-face as an irrelevant flanking distractor would produce no disruption of the digit 
parity task at all (see Gronau et al., 2003). 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 48 undergraduate students (mean age = 21; 20 women) volunteered. They had all 
known their same-gender classmate for at least 2 years. Participants were recruited by 
pairs so that each participant served as the classmate for the other participant. 
Stimuli and procedure 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that faces were presented in a flanking 
position instead of a central position. Faces were randomly presented on the left side of the 
left digit or on the right side of the right digit so that the centre of the picture was 5° from 
fixation (see Fig.1c). 
Results 
Data of 2 participants could not be collected entirely (1 because of technical reasons and 1 
because the participant felt uncomfortable during the experiment) and were discarded from 
all analyses. 
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Reaction times 
Data of 8 other participants who made errors on Trial 29 or 39 were discarded. 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate -self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 
29, 30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted on RTs. There was no significant effect of Trial, F(4,144) = 1.02, p = 0.40, no 
significant effect of Order, F(1,31) < 1, and no significant interaction, F(4,124) < 1 (see 
Fig.3a). 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unfamiliar) as within-subject 
factor was conducted on RTs and showed no significant effect, F(2,74) = 2.28, p = 0.11 
(see Fig.3b). Nonetheless, as the pattern of performance was quite similar to that observed 
in Block 2 of Experiment 1 (see Fig.2b and Fig.3b) we split data of Block 2 in 2 parts to 
examine separately the pattern of performance on the first and second halves of trials. The 
analysis of RTs during the first half of Block 2 revealed a marginal effect of Identity, F(2,74) 
= 3.911, p = 0.0504. HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated that the difference between the RTs in 
the ‘classmate’s face’ condition (M = 1122 ms) and the RTs in the ‘unfamiliar face’ condition 
(M = 976 ms) was significant, p = 0.039. RTs in the ‘self-face’ condition (M = 1045 ms) did 
not differ from RTs in the ‘classmate’s face’ condition, p = 0.39, or in the ‘unfamiliar face’ 
condition, p = 0.47 By contrast, the analysis of RTs during the second half of Block 2 did not 
show any effect of Identity, F(2,74) = 1.245, p = 0.29 (see Fig.3b). 
Error rates 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate-self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 29, 
30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
error rates. There was no significant effect of Trial, F(4,176) < 1, no significant effect of 
Order, F(1,44) < 1, and no interaction, F(4,180)=1.32; p=0.27 (see Fig.3d). 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unknown) as within-subject factor 
was conducted on error rates and showed no significant effect, F(2,90) < 1 (see Fig.3e). 
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2: (a) Mean reaction times (RTs) and (d) mean error 
rates to the digit-parity task as a function of the order of presentation of the familiar 
faces in Block 1; familiar distractor faces appeared on trials 29 and 39. (b) Mean RTs 
and (e) mean error rates as a function of the Identity of the distractor face presented 
in Block 2. (c) Mean RTs as a function of the distractor face’s Identity presented on 
the first and the second halves of Block 2. Error bars represent the standard error of 
the mean. 
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Discussion 
In agreement with previous studies using the own name (Gronau et al., 2003), present 
results indicate that the self-face presented outside the focus of attention and irrelevantly 
for the ongoing task produces no distraction in Block 1 or in Block 2 overall, as reflected by 
both reaction times and error rates. However, a complementary analysis of Block 2 
indicated that the facial identity marginally affected reaction times on the first half of trials. 
Here, the distraction was due to the processing of the classmate’s face. Yet, as in 
Experiment 1, this effect disappeared in the second part of Block 2. This might indicate that 
after a few dozen of trials, when participants master the digit-parity task, they start shifting 
their attention at periphery and process the distractor faces. These shifts produce a weak 
interference effect that is not strong enough to overall affect performance in Block 2 and 
that habituates quickly. By contrast, in Block 1 the two appearances of the familiar faces did 
not interfere with the digit-parity task, probably because at that time the participants’ 
attentional resources are still devoted to the digit-parity task. This small effect of familiar 
faces irrelevantly presented at periphery might seems at odds with Gronau et al. (2003)’s 
findings. However, this effect appeared lately in the experiment, lasted a very limited 
number of trials and was detected only through post-hoc analyses in the absence of a main 
effect of Identity. More importantly, the occurrence of this effect indicates that facial identity 
was perceivable at this eccentricity. In other words, the non-occurrence of interference 
effect in Block 1 cannot be attributed to a lack of perception of peripheral distractor faces. 
General discussion 
Present results indicate that the self-face, a particularly distinctive feature of the self, has no 
enduring distractive power compared with unfamiliar faces when it is presented at fixation, 
within the observer’s attentional focus. Indeed, the self-face was only momentarily more 
distractive than unfamiliar faces. In addition, crucially the self-face was never consistently 
more distractive than that of another familiar person. Therefore, present results suggest that 
the allocation of attention was temporarily driven by the high familiarity of the to-be-ignored 
distractor faces rather than by the self-referential properties of the self-face. Yet, and 
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contrary to the participant’s name which may be shared by other individuals, the 
participant’s own face is exclusively self-referential. Thus, one might have expected that it is 
even more likely than one’s own name to attract attention by comparison with other faces. 
However, the present study demonstrates that one’s own face is not an exceptional kind of 
stimulus since it rapidly loses its attention grabbing character. The present study extends 
Harris and Pashler (2004)’s work by showing that even a unique self-referential stimulus 
such as one’s own face is not a potent distractor, at least when its presentation is not 
related with the ongoing task. 
Moreover, in the present study, the self-face did not elicit reliable distraction effect when it 
was presented outside the focus of attention. This result is consistent with Gronau et al.’s 
(2003) study reporting that the participant’s own name did not produce any distraction when 
presented outside the focus of attention and irrelevantly to the ongoing task. Nonetheless, 
our data indicated that participants temporarily shifted their attention towards peripheral 
faces once they mastered the digit-parity task. Importantly, the observation that the capacity 
of the familiar faces to provoke a distraction was dependent upon their location within the 
focus of attention indicates that this distraction is not due to an automatic capture of 
attention (see also Bundesen et al., 1999). Indeed, in Experiment 1 the central location of 
the faces between the two target digits forced participants to attend to the distractor faces 
(despite of the instruction) in order to perceive the two digits. By contrast, in Experiment 2, 
there was no need to attend to the distractor faces presented at periphery in order to 
process the target digits. Our results indicate that in this case participants successfully 
followed the instruction to ignore the faces in the first part of the experiment since the 
presentation of the familiar faces did not affect reaction times. In the second part of the 
experiment, however, they apparently temporarily shifted their attention towards peripheral 
faces. Rather, present findings suggest that familiar faces hold attention and elicit a 
transient difficulty to disengage attention only once they are attended6, as in Experiment 1 
and in the second part of Experiment 2 (see Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001, for similar 
findings with threatening words; see also Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, in press, for a 
                                                          
6 We thank Jan Theeuwes for this suggestion. 
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recent review on the distinction between capture and retention of attention in anxiety). This 
hypothesis should be addressed more precisely and with paradigms allowing a clear 
distinction between these two components of capture and retention of attention in future 
work. Note that the digit-parity task we used is a quite demanding task. Harris and Pashler 
(2004)’s study showed that the attention grabbing capacity of one’s own name depended on 
the amount of available resources. It is possible that a less demanding task would have 
allowed more substantial shifts of attention towards the peripheral distractor faces. This 
should also be addressed in future work. 
In sum, present result does not support the widespread claim that self-referential stimuli or 
information important to the participant automatically summon attention. Yet, such a claim is 
still viewed as evidence for the late selection theory of attention even in recent cognitive 
psychology textbooks (e.g., Smith & Kosslyn, 2007; Solso, MacLin, & MacLin, 2005; 
Sternberg, 2006). Moreover, the present results, as well as those of Harris and Pashler 
(2004)’s study, stress that the response to one’s own face or one’s own name habituates 
very rapidly. This finding has important practical and clinical implications. Indeed, recent 
neuropsychological research used self-referential stimuli such as the patients’ own name in 
order to assess residual awareness of the environment in non-communicative brain-
damaged patients (i.e., patients in a vegetative or in a minimally conscious state). In such 
studies, properties of a patient’s brain responses (e.g., ERPs) elicited when hearing her/his 
own name is supposed to inform us about the perception of this stimulus in the environment 
(Perrin et al., 2006; see also Holeckova, Fischer, Giard, Delpuech, & Morlet, 2006; Perrin et 
al., 2005). The fact that responses to self-referential may habituate quickly has not been 
addressed in such studies, presumably because, again, it was assumed that self-referential 
materials automatically grab attention (e.g., Holeckova et al., 2006; Sui et al., 2006; but see 
Laureys, Perrin, & Brédart, 2007). Yet, in most of these studies, the same self-referential 
stimulus was usually presented several times during the experimental session. After the 
results from Harris and Pasher (2004) and the present study, it seems that averaging 
across repeated trials is likely to fail giving rise to patients’ responses that occurred after the 
first few presentations of self-referential materials. 
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In conclusion, present findings demonstrate that a unique and distinctive self-referential 
stimulus such as one’s own face is not a potent distractor compared to other faces. The 
distraction it produces does not differ from that produced by another familiar face, is only 
temporary and is modulated by the position of the face within the participant’s focus of 
attention. Future work should clarify whether this distraction is due to a difficulty to 
disengage attention as hypothesized here and/or whether the self-face has the capacity to 
automatically capture attention in some conditions. 
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 Chapter 7 
DO PICTURES OF FACES, AND WHICH ONES, 
CAPTURE ATTENTION IN THE INATTENTIONAL 
BLINDNESS PARADIGM? 
Christel Devue, Cédric Laloyaux, Dorothée Feyers, Jan Theeuwes, and Serge Brédart 
(Submitted). 
Abstract 
Faces and self-referential materials (e.g. the own name) are more likely to capture attention 
in the inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm than others stimuli. This effect is presumably 
due to the meaning of these stimuli rather than to their familiarity (Mack & Rock 1998). IB 
has mostly been investigated with schematic stimuli in previous work. In the present study, 
the generalisability of this finding was tested using photographic stimuli. In support to the 
view that faces constitute a special category of stimuli, it was found that pictures of faces 
resisted more to IB than pictures of common objects (Experiment 1) or than pictures of 
inverted faces (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the influence of face familiarity and 
identity (i.e. the participant’s own face, a colleague’s face and an unknown face) on IB rates 
was evaluated. Unexpectedly, no differential resistance to blindness across these three 
kinds of faces was found. In conclusion, picture of faces attracted attention more than 
pictures of objects or inverted faces in the IB paradigm. However, this effect was not 
dependent on face familiarity or identity. 
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Introduction 
From 1988 to the publication of their book in 1998, Mack and Rock carried out a research 
project aimed at investigating the relations between perception and attention (Mack & Rock, 
1998). More specifically, they examined whether perception without attention was possible. 
To investigate this issue, they designed a paradigm in which an unexpected stimulus was 
presented in the visual field of an observer while his/her attention was focused on another 
task. In this paradigm, observers were instructed to report which arm (vertical or horizontal) 
of a large cross presented very briefly is longer than the other. This procedure was used 
during two or three trials (i.e. non-critical trials). Then, on the third or fourth trial (i.e. critical 
trial), a critical stimulus (CS) was unexpectedly presented simultaneously beside the large 
cross (see Figure 1). At this moment, observers were in conditions of inattention since they 
could not expect the appearance of the CS. Immediately after the length judgment task, 
observers were asked whether they had seen something besides the large cross that was 
not present before. Then, they were asked to describe it or to indicate it in a set of 
alternatives. After two or three non-critical trials, the CS was presented a second time. 
Therefore, observers were at that moment in a condition of divided attention, since they 
expected the appearance of something else. Finally, in the last trial in which the CS was 
presented, observers were instructed to ignore the length judgment task and to stare the 
fixation cross. This constituted a control trial in which full attention was devoted to the 
processing of the CS. This trial allowed the verification of the CS perceptibility. 
In Mack and Rock’s early experiments, critical stimuli consisted in simple geometrical 
shapes (e.g. a square, a diamond, a coloured spot). They found that a high rate of 
observers (up to 85%) failed to detect the CS, a phenomenon that they called inattentional 
blindness (IB, Mack & Rock, 1998). From these findings, Mack and Rock concluded that 
perception requires attention and that attention must first be captured before perception can 
occur. From this assumption emerged the question of whether certain important and 
meaningful stimuli would be particularly prone to capture attention. 
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Figure 1. Presentation sequence of a non-critical trial (a) and critical trial (b): the 
critical stimulus (CS) appears at fixation besides the large cross (adapted from Mack 
& Rock, 1998). 
Mack and Rock (1998) chose to address this question by presenting their participant’s own 
name at fixation as CS in their IB paradigm. Indeed, since the late fifties, the own name has 
been described as particularly important with regard to its capacity to grab attention by 
comparison with other stimuli such as neutral words (Moray, 1959). Accordingly, Mack and 
Rock found that the own name was more resistant to IB than other stimuli (another name or 
some of the most frequent words in the English language such as “House” or “Time”). They 
then concluded that the own name captures attention because of its importance (rather than 
because of its lexicality or familiarity). Moreover, they carried out further experiments in 
which an alteration was made to the participant’s name by replacing the first vowel by 
another one and found that the detection rates were then highly reduced. According to the 
authors, these results suggested that the own name does not capture attention because of 
its gross perceptual features (as an early selection of attention theory would have predicted, 
see Broadbent, 1958) since a modest alteration of these features had such a strong effect 
on its attention-grabbing capacity. Conversely, these results were in favour of a late 
selection theory (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963) in which attention is assumed to be captured at 
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a relatively ‘late’ stage of the visual processing at which the meaning of the stimulus is 
available. 
In order to test whether other meaningful stimuli had the same capacity to capture attention, 
they conducted several additional experiments. Faces appeared to be ideal candidates as 
they seem to be special stimuli due to their great social importance (Bruce, 1988; 
Kanwisher et al., 1997; Perrett et al., 1985). They used cartoon-like faces and found that a 
happy face icon was more resistant to IB compared to other kinds of critical stimuli (sad, 
neutral, scrambled, or inverted happy faces as well as circles). Since they also found that 
the IB rates were significantly lower when the own name or the happy face icon were 
presented than when a highly frequent word such as ‘The’ was presented under 
comparable conditions, they concluded that familiarity alone cannot account for the 
detection of the own name or the happy face icon. More recently, Mack et al. (2002) 
confirmed the notion that one’s own name or a happy face icon capture attention because 
of their importance and high signal value using three different paradigms (IB, attentional 
blink, and stimulus crowding). Studies with patients also demonstrated the influence of such 
important stimuli on attention. For instance Vuilleumier and Schwartz (2001) showed that 
faces and emotional expressions can influence the distribution of spatial attention and that 
they can be processed despite lying on the unattended hemifield in brain-damaged patients 
presenting hemineglect. Recently, Perrin et al. (2006) using ERP showed that minimally 
conscious patients and some vegetative state patients present differential P3 component in 
response to their own name by comparison with other names. 
Overall, these studies thus suggest that stimuli of great social importance such as faces 
and self-referential material such as one’s own name have the ability to capture attention. 
However, faces used in Mack and Rock (1998)’s experiments were cartoon-like happy 
faces and it is unknown whether the effects they reported would still hold if more realistic 
stimuli are presented. Other studies have used photographic stimuli in different paradigms 
and indicated that faces seem to be prioritised in terms of allocation of attention. For 
instance, David et al. (2006) used a change blindness paradigm and showed that, in natural 
scenes, gradual changes in facial expressions were better detected than gradual changes 
in objects’ colour. Ro et al. (2001) showed that, in a change detection task, changes to a 
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single face presented among objects of different categories were better detected than 
changes to these objects. If they did not demonstrate that faces intrinsically capture 
attention, these studies nonetheless suggest that realistic pictures of faces are 
preferentially attended to than pictures of other objects. However, Palermo and Rhodes 
(2003) used the same paradigm as Ro et al. (2001) and found that changes to a single 
object presented among several faces were better detected than changes to faces, that is 
an “odd-one-out” effect, regardless of the significance of the stimuli. The extent to which 
faces are really able to capture attention thus remains unclear. More recently, Theeuwes 
and Van der Stigchel (2006) used the inhibition of return phenomenon to show that when a 
face and an object are simultaneously presented, the attention is automatically shifted 
towards the location of the face. Hence, this last study suggests that a realistic facial 
stimulus might also capture attention by comparison with another type of stimulus in the IB 
paradigm. 
The first aim of this study was to assess the capacity of realistic representations of faces to 
capture attention in the IB paradigm. Therefore, in a first experiment we tested whether 
pictures of faces are more resistant to IB than pictures of other non-facial common objects 
(fruits and vegetables). In addition, in a second experiment, we compared the capacity of 
upright faces to capture attention with that of other stimuli matched for their low level 
properties (i.e. inverted faces). 
The second aim of this study was to examine whether faces differing in their degree of 
familiarity and self-relevance may differ in their capacity to capture attention. Indeed, it is 
still unclear whether resistance to blindness is affected by the familiarity or identity of a 
face. In addition, there are controversies with regard to the capacity of self-referential 
stimuli to capture attention. Hence, we assessed whether a stimulus combining two 
properties likely to capture attention (i.e. the self-face is both a facial stimulus and self-
relevant) is particularly prone to capture attention in the IB paradigm. The only study that, to 
our knowledge, investigated the role of familiarity on attentional properties with 
photographic stimuli is that of Buttle and Raymond (2003). In a change detection task 
involving highly familiar (famous) and recently learned faces, they showed that changes 
involving a famous face were better detected than changes involving a less familiar face. 
Inattentional blindness and faces 
 158 
This study does not allow any prediction about the self-face but at least suggests that 
familiar faces could be better detected than unfamiliar ones. 
Moreover, only few studies (Brédart et al., 2006; Devue & Brédart, in press; Laarni et al., 
2000; Ninomiya et al., 1998; Tong & Nakayama, 1999) have investigated the attentional 
properties of the self-face. Indeed, previous studies investigating the attentional properties 
of self-referential materials used the own name rather than the own face (see e.g. 
Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau et al., 2003; Harris et al., 2004; Harris & Pashler, 2004; 
Kawahara & Yamada, 2004; Mack et al., 2002; Mack & Rock, 1998; Wolford & Morrison, 
1980). Yet the own face is more exclusively a self-referential stimulus than the own name. 
Indeed the former cannot be shared with other people whereas the latter can be. Moreover, 
control to these self-referential stimuli was sometimes inappropriate (i.e. neutral or 
unfamiliar stimuli were used). 
In a third experiment, we thus assessed the attention-grabbing capacities of faces differing 
in their degree of familiarity in the IB paradigm. We compared the performance obtained 
when the self-face is presented to that obtained when a highly and personally familiar face 
(i.e. a colleague’s face) or an unknown face is shown. Thus, the comparison of the self-face 
with another highly familiar face would give the best possible approximation of the role of 
the self-referential component in attentional capture whereas the comparison with an 
unknown face would inform us on the effect of familiarity. In order to carry out such an 
experiment, we needed to present participants with pictures of themselves or a colleague 
whereas they did not expect to see such pictures. Due to these special conditions, the 
original paradigm designed by Mack and Rock (1998) was slightly modified. We inserted, 
between the inattention and the divided attention trials, a trial in which no CS was presented 
but which was nonetheless followed by an assessment of the detection and recognition of 
an additional item (bias trial). This way, we could determine whether participants were 
biased to think that they should see something just because the question was asked (i.e. 
false positives), and more importantly in the third experiment, that they were biased to see 
their own face. We also added this catch trial in the two first experiments in order to allow 
accurate comparisons between all three experiments. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight participants (18 men) from the University of Liège took part in the experiment on 
voluntary basis. They were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. They gave their informed consent prior their inclusion in the 
experiment. As the crucial point in this paradigm is that a given participant can only be 
confronted once to one critical trial in condition of inattention, we used a between-subjects 
design. Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: 
‘face’ (n = 24) or ‘object’ (n = 24) as CS. 
Stimuli 
There were 8 possible CS: four oval-shaped objects (a lemon, a strawberry, a potato and a 
pear) and four unfamiliar faces (two males and two females). The size of these stimuli was 
about 0.9 degrees in width and 1.3 degrees in height (at a viewing distance of 56 cm and 
with a resolution of 0.035 cm per pixel). Each facial stimulus was obtained by cropping 
pictures between the hairline and the chin with the image manipulation software Gimp 27. It 
was given an oval shape by tracing an ellipse in a rectangle of 25 X 35 pixels. Extraneous 
background information was concealed (see Figure 2a). The object stimuli were constructed 
using the same parameters as for faces (see Figure 2b). Contrast and luminance of each of 
these pictures were equalised by the experimenter. Each of the 4 objects and of the 4 faces 
was presented as CS to six different participants. 
                                                          
7 www.gimp.org 
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The arms of the cross that served as the stimulus for the length judgment task were black 
and had 4 different sizes comprised between 3.6 and 4.5 degrees (the two intermediate 
sizes being equal to 3.9 and 4.1 degrees). The mask was a square of 8.9 degrees covering 
the area in which stimuli could appear. All these stimuli were presented on a mean grey 
background (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of a facial stimulus (a) and of an object stimulus (b). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lighted room on a personal computer. They 
viewed stimuli at a distance of 56 cm controlled by means of a chin-rest. The stimuli were 
presented on a CRT 17 inches monitor with an 85 Hz refresh rate and the resolution of the 
screen was set to 1024 by 768 pixels. The presentation of the stimuli was controlled and 
responses were recorded with E-Prime 1.0 software8. Participants were instructed that they 
should perform a task on geometrical shapes. They were asked to stare at a centred 
fixation cross and to judge which arm of a larger cross presented very briefly was longer 
compared to the other one. Each trial was initiated by a key press of the participant when 
he/she was ready. A fixation cross was presented for 1500 ms. Then, a larger cross 
appeared for 200 ms randomly in one of the four quadrants on a 45° diagonal from the 
fixation, the arms intersection being at 2.3° from the fixation. The two arms of the cross 
                                                          
8 http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/ 
Chapter 7 
 161 
were chosen randomly among the four possible sizes with the constraint that both of them 
could not have the same size. Participants indicated their decision with a key press (“b”= 
vertical or “n”= horizontal). During critical and control trials, a CS appeared at fixation (i.e. at 
the location of the fixation cross) for 200 ms at the same time as the larger cross. Finally a 
mask was presented for 500 ms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Time course of a critical trial in experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
Each participant was presented with 9 trials (see Table 1). CS was presented during the 
fourth (inattention trial), the eighth (divided attention trial) and the ninth trial (control trial). 
The same CS was presented throughout the whole experiment to a given participant. After 
each critical trial, participants were asked if they had seen anything besides the large cross 
and the mask (referred to as the black and white spotted square) that was not present 
during previous trials. Regardless of their response, they had to choose what had just been 
presented among an 8-AFC composed of the four faces and the four objects. These eight 
items randomly appeared in one of eight possible locations (see Figure 3). In order to 
assess whether participants were prone to produce false positive, the CS was not 
presented during the sixth trial (bias trial). However, the participants were still questioned 
about the presence of something additional and they had to pick out what ‘had been 
presented’ in the 8-AFC. Before the ninth trial (control trial), participants were urged to 
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concentrate on the centre of the screen and to stare at the fixation cross without paying 
attention anymore to the large cross. They were again asked if they had seen something 
additional and had to pick it out in the 8-AFC. 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8 Trial 9 
Cross 
alone 
Cross 
alone 
Cross 
alone Cross + 
Cross 
alone 
Cross 
alone 
Cross 
alone Cross + 
To-be-
ignored 
cross + 
   
Critical 
stimulus 
 
   
Critical 
stimulus 
Critical 
stimulus 
   8-AFC  8-AFC  8-AFC 8-AFC 
   
 
Inattention 
  
Bias 
 Divided 
attention 
 
Control 
Table 1. Illustration of the procedure used in experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
Results 
Since the present study was aimed at evaluating in the ability of faces or other stimuli to 
capture attention when they appear unexpectedly in condition of inattention, we focused our 
analyses on the inattention trial (i.e. first critical trial) for all analyses reported hereafter. 
Moreover, in the ‘detection rates’ section, we examined the tendency of participants to 
report the presence of an additional item whereas nothing has actually been presented by 
means of the bias trial. 
Length judgment task 
First, the performance on the primary task (i.e. line length judgement) was analysed. The 
overall accuracy on this task was 66%. A Chi-square analysis showed that the accuracy did 
not differ significantly between the two groups on the inattention trial, χ²(1) = 2.42, p = 0.12. 
Moreover, the rates of correct responses on critical trials (trials 4 and 8 being pooled), 68%, 
did not differ significantly from that on adjacent trials (trials 3, 5, 6 and 7 being pooled), 
71%, χ²(1) < 1. 
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Figure 4. Left panels: Percentage of participants that reported having detected an 
additional stimulus as a function of the type of critical stimulus (CS) presented in 
critical and bias trials of experiments 1, 2 and 3. Right panels: Percentage of correct 
recognition of the CS among an 8-AFC. ‘*’ refers to a significant p value below 0.05; 
‘n.s.’ refers to a non-significant p value superior to 0.05. Note that we did not conduct 
analyses on the detection rates of the control trial because performance was at 
ceiling. This control trial indicates that the CSs were readily visible in condition of full 
attention. 
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Detection rates 
We compared the detection rates as a function of the type of CS presented (i.e. face versus 
object) during the first critical trial by means of a Chi-square analysis. Faces (58%) were 
significantly better detected than objects (4%), χ²(1) = 16.39, p < 0.001. In addition, the bias 
trial indicated that only 2 participants from the ‘face’ condition (8%) and 3 from the ‘object’ 
condition (12.5%) reported seeing something whereas nothing had been presented. 
Complete results are presented on the left panel on Figure 4a for exhaustiveness. 
Correct recognition rates 
We compared the ability of participants to recognise the CS that has been presented on the 
inattention trial by means of another Chi-square analysis. The correct recognition rates did 
not differ significantly between faces (29%) and objects (21%), χ²(1) < 1. Complete results 
are presented on the right panel of Figure 4a. 
Discussion 
Current results confirm previous findings, now with realistic photographic stimuli, that faces 
are more resistant to IB than other objects (Mack & Rock, 1998). In general terms, this 
finding is consistent with the idea that faces are more likely to grab attention than other 
objects (Mack et al., 2002; see also Ro et al., 2001; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; 
but see Palermo & Rhodes, 2003). The present experiment that used realistic photographic 
stimuli also shows an overall IB effect of 69%. The present findings thus provide a 
confirmation of previous findings demonstrating the robustness of the IB effect (otherwise 
already demonstrated in more complex situations such as dynamic events, see Simons & 
Chabris, 1999). 
Although faces were better detected than objects during the inattention trial, recognition 
rates did not differ significantly between faces and objects. This shows that despite the fact 
that they are not easily identifiable, faces possess the ability to capture attention more than 
another category of objects. This poor recognition performance is probably due to the 
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difficulty to recognise a small novel face, presented unexpectedly while participants are 
engaged in another task, after a relatively short exposure (e.g. Bruce et al., 2001). Crucially 
though, even if participants were not capable of recognising a face in such conditions, this 
face nevertheless had a strong power to attract attention and reduce IB rates dramatically. 
The bias trial also indicated that few participants (5 on 48, = 10.4%) were biased to report 
seeing something when nothing was actually presented. This suggests that those reporting 
seeing something on the first critical trial really did so since most participants were able to 
correctly report that nothing was presented9. 
It cannot be excluded that the results of Experiment 1 reflect some low-level differences 
between faces and other objects. For instance, because of their inner features, faces could 
be less homogenous than objects, rendering the former more readily detectable than the 
                                                          
9 However, one could argue that participants were not in the same situation during the inattention trial 
and during the bias trial in which attention was in fact already divided due to the earlier 
presentation of the first critical trial (we thank Ian Thornton for this suggestion). In order to answer 
this potential criticism, we recruited 18 new participants to whom the first critical trial (inattention) 
was not presented anymore. Thus, following three non-critical trials, the bias trial was presented 
and constituted the first trial after which participants were asked whether they had detected 
something additional although nothing had been presented. Results showed that 5 participants 
(28%) reported seeing something. When asked to describe what they had seen before the 8-AFC, 
not surprisingly, 3 participants were not able to answer and just had a feeling of having seen 
something, 1 described a picture composed of points appearing after the big cross and before the 
mask, and 1 described a strange large image with plants. These two descriptions clearly fit the 
appearance of the mask and indicate that some participants may confuse the perception of the 
mask with that of an additional item. These participants probably noticed the mask because of the 
question and confused it with something additional because they had not noticed it before. It is 
thus possible that the rates of false positives seemed higher when nothing was presented at first 
because participants did not know what there was to ‘see’ whereas when the bias trial was 
presented after a genuine critical trial people knew what could be presented and by consequence 
were surer that they had not seen such thing. This problem of false positives had already been 
addressed by Mack and Rock (1998). In a control experiment similar to that conducted here, they 
found that 25% of participants reported that there was something although nothing had been 
presented. Thus, according to Mack and Rock (1998), “to avoid appearing either dumb or blind, 
these subjects may have answered yes to our question even though they actually had not seen 
anything else” (p. 238). They concluded that the rate of IB is generally underestimated since these 
cases are actually additional cases of IB. 
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latter. To address this possibility, we conducted a second experiment in which we 
compared the detection of upright and inverted faces. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The aim of this second experiment was thus to compare faces to another kind of CS that 
have exactly the same low level properties as faces (contrast, luminance, complexity, etc) 
but that is not perceived as a face, i.e. inverted faces. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
inverted faces are not processed as faces but rather as objects (e.g. Valentine, 1988). 
Hence, if a detection advantage for upright faces by comparison with inverted faces is 
obtained, it would confirm the view that the advantage is due to their meaning rather than to 
other lower level characteristics. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 48 new participants (11 men) from the University of Liège. They were 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: ‘upright face’ (n = 24) or ‘inverted 
face’ (n = 24) as CS. They were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. They gave their informed consent prior their inclusion in the 
experiment. 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and the procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 1 except that the 
four objects used in Experiment 1 were replaced by the four unfamiliar faces that had been 
flipped vertically. Each of these 8 CS was presented throughout the whole experiment to 6 
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different participants. The 8-AFC now comprised 4 upright faces and the same 4 inverted 
faces. 
Results 
Length judgment task 
The overall accuracy on the length judgment task was 65 % which is similar to the 66% 
obtained in Experiment 1. Chi-square analyses showed that the accuracy did not differ 
significantly between the two groups on the inattention trial, χ²(1) < 1. Moreover, the rates 
of correct responses on critical trials (trials 4 and 8 being pooled), 59%, did not differ 
significantly from that on adjacent trials (trials 3, 5, 6 and 7 being pooled), 66%, χ²(1) = 
1.27; p = 0.26. 
Detection rates 
As in Experiment 1 upright faces resisted more to IB than other stimuli. Indeed, upright 
faces (50%) were significantly better detected than inverted faces (21%),χ²(1) = 4.46, p = 
0.035. Moreover, the bias trial indicated that only 3 participants from the ‘upright face’ 
condition (12.5%) and 2 from the ‘inverted face’ condition (8%) reported the presence of an 
additional item when nothing had actually been presented. Complete results are presented 
on the left panel of Figure 4b for exhaustiveness. 
Recognition rates 
The correct recognition rates did not differ significantly between upright faces (29%) and 
inverted faces (21%) after their first appearance, χ²(1) < 1. Complete results are presented 
on the right panel of Figure 4b. 
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Discussion 
This second experiment confirms the findings of Experiment 1 that faces are more resistant 
to inattentional blindness than other stimuli. Here the stimuli of comparison were the same 
faces that were either upright or inverted. Since upright and inverted faces had exactly the 
same low level properties, this detection advantage for upright faces is thus imputable to 
their meaning. In the present experiment, the overall IB rates was 64.5% which is 
consistent with the IB effect found in Experiment 1 and again confirms the robustness of the 
IB effect. In line with Experiment 1, few participants (5 on 48, = 10.4%) reported seeing 
something when nothing was actually presented during the bias trial. 
Finally, as in Experiment 1, upright faces benefited from a detection advantage without 
being better recognised than inverted faces after their first appearance. 
In the preceding experiments we showed that an unfamiliar face grabs more attention than 
other stimuli. We will now examine whether familiarity and identity of a face influence its 
ability to capture attention. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In this experiment, the resistance to blindness of three types of faces differing in identity 
and familiarity was compared. The CS was either an unfamiliar face (as in Experiment 1 
and 2) or a familiar face. In that latter case, the CS was either the participant’s own face or 
the face of a participant’s friend. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred and forty-four participants (37 men) from the University of Liège participated 
in the experiment on a voluntary basis. Each of them had been photographed previously in 
the Cognitive Psychology Unit for their participation in a self and familiar face recognition 
experiment (each participant had taken part to these experiments with a friend/colleague 
and they were control of each other). They were recruited by phone (on average 11 months 
after they had been photographed) and were asked to participate in a visual perception 
experiment about geometrical shapes that appeared to be completely unrelated. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: ‘self-face’ (n 
= 48), ‘colleague’s face’ (n = 49) and ‘unknown face’ (n = 47) as CS. They were naïve as to 
the purpose of the experiment and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They gave 
their informed consent prior their inclusion in the experiment. 
Stimuli 
Now, the CS was either a greyscale picture of a familiar or of an unfamiliar face. These 
facial stimuli were constructed using the same parameters as those described above. When 
the CS was unfamiliar (‘unknown face’ condition), it was chosen among a set of 6 unknown 
faces (3 males and 3 females). When the CS was a familiar face, it was either the 
participant’s own face (‘self-face’ condition) or the face of a participant’s friend (‘colleague’ 
condition). 
Procedure 
The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1 and 2 except that the 8-AFC was 
now tailored for each participant. The 8-AFC was always composed of four faces of the 
same gender as the participant and of the same four objects as in Experiment 1. The four 
faces were two unknown faces and two familiar faces (the participant’s own face and 
his/her colleague’s face). Hence, whatever the group the participant belonged to, he/she 
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had to choose between two familiar and two unfamiliar faces and could not make a default 
decision based on the face familiarity if he/she had not really recognised it. The four objects 
served as filler items in the 8-AFC and were never presented as CS during this experiment. 
In addition, after the 9 trials, participants were presented with the four faces and were asked 
to identify them. To make sure that the possible differences obtained between the three 
groups of participants were due to the different familiarity of the CS they had been 
presented, participants who were not able to identify one (would it be their own face or their 
colleague’s face) or both familiar faces were discarded. 
Results 
Twenty-one participants could not identify at least one of the two familiar faces during the 
final identification phase (i.e. 7 participants in the ‘self-face’ condition, 8 in the ‘colleague’s 
face’ condition and 6 in the ‘unknown face’ condition) and were discarded from further 
analyses (there were thus 41 participants per condition)10. 
Length judgment task 
The overall accuracy on the length judgment task was equal to 69%, which is in line with 
the two previous experiments. Chi-square analyses showed that the accuracy did not differ 
significantly between the three conditions on the inattention trial, χ²(2) = 2.36, p > 0.25. 
Performance on critical trials (trials 4 and 8 being pooled), 70%, did not differ significantly 
from that on adjacent trials (trials 3, 5, 6 and 7 being pooled), 75%, χ²(1) = 1.52, p = 0.22. 
 
                                                          
10 Nonetheless, it has to be mentioned here that most of these 21 participants recognised the stimuli 
as being their own face and their colleague’s face after we told them. Some of them admitted that 
they thought they had recognised the faces but did not dare to tell so. Some of them were also a bit 
stunned as they did not understand how the pictures of these faces could have ended up in the 
present experiment. 
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Detection rates 
Here we focused again on inattention trial to examine whether the self-relevance and 
familiarity of faces can influence their resistance to blindness. The null hypothesis that all 
three types of faces are equally resistant to blindness could not be rejected since the facial 
identity did not significantly influence the detection rates (self-face = 44%, colleague’s face 
= 29%, unknown face = 44%), χ²(2) = 2.46, p > 0.25. However, to ensure that this 
numerical difference of 15% between the ‘colleague’s face’ condition and the two other 
conditions did not reflect a genuine effect that the global Chi-square could not reveal, we 
perform two 2x2 analyses with the ‘colleague’s face’ condition tested against the two other 
conditions. These two analyses did not reveal significant differences between the 
colleague’s face condition and the other conditions, both χ²(1) = 1.89, p = 0.17. 
At the bias trial, only one participant in the ‘self-face’ condition (2.44%), one in the 
‘colleague’s face’ condition (2.44%) and five in the ‘unknown face’ condition (12.20%) 
reported seeing something when nothing additional was actually presented. Complete 
results are presented on the left panel of Figure 4c for exhaustiveness. 
Correct recognition rates 
A Chi-square analysis showed that the familiarity of the face tended to increase the 
recognition of the CS presented during the inattention trial (self-face = 39%, colleague’s 
face = 34%, unknown face = 17%). However, the difference between the three groups was 
not significant, χ²(2) = 5.18, 0.10 > p > 0.05. The right panel of Figure 4c nonetheless 
shows that this advantage of both familiar faces over the unknown face was significant in 
the divided attention and in the control trial. 
Bias trial 
We examined the participants’ choices after the bias trial to evaluate whether they were 
biased to think that the experiment dealt with their own face and therefore that their own 
face had been presented. Overall (i.e. irrespective of participants reporting the presence of 
an additional item or not), 12 participants (9.76%) chose their own face when nothing had 
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actually been presented: 2 (4.9%) from the ‘self-face’ condition, 7 (17.1%) from the 
‘colleague’s face’ condition and 3 (7.3%) from the ‘unknown face’ condition. In addition, 
binomial tests (confidence interval thresholded at α = 0.05) were used to assess whether 
these rates differed from what had been expected by chance (i.e. 12.5%). Participants from 
the ‘colleague’s face’ and ‘unknown face’ conditions chose their own face at random and 
participants from the ‘self-face’ condition chose their own face less often than expected by 
chance when nothing had been presented. 
Among participants who reported having seen something on the bias trial (i.e. 7 
participants, see above), none chose the self-face in the ‘self-face’ condition, one did so in 
the ‘colleague’s face’ condition and none did it in the ‘unknown face’ condition. 
Discussion 
Unexpectedly, the results of this third experiment do not suggest any significant influence of 
self-relevance or of face familiarity on detection rates since all faces grabbed attention 
similarly. A first explanation for this null effect is that the combination of two properties likely 
to grab attention (i.e. facial aspect and self-relevance) does not increase the resistance of 
the self-face to blindness. Indeed, it seems that the detection rates reported when the self 
face was presented (i.e. 44%) was similar to those found for unfamiliar faces across our 
three experiments (i.e. 44% in the present experiment, 58% in Experiment 1, and 50% in 
Experiment 2, thus 51% on average). 
However, our results indicated a non-significant numerical difference of 15% between the 
reported detection rates for a friend’s face (i.e. 29%) and the two other types of faces (i.e. 
44% for both). Therefore, an alternative explanation for this null effect might simply be a 
lack of statistical power. Indeed, IB experiments require a large number of subjects in order 
to reach good power and because participants were unexpectedly presented with their own 
face and a colleague’s face, we were limited by the number of participants we could recruit. 
Nevertheless, given that the detection rate of the self-face was similar to that of unfamiliar 
faces, even if the difference between the colleague’s face and other faces was significant, 
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this would not mean that the self-face particularly attract attention but rather that the 
colleague’s face is less prone to attract attention than another face. 
Nonetheless, there are two points that suggest that the non-significant difference between 
the ‘colleague’s face’ condition and the two other conditions does not reflect a genuine 
difference in the attention-grabbing capacity of such a highly familiar face. First, such a 
decrease in detection for the colleague’s face in comparison with a less familiar face (the 
unknown face) is quite unexpected. We would rather have expected a linear effect where 
the attention-grabbing capacities decreased as the familiarity decreased (i.e. self-face > 
friend’s face > unfamiliar face, see e.g. Buttle & Raymond, 2003). Second, because of this 
unexpected result, recognition data were analysed in more details. This analysis showed 
that the colleague’s face, contrary to the others, was relatively well recognised when 
participants did not report that they had seen something additional after the first critical 
trial11. This could indicate that some participants who detected their colleague’s face did not 
report it (e.g. because they did not remember that they had previously participated in an 
experiment in which they were paired with this particular person, found it ‘weird’ to perceive 
such a picture and were unsure of their perception) but nonetheless recognised it in the 8-
AFC. This explanation is plausible if one imagines the situation of the participant. He/she, in 
most cases, is tested by an experimenter he/she does not know, on average 11 months 
after having been photographed to participate in another familiar faces experiment with 
his/her friend. Thus, it seems quite unlikely that this experimenter knows the identity of 
his/her friends and in addition have their pictures (see also footnote number 10)! In this 
situation, they had some reasons to be reluctant to report such a perception. 
                                                          
11 In that situation, 28% of participants accurately recognised their colleague’s face, against 17% that 
recognised their own face and 4% that recognised an unfamiliar face. The difference between the 
recognition of the colleague’s face and an unknown face was significant, χ²(1) = 4.84, p = 0.028. 
Moreover, also in support of this idea, a binomial test indicated that the recognition of undetected CS 
was at random level for the self-face – Critical Interval = 3% to 28% - and for the unknown face - C.I. 
= 3% to 28% - but significantly higher than random level for the colleague’s face - C.I. = 4% to 27%. In 
other words, although they reported that they did not detect the presence of an additional item, 
participants from the ‘colleague’s face’ condition picked out their colleague’s face in the 8-AFC more 
often than expected by chance. 
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At the bias trial, like in the two other experiments12, there were only few false positives since 
only 7 participants out of 123 (5.70%) reported seeing something when nothing was 
actually presented. The bias trial also allowed us to verify whether participants were biased 
to think that their own face had been presented due to their previous participation in a self-
face experiment. Apparently it was not the case since participants were less than 10% to 
choose their own face when nothing was presented (i.e. after the bias trial). Moreover, after 
the bias trial, in all three conditions the choice of the self-face was not higher than random 
level and actually, in the ‘self-face’ condition, the choice of the own face was even lower 
than expected by chance. 
Finally, recognition rates indicated that familiar faces tended to be better recognised than 
unfamiliar faces even if the former were not more resistant to blindness than the latter (see 
Figure 4c). 
General discussion 
Previous studies using the IB paradigm have shown that some categories of important and 
meaningful stimuli such as faces or self-referential materials (e.g. the participant’s own 
name) particularly capture attention and resist IB compared to stimuli of a lesser importance 
(Mack & Rock, 1998). The present study aimed at investigating the resistance of such 
important stimuli to inattentional blindness with realistic facial stimuli and to investigate 
further the role of familiarity and self-relevance in the IB phenomenon. We thus tested the 
attention-grabbing capacities of pictures of faces by comparison with pictures of common 
objects (fruits and vegetables, Experiment 1) or by comparison with pictures of inverted 
faces (Experiment 2). In addition, we compared three categories of faces in order to assess 
the influence of self-relevance and familiarity on attentional capture (Experiment 3). 
 
                                                          
12 The reported detection rate in the present experiment was not significantly different from that 
obtained in Experiment 1, χ²(1) = 1.18, p = 0.28; or in Experiment 2, χ²(1) = 1.18, p = 0.28. 
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Detection rates and resistance of facial stimuli to blindness 
Our first experiment showed that faces were significantly better detected than other objects 
(i.e. 58% versus 4% of detection) under condition of inattention confirming with more 
realistic stimuli previous findings about the special attentional properties of faces (Mack & 
Rock, 1998; Ro et al., 2001; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; but see Palermo & 
Rhodes, 2003). In addition, results of our second experiment showed that upright faces 
were also better detected than inverted faces (i.e. 50% versus 20% of detection) ruling out 
any alternative explanation in terms of potential low level inherent differences between 
faces and objects. Finally, the result of the third experiment showed no significant 
difference between the detection rates of the self-face (44%), a colleague’s face (29%) and 
an unknown face (44%). In addition, the self-face was clearly detected in the same range 
as the unknown face in Experiment 3 and also in the same range as unfamiliar faces in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. This finding does not support the view that a stimulus 
combining two properties that are likely to grab attention such as the self-face can capture 
attention more than stimuli having only one of these two properties (i.e. facial aspect). We 
already addressed the issue of a potential lack of power in discussion of Experiment 3 and 
suggested that the non-significant decrease of reported detection rates for a friend’s face 
might be due to some subjects being reluctant to report their perception. However, while 
there might be a power issue regarding a potential difference between the colleague’s face 
and the other faces, there seems to be no power issue regarding the comparison between 
the own face (44%) and the unknown face (also 44% in Experiment 3). It remains that there 
are two possible interpretations regarding the similar detection rates for the self-face and 
unfamiliar faces: 
(1) Self-referential stimuli have no special attentional properties. The first possibility is that 
self-relevance itself does not particularly capture attention in conditions of inattention (as 
shown in Experiment 3) and that a face is a sufficiently important and meaningful kind of 
stimulus to capture attention whatever its identity (by comparison with a non-face, as shown 
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). This would be in agreement with previous findings 
showing that self-referential stimuli are not special in the sense that they do not 
automatically capture attention (Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau et al., 2003; Harris et al., 
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2004; Harris & Pashler, 2004; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004; Laarni et al., 2000). The 
conditions in which self-referential stimuli have been shown to elicit attentional bias by 
comparison with other stimuli were as follow: when they were presented as distractor but 
that they were related with the ongoing task (Brédart et al., 2006; Gronau et al., 2003; 
Kawahara & Yamada, 2004), when - if unrelated with the ongoing task - they were 
presented centrally (i.e. within the observer’s focus of attention, sees Gronau et al., 2003) 
and when enough attentional resources were available for their processing (Harris & 
Pashler, 2004). By contrast, self-referential stimuli did not particularly grab attention when 
they were presented peripherally (i.e. outside the observer’s focus of attention) and that 
their presentation was unrelated with the ongoing task (Gronau et al., 2003; Kawahara & 
Yamada, 2004; Laarni et al., 2000) or when attentional capacities were exhausted by 
another task preventing their processing (Harris & Pashler, 2004). Therefore, the current 
study indicates another specific condition in which self-referential stimuli might not be 
particularly prone to capture attention: when they are presented at the centre of the visual 
field, unexpectedly and briefly while observers are engaged in another unrelated and 
demanding task. 
(2) Need of attention to process identity. The second interpretation of our results could be 
that attentional capture is indeed determined by meaning and significance (see Mack & 
Rock, 1998), but by a ‘rough’ meaning, at a processing stage where precise semantic 
details and fine sub-categorisation are not available yet (i.e. a ‘not that late’ selection of 
attention, see e.g. Lachter et al., 2004 for a similar view). In order for faces to capture 
attention outside our direct attentional focus, it is required that there are perceptual 
processes that automatically scan and analyse the visual field for face stimuli. Because 
faces capture attention one has to assume that faces are discriminated by some 
‘preattentive’ or unconscious processing (Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). The current 
findings suggest that the discrimination between a face and a non-face configuration can be 
based on this early preattentive processing (that could take place in the occipito-temporal 
cortex, see Devue et al., 2007). However, in order to discern the identity of the face, a 
second ‘attentive’ processing stage (possibly originating in the fusiform gyrus, see Devue et 
al., 2007) may be necessary. This could explain why faces are more likely to capture 
attention than common objects (see Experiment 1) or to unusual facial configuration (i.e. 
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inverted face, Experiment 2) while faces of different identities and levels of familiarity do not 
differ in their attention-grabbing capabilities (see Experiment 3). It would be interesting to 
address further the generalisability of our finding to other types of facial classification (e.g. 
gender, gaze direction, race, or emotional expression). For instance, one could ask whether 
pictures of faces differing in their emotional facial expressions could be differentiated pre-
attentively. Indeed, this topic is also highly debated in the literature (for a review, see e.g. 
Weierich et al., in press). A first answer has been brought by Mack and Rock (1998) that 
showed that happy-face icons were more readily detected than neutral or sad schematic 
faces. However, it is probable that Mack and Rock’ participants encountered happy-face 
icons far more often than their sad or neutral counterpart (e.g. in the eighties, the yellow 
smiley face was a famous symbol of ‘house’ music). Therefore, it is uncertain whether this 
effect did not actually reflect a mere familiarity effect. Using photographic emotional facial 
stimuli would thus allow an answer to that question. If faces displaying different facial 
emotions could differentially resist to blindness in the IB paradigm, it would be an indication 
that emotional information, contrary to identity information, can be processed pre-
attentively. 
In sum, further work is necessary to determine the reason of our null effect (i.e. a non-
specificity of self-referential stimuli in the IB paradigm or the need of attention to process 
identity). If our null effect reflects a genuine absence of difference in the capacity of different 
faces to resist to blindness, then why did some other studies find that self-referential stimuli 
capture or attract attention (e.g. Brédart et al., 2006, Mack et al., 2002, Mack & Rock, 1998, 
Moray, 1959, Shapiro et al., 1997, Wolford & Morrison, 1980)? We propose a ‘retention 
hypothesis’ to explain the discrepancy between present results and previous ones. It seems 
that terms such as attentional ‘capture’, ‘attraction’ or ‘draw’ might have been used 
inadequately. It has to be mentioned here that ‘self-effects’ found previously were either 
reflected by an increase or by a decrease in performance due to the presentation of self-
referential stimuli. Indeed, some studies showed that self-referential stimuli were 
advantaged (e.g. enhanced reportability) by comparison with other stimuli and concluded 
that they attract attention (e.g. Shapiro et al., 1997, Wolford & Morrison, 1980). However, in 
those cases, this advantage may be due to the fact that self-referential stimuli are 
processed more efficiently than less familiar stimuli once they are already located in the 
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observer’s focus of attention rather than to a capture of attention (see e.g. Bundesen et al., 
1997). This is what our recognition data suggests: once a face has attracted attention 
(because of its facial properties per se and independently of its familiarity) and that this face 
happens to be a familiar face, then it will be processed more efficiently and therefore better 
recognised than a novel face. 
By contrast, in other studies, self referential-stimuli produced an interference effect (i.e. an 
increase of reaction times or of error rates, see e.g. Devue & Brédart, in press; Harris & 
Pashler, 2004; Wolford & Morrison, 1980). We argue that this interference is not necessarily 
due to a capture of attention by this stimulus. Rather, it could be due to a difficulty to 
disengage attention from this stimulus once it is attended by the observer. In other words, it 
is possible that even though the self-face may not capture attention relative to other faces, 
the self-face nonetheless retains attention more than other faces once the attention is 
focused on it (see Fox et al., 2001 for a similar claim with fear-related stimuli). A recent eye-
movement study (Devue et al., submitted) supports this assumption. In that study, 
participants were to look for a specific facial configuration independent of identity on a 6-
faces display. On some trials, the self-face or another familiar face (i.e. a friend’s face) was 
presented irrelevantly with the ongoing task among 5 unfamiliar faces. We found that the 
participant’s eyes did not go faster to the self-face (or to the friend’s face) than to an 
unfamiliar face (i.e. the two familiar faces did not attract attention automatically). However, 
once the self-face was within the participant’s focus of attention (i.e. when it was overtly 
attended), it was fixated longer than unfamiliar faces, suggesting that familiar faces may 
just benefit from a preferential allocation of attention. 
In conclusion, this retention hypothesis could explain some apparent discrepancies in the 
literature about self-referential stimuli. It is possible that studies that found a “self effect” 
used a paradigm involving a capture as well as a retention of attention (e.g. if the self-
referential stimulus is located within the observer’s focus of attention, see Devue & Brédart 
in press; Shapiro et al., 1997; Wolford & Morrison, 1980; or if the task demands allow 
attentional shifts towards self-referential stimuli located peripherally, see Brédart et al., 
2006) and that this effect was actually due to the retention and not to the capture of 
attention. By contrast, studies that did not find specific ‘self-effect’ could have used 
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paradigms involving only a capture of attention (e.g. if the self-referential stimulus is located 
outside the focus of attention and that its presentation is irrelevant for the task at hand, see 
Laarni et al., 2000). 
Recognition rates 
In our two first experiments faces were not better recognised than common objects 
(Experiment 1) or that inverted faces (Experiment 2) despite that faces were more readily 
detected than other stimuli. This is in line with our hypothesis formulated above that the 
visual system can detect facial structures pre-attentively but that further processing is 
necessary to access other information such as identity. Recognising a novel face after a so 
short exposure seems quite difficult (e.g. Bruce et al., 2001). 
In Experiment 3, familiarity affected recognition performance even though all three faces 
similarly attracted attention. Indeed, overall familiar faces were better recognised than 
unknown faces (at least after several presentation of the CS). These recognition results are 
consistent with the two hypotheses formulated above as regard with our detection results 
(i.e. self-face not special per se or need of attention to process identity). Indeed, the 
recognition performance suggest that once the attention is on a face, the processing of the 
self-face or another highly familiar face is facilitated by comparison with that of a face met 
for the first time. This advantage in terms of recognition for familiar faces has been shown 
previously (see for instance Bruce et al., 2001) and is probably due to the fact that the 
robust representation built after an extensive experience with highly familiar persons’ faces 
facilitates their processing (Tong & Nakayama, 1999). 
False positives and participants’ bias 
In our three experiments, the bias trial (i.e. the trial without CS inserted between the 
inattention trial and the divided attention trial) showed that false positives were quite 
unlikely (i.e. less than 10% in all experiments). This indicates that participants who reported 
the presence of the CS after the inattention trial did so accurately since they were able to 
correctly judge that nothing had been presented in the bias trial that followed. 
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Because it was presented after the inattention trial, the bias trial did not constitute a perfect 
measure of the occurrences of false positives. However, it was impossible to check the 
occurrence of false positives before the first critical inattention trial since by definition in this 
paradigm an observer can only be once in condition of inattention. Nonetheless, in the 
specific context of our third experiment this trial constituted a source of information about 
the reliability of participants’ verbal reports. Indeed the bias trial allowed us to control that 
participants were not biased to think that the experiment dealt with their own face. Results 
indicated that participants did not tend to infer that their own face had been presented and 
that the responses they gave on the other trials are quite trustworthy. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, our results showed that pictures of unknown faces were better detected 
than pictures of common objects or inverted faces. A last experiment showed that the self-
face or another highly familiar face do not particularly capture attention as all three faces 
were similarly resistant to IB. However, once a familiar face has been attended, its 
processing is facilitated by comparison with that of a novel face. This study gives rise to 
novel hypotheses to investigate. The first possibility is that self-referential materials have no 
special attention-grabbing capacities, at least in the conditions defined by the IB paradigm. 
The second possibility is that the access to the precise meaning and a fine sub-
categorisation of a facial stimulus are not yet possible at the moment the attention is 
captured and that attention is necessary to process identity. 
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 Chapter 8 
YOU DO NOT FIND YOUR OWN FACE FASTER; 
YOU JUST LOOK AT IT LONGER 
Christel Devue, Stefan Van der Stigchel, Serge Brédart, and Jan Theeuwes (Submitted). 
Abstract 
Previous studies investigating the ability of high priority stimuli to grab attention reached 
contradictory outcomes. This study used eye tracking to examine the effect of the presence 
of the self-face presented among other faces in a visual search task in which the face 
identity was task-irrelevant. We assessed whether the self-face (1) received prioritized 
selection (2) caused a difficulty to disengage attention, and (3) whether its status as target 
or distractor had a differential effect. We included another highly familiar face to control 
whether possible effects were self-face specific or could be explained by high familiarity. 
We found that the self-face interfered with the search task. This was not due to a prioritized 
processing but rather to a difficulty to disengage attention. Crucially, this effect seemed due 
to self-face familiarity, as similar results were obtained with the other familiar face, and was 
modulated by the status of the face since it was stronger for targets than for distractors. 
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Introduction 
When we open our eyes, we receive a large amount of visual information. Because our 
visual system has a limited capacity, selection must occur to prioritize important stimuli 
while ignoring less important ones. For almost fifty years, debates have opposed partisans 
of an early selection of attention (Broadbent, 1958), to whom this attentional selection 
concerns the gross stimulus features at an early stage of processing, to partisans of a late 
selection of attention (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963), to whom the attentional selection takes 
place after semantic processing of all the incoming information. To resolve these debates 
highly important stimuli (e.g., one’s own name) have been used, trying to determine 
whether they can be processed in conditions where they are supposedly unattended. These 
studies led to contradictory outcomes. 
The infatuation for self-referential stimuli has started after that Moray (1959) showed that 
participants better remembered that they had heard their own name presented to one ear 
compared to other words while repeating aloud a message presented to the other ear. In a 
visual tantamount of Moray’s paradigm in which participants were instructed to make a 
parity judgment on two digits flanking a to-be-ignored word (that was their own name on 
some trials), 80% of participants reported that they had seen their own name whereas they 
recognized only 68% of words presented in similar conditions (Wolford and Morrison, 
1980). Moreover, the own name is particularly resistant to the attentional blink (Shapiro, 
Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) and to repetition blindness (Arnell, Shapiro, & Sorensen, 
1999) during rapid serial visual presentations when compared to other names or nouns. In 
the inattentional blindness paradigm, the own name is also less subject to blindness than 
other names or frequent words (Mack & Rock, 1998). Additionally, Mack and Rock (1998) 
showed that the own name pops out of a display of up to 12 items in a visual search task 
(but see Harris, Pashler, & Coburn, 2004 who obtained search slopes not flat enough to 
claim that the own name pops out even if it was detected more rapidly than other names). 
However, Bundesen, Kyllingsbaek, Houmann, and Jensen (1997) showed that one’s own 
name does not automatically attract attention. In their experiment two white-coloured (to-be-
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ignored distractors) and two red-coloured (to-be-reported targets) names were presented. 
The own name was presented on some trials as target or as distractor. The own name 
presented as distractor did not cause more interference than other names but participants 
were more accurate in reporting their own name presented as targets than in reporting 
targets from display without their own name. However, a control experiment showed that 
this advantage for the own name presented as target was not attentional, but rather 
reflected a better identification of the participant’s own name compared with other names. 
Other studies later demonstrated that one’s own name summons attention when 
participants are set to identify target names but not when participants are set to find the 
colour of a target (Kawahara & Yamada, 2004). Similarly, in a Stroop-like task, the own 
name attracted attention if presented centrally within the participant’s attentional focus but 
when presented peripherally, it attracted attention only when it was task-relevant but not 
when it was task-irrelevant (Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003). 
More recent studies have examined the attentional properties of another self-referential 
stimulus, the self-face, and also found contrasting results. For instance, Laarni et al. (2000) 
found that only 18% of participants reported the presence of their own face in the 
background while they were performing a matching task on two faces presented at 
foreground. Similar results were obtained with a celebrity face (the Finnish President). 
Conversely, Brédart, Delchambre and Laureys (2006) found that the self-face flanking a 
classmate’s name in a face-name interference paradigm produced a stronger interference 
on the processing of this name than in the reverse situation when a classmate’s face 
flanked the participant’s own name. This suggests that the self-face also has some 
attention-grabbing capacity. Accordingly, Tong and Nakayama (1999) showed that the self-
face was more quickly detected among distractors than strangers’ faces, even when 
presented in atypical orientations and after hundreds of trials. 
In the present study, we used the eye tracking technique to investigate more precisely the 
way in which attention is allocated when the self-face is presented among unfamiliar faces. 
We put three main questions: (1) Do our eyes go faster to the self-face than another face? 
In other words, is the self face prioritized in visual search? ; (2) Once attending a face, do 
our eyes stay longer on the self-face than on another face? In other words, does the self-
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face hold attention?; (3) Are these potential effects dependent on the status of the self-face 
as target or distractor? In order to disentangle “self-effect” from familiarity effect, we 
included another highly familiar face (a friend’s face) in the experiment. We designed a 
visual search task in which participants searched an array of familiar and unfamiliar faces 
looking for a face with a particular configuration resulting from the pronunciation of a 
specific sound. The task implied processing facial features but without the need to process 
the facial identity. Therefore, the familiarity and identity of the faces were completely task-
irrelevant. Moreover, the task-relevant features were neutral with respect to emotional 
content in order to prevent any effect of other confounding emotional variables. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-two observers (four males) were recruited by gender-matched pairs so that each of 
them served as the friend for the other participant.  
Stimuli 
Twenty-two individuals (11 females and 11 males) had been photographed to be used as 
unfamiliar faces, in a frontal position while pronouncing a [m] and an [o] (i.e., two easily 
producible and differentiated phonemes, see Figure 1). Each participant in the experiment 
was also photographed in similar conditions, the two pictures being used as “self-face” for 
him/herself and as “friend’s face” for his/her friend. All pictures were converted in 
greyscales. Hair below the ear lobes and neck were removed so that all faces had an 
overall oval shape. Faces were placed on a uniformed light grey background and resized to 
subtend 2.9 degrees in height and around 2.1 degrees in width. The self-face was 
presented in a mirror orientation. 
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Figure 1. Sample face stimuli showing a [m] sound (top) and an [o] sound (bottom). 
Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a dim-lighted room. They were maintained at a 75 
cm distance from the computer screen by means of a chinrest. Eye movements were 
measured with an Eye Link II eye tracking system with 500 Hz sampling rate. Participants 
were instructed to judge whether a target face was present or absent in a 6-faces display 
(see Figure 2) by means of two response keys. For half of the participants the target face 
displayed a [m] and remaining distractors displayed an [o]. The reversed situation was 
presented to the remaining half of participants. Participants received no instruction about 
the presence of familiar faces. Each trial began with a fixation cross that participants were 
instructed to stare at until the presentation of the faces. After 500 ms, 6 faces positioned on 
a virtual circle at 8.3 degrees around fixation appeared until a response was made (up to 3 
seconds), followed by a blank of 1000 ms. If participants moved their eyes away from 
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fixation (1.3 degrees) before the pictures onset, they heard a “beep” sound. They received a 
visual feedback in case of an incorrect or too slow response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a 6-faces display in which a target is present ([o] target among 
[m] distractors). 
The test included 288 trials presented in a random order. A target was present in 50% of 
these trials. Each familiar face was presented a total of 72 times (the self-face on 25% of 
trials and the friend’s face on 25% of trials) distributed as follow: one half of the cases in the 
absent target condition (36 times) and the other half of the cases in the present target 
condition (36 times). In that latter case, each familiar face was the target 1 time out of 6 (6 
times) and it was a distractor the 5 remaining times out of 6 (30 times). Each familiar face 
was always presented along with 5 unfamiliar faces. Hence, the processing of the familiar 
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faces was completely irrelevant for the task and the presence of one of these faces was 
totally unpredictive of the correct response.  
Displays were only composed of unfamiliar faces in the remaining 50% of trials that were 
distributed as follow: 72 trials with a target present and 72 trials with no target. The 
unfamiliar faces were picked up randomly among the set of 22 unfamiliar faces with the 
constraint that two identical faces could not appear within the same trial13,14. 
Before the test, participants performed a 48-trials training session composed of 6 additional 
unfamiliar faces that were not presented during the test. 
Design and data analysis 
We first examined the effect of the Condition (target present vs. target absent) and of the 
inclusion of a familiar face within the display (Display type: self-face, friend’s face, all 
unfamiliar faces) on mean reaction times (RTs) and on mean number of saccades. The 
mean number of saccades was the number of eye movements necessary to judge correctly 
whether the target was present or absent (from the display onset until a correct response 
was given). These analyses determined whether the presence of a familiar face within the 
display interfered with the ongoing task by comparing it to a condition in which only 
unfamiliar faces were presented. 
                                                          
13 Each individual unfamiliar face had the same probability to be presented as each familiar face (in 
25% of trials) and the same probability to be presented as a target (2.1%) or as a distractor (22.9%). 
14 To ensure that acuity from fixation was sufficient to recognize the faces at this eccentricity we 
conducted a control experiment with 8 other observers. The design was the same as in the main 
experiment except that one single face was presented at one of the 6 possible locations. The five 
other locations were occupied by grey ovals. The presentation time was reduced to 180 ms to prevent 
participants from making effective saccade and fixating the face. The faces were either the 
participant’s face, one familiar face or 2 unfamiliar faces (displaying an “M” in a half of the trials and 
an “O” in the other half). Each person’s face appeared in 25% of trials. Participants were to perform a 
3-AFC (i.e. “me”, “friend” or “unfamiliar face”) identification task. The correct identification rates were 
94%, 95% and 96%, respectively, indicating that faces were readily recognizable at this eccentricity. 
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In addition we assessed, for target faces, the effect of the Face’s identity (self-face, friend’s 
face, unfamiliar face15) on the first time to arrive at this very face. The first time to arrive at 
the target corresponded to the delay between the display onset and the time point where 
the eyes landed for the first time on the relevant face. This analysis assessed the existence 
of a prioritization of processing for the self-face. Finally, we examined the effect of the 
Face’s identity and of its Status (target vs. distractor16) on total glance duration; a measure 
defined as the total time spent fixating the face. This analysis tested whether the self-face 
holds attention more than another face. In order to properly compare targets and 
distractors, only target present trials were taken into account in this analysis. Moreover, 
only trials in which a correct response was given and in which the relevant face was fixated 
were included in these two analyses. 
Trials with anticipatory eye movements (latencies under 80 ms) were excluded from 
analyses. 
Results 
Data of two participants that only had respectively 20% and 23% of analysable data (e.g., 
trials without too early saccades or errors) and data of one participant whose response time 
and accuracy was more than 2.5 SD by comparison with the mean of the sample was 
discarded.  
RTs. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (target present vs. absent) and 
Display type (i.e., the face included in the display: self-face, friend’s face, all unfamiliar 
faces) as factors was conducted on RTs. Condition had a significant effect, F(1,18) = 
386.34; p < 0.001, with faster responses when the target was present (M = 1373 ms, SD = 
254 ms) than when the target was absent (M = 1878 ms, SD = 370 ms). Display type also 
                                                          
15 The unfamiliar face identity represents “pure” unfamiliar trials in which no familiar face was present 
in the display. 
16 The unfamiliar distractor condition was computed by choosing one unfamiliar face at random 
among the possible unfamiliar distractors. 
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had a significant effect, F(2,36) = 3.63; p < 0.05. Planned comparisons indicated that RTs 
were slower when the self-face (M = 1642 ms, SD = 276 ms) and when the friend’s face (M 
= 1630 ms, SD = 252 ms) were presented than when only unfamiliar faces (M = 1604 ms, 
SD = 226 ms) were presented, p = 0.018 and p = 0.049. By contrast, RTs were not 
significantly different when the self-face and when the friend’s face were presented, p = 
0.47. There was no interaction between Condition and Display type, F < 1 (see Figure 3A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction times (A) and mean number of saccades necessary to judge 
whether the target is present or absent (B) as a function of the Condition and of the 
face contained in the display (Display type). Mean reaction times (C) in the target 
present condition as a function of the Status (target vs. distractor) of the familiar faces 
present within the display. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Moreover, to decompose the interference caused by the familiar faces as a function of their 
status in the target present condition, we conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
with Status (target vs. distractor) and Face’s identity (self-face vs. friend’s face) as factors. 
There was no significant effect nor interaction, all Fs < 1 (see Figure 3C). 
Mean number of saccades. We also conducted a 2 Condition by 3 Display type ANOVA on 
mean number of saccades. Condition had a significant effect, F(1,18) = 573.56; p < 0.001, 
as less saccades were necessary to respond when the target was present (M = 4.51, SD = 
0.69) than when the target was absent (M = 7.06, SD = 0.84). Display type had no 
significant effect, F < 1, and there was no interaction, F < 1 (see Figure 3B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean time to arrive at a target face as a function of its Identity. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
First time to arrive at the target. In this analysis we determined the first time participants 
arrived with their eyes at the self-face, a friend’s face or an unfamiliar face (Face’s identity) 
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as targets. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed no effect of Face’s identity, F < 
1 (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean total glance duration on a face as a function of its Status (target vs. 
distractor) and Identity. Error bars represent SEM. 
Total glance duration. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed to determine 
whether there was a difference in glancing at the self-face, a friend’s face and an unfamiliar 
face (Face’s identity) depending on whether it was a target or a distractor (Status). Face’s 
identity affected the total glance duration, F(2,36) = 7.74; p < 0.002. Planned comparisons 
indicated that the self-face (M = 380 ms, SD = 121 ms) and the friend’s face (M = 358 ms, 
SD = 148 ms) were fixated longer than an unfamiliar face (M = 323 ms, SD = 67 ms), p < 
0.001 and p < 0.05, respectively, the two familiar faces not differing between each other, p 
= 0.14. Status of the face significantly influenced the total glance duration, F(1,18) = 
146.46; p < 0.001, with target faces (M = 484 ms, SD = 207 ms) being fixated longer than 
distractor faces (M = 224 ms, SD = 58 ms). 
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The interaction between Face’s identity and Status was significant, F(2,36) = 3.64; p < 0.05. 
Planned comparisons indicated that the self-face as target was fixated longer than 
unfamiliar target faces, p < 0.001, and that the friend’s face as target only tended to be 
fixated longer than unfamiliar target faces, p = 0.072. The two familiar faces as targets were 
not differentially glanced, p = 0.17. The self-face as distractor was also fixated longer than 
an unfamiliar distractor face, p < 0.02. The other comparisons between identities did not 
reach significance, all ps > 0.10. All faces were fixated longer when they were targets than 
when they were distractors, all ps < 0.001 (see Figure 5). 
Discussion 
The first finding is that search in our task was performed in a slow and serial manner (see 
Figure 3A and B; a movie showing a sample of eye movements is also presented as 
supplementary material). Importantly and consistently with previous observations (Brédart 
et al., 2006), the presence of the self-face in the display interfered with the ongoing task as 
observers responded faster to displays in which only unfamiliar faces were presented 
compared to displays in which the self-face was present. This effect is even more striking 
that even if the processing of faces was necessary to the task, the face identity was 
completely task-irrelevant. Critically, the presentation of another familiar face also caused a 
distraction arguing in favor of a familiarity effect rather than a “self effect”. 
Crucially, the current data allow us to directly determine whether the self-face automatically 
summons attention in comparison to an unfamiliar face. We assessed the delay between 
the onset of the display and the moment a saccade landed for the first time on a face. We 
found no effect of the face’s identity as the time to arrive on a face was similar for all three 
types of faces. Note however that our control study clearly indicates that the faces were 
readily recognizable from the central fixation point. In other words, the absence of 
attentional prioritization cannot be due to insufficient perceptual acuity when fixating the 
middle. Inconsistently with conclusions drawn from previous studies with the own name 
(Mack & Rock, 1998; Wolford & Morrison, 1980), current results thus clearly indicate that 
the self-face does not benefit of attentional prioritization and does not pop out of a display 
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composed of other faces. However, this result is consistent with previous studies showing 
that the own name (Bundesen et al., 1997; Harris et al., 2004) or the self-face (Laarni et al., 
2000) does not summon attention. These discrepancies between previous findings could be 
explained by a retention component. 
Indeed, our eye movement data also permit to directly assess whether the self-face holds 
attention in comparison with another face. We found that fixations lasted longer on the self-
face and on the friend’s face in comparison with unfamiliar faces. Therefore, even if familiar 
faces are not prioritized in visual search, they are fixated longer once they are in the focus 
of attention and it is more difficult to disengage attention from those familiar faces by 
comparison with less familiar faces. Hence, highly familiar stimuli could just benefit from a 
preferential allocation of attention instead of a genuine ability to capture attention.  
Present findings could thus resolve apparent contradictions in previous studies that showed 
effects of self-referential stimuli presented irrelevantly with the ongoing task when located 
within the focus of attention (Gronau et al., 2003; Wolford and Morrison, 1980) but not when 
located outside the focus of attention (Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau et al., 2003; Laarni et 
al., 2000). In other words, “self effects” found in previous studies could be due to a retention 
of attention by important stimuli rather than to automatic attentional prioritization (see Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001 for similar results with threatening words), explaining the 
absence of effect when they are not located in the focus of attention. 
Another factor of importance determining specific attentional properties of self-referential 
stimuli seem to be their relationship with the ongoing task (Brédart et al., 2006; Gronau et 
al., 2003; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004; Shapiro et al., 1997) and their status as target or 
distractor (Bundesen et al., 1997). Present data confirm this claim since the preferential 
allocation observed for familiar faces was modulated by the stimulus status as target or as 
distractor even though face identity was completely task-irrelevant. The effect of identity on 
total glance duration was stronger when faces were targets than when they were 
distractors. Present data allows interpreting previous findings further and brings new insight 
about visual search implying complex stimuli. First, only task-relevant features - e.g., here 
the shape of the mouth, the colour of the items in Bundesen et al. (1997) and in Gronau et 
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al. (2003)s’ studies - would be selected and processed. At this point, if these task-relevant 
features do not match those defining the target, other task-irrelevant features of the item – 
e.g., those determining facial identity here or lexical entries in Bundesen et al. - can be 
easily overlooked, explaining the weaker effect of the self-face as distractor as well as the 
absence of effect of distractors in other studies where distractors’ features never matched 
the primary task (Bundesen et al., 1997). When the task-relevant features match those 
defining the target then the attention engages on this stimulus before the observer decides 
that she has found the target. This is confirmed by present data showing that targets were 
overall fixated about twice as long as distractors. This engagement of attention might reflect 
a checking process before the response is given, allowing a deeper processing of the 
stimulus and as a consequence of its task-irrelevant features. These task-irrelevant 
features can have a distractive power triggering an even longer retention of attention when 
they are highly familiar to the observer as shown by present data. 
In conclusion, we found that a unique and distinctive self-referential stimulus such as the 
self-face is not systematically prioritized in comparison to another highly familiar face or 
even by comparison with a less important unfamiliar face. Moreover, we demonstrated for 
the first time that once the self-face is fixated, it holds attention as it seems more difficult to 
disengage attention from it than from a less familiar face. Importantly however, this effect 
was dependent upon the status of the face as target and similar effects were observed with 
another highly familiar face. 
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 Chapter 9 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
1. Summary and discussion of present findings 
In this thesis we asked the question of the specificity of a highly distinctive self-referential 
stimulus, the self-face. Indeed, the literature was still unclear as regard with the specificity 
of self-referential stimuli. Intuitively one would hypothesize that the information relative to 
his or her own person must be processed in a special way by comparison with less 
personal and important information. However, this assumption is still highly debated in the 
literature and some researchers have suggested that this assumption might not be true 
(see Gillihan & Farah, 2005 for a review). 
Therefore, in the present thesis, we have conducted five studies examining whether the 
self-face is processed in a special way by comparison with other faces. We have put three 
main questions: (1) how accurate is the representation of the self-face in memory?; (2) is 
this representation subtended by specific neural correlates?; and (3) does the self-face 
have special abilities to attract and/or to hold attention? 
Throughout this work, we chose to use the self-face because, by contrast with most self-
referential stimuli, it is highly distinctive and unique to each person. Moreover, the self-face 
can be presented in the visual modality and, as a consequence, studied in a virtual infinite 
number of paradigms. Importantly, in order to allow an interpretation of possible effects as 
resulting from the ‘self’ property of the self-face rather than resulting from other factors such 
as the high familiarity of the self-face, we always compared the patterns of performance 
obtained with the self-face to those obtained with another personally familiar face. Our 
studies and their results are summarized and discussed below. 
General discussion 
 196 
1.1. Self-face and memory 
In a first study (see Chapter 4), we used a psychophysical method to examine the extent to 
which we represent our own face accurately. Indeed, this aspect of memory of the self-face 
had been largely neglected (for an exception see Thompson, 2002) and was still unknown. 
Previous studies that examined the way the self-face is represented in memory usually 
focused on the orientation of the representation (i.e. mirror-oriented versus normal view, 
see Brady et al., 2005; Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986), on the canonical view of the self-
face (Laeng & Rouw, 2001; Troje & Kersten, 1999) or, on the features used to recognize its 
usual orientation (Brédart, 2003). Overall, these studies showed that, unlike faces of other 
familiar persons, the canonical view for our own face is a frontal view. Moreover, our own 
face is represented with a mirror-orientation. This probably arises from the fact that we 
cannot see our own face directly and that we need mirrors, pictures or videos. As we mostly 
see our own face in the mirror with a frontal view, we simply represented it the way we 
usually perceive it. This is actually the same with other familiar faces that we rather 
represent in a normal oriented-view, which is the way we mainly encounter them. In that 
sense, the perceptual representation of the self-face is thus not really special. 
In our study, we assessed the precision of the representation of our own face. To do so, we 
created a set of 18 modified pictures for each participant’s face. The modification consisted 
in increasing or decreasing the interocular distance by steps of two pixels (up to 18 pixels, 
on a horizontal axis, in each direction). These altered pictures and the original picture of the 
participant’s face were presented in a random order and participants were to judge from 
memory whether each picture was intact or altered. Each participant also performed the 
same task with pictures of a friend’s face. Moreover, we compared the performance of our 
participants to that of another group of participants instructed to perform a perceptive 
discrimination task. In this control task, two pictures (i.e. an original picture and another 
one, either original or altered) were presented simultaneously and participants were to 
judge whether both pictures were identical or not.  
Results showed that participants were as accurate at picking out their intact own face from 
memory as other participants involved in a perceptual discrimination task. Moreover, the 
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just noticeable differences (i.e. the modification necessary to judge that a face is altered in 
75% of the cases) were similar in the memory and in the perceptual discrimination task. 
This indicates that even if we only access a restricted range of views of our own face, the 
precision of its representation and the accuracy with which we can recognise it are only 
limited by the acuity of our visual system. This study also suggests that the physical 
constraints characterizing the perception of our own face do not affect much the accuracy 
of its representation. Indeed, participants had similar performance with their own face and 
with their friend’s face. 
This study thus brings new information about the representation of one’s own face. It 
suggests that the accuracy of the representation of one’s own face is not special. This runs 
against the idea that we should be especially good at recognising our own face (see 
Heatherton et al., 2004). In addition, this study also informs us about the memory for highly 
familiar faces in a different way than previous studies. Most of these studies used methods 
giving information about familiar faces by comparison with unfamiliar faces. In some tasks, 
participants had to explicitly recognize and/or identify familiar faces for instance by naming 
familiar faces or by judging whether faces presented among novel faces were familiar or 
not. In other tasks, the influence of the familiarity of the faces was assessed by comparing 
performance on familiar and unfamiliar faces in tasks that did not require an explicit 
recognition or identification (e.g., matching two pictures of the same person or faces 
presented in different orientations). Such methods gave information about people’s ability to 
recognize the global appearance of familiar faces and about the parameters (e.g., the 
orientation) or information (e.g. external traits versus internal traits) that facilitate the 
processing of the face. The method we used was different in that people had to recognize 
the real face of a person among other pictures of the same person that had been modified. 
This allowed a precise examination of the accuracy of the memory for one’s own face and 
other familiar faces.  
However, this method also has some limitations. Indeed, it implied the displacement (i.e. 
modification of facial configuration) of one single facial feature. We displaced the eyes 
because they constitute an important component in facial recognition (e.g., O’Donnell & 
Bruce, 2001) and to replicate Ge et al. (2003)’s method. Yet, it is possible that results would 
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have been different with displacement of other facial features. For instance, a recent study 
(Brooks & Kemp, 2007) demonstrated that people perform at chance when they have to 
detect displacements of the ears of personally familiar faces. Therefore, it is possible that 
this high accuracy found for the detection of eyes displacement do not generalize to all 
kinds of facial manipulations. 
Consistently, another study conducted in our lab (Devue, 2004) showed that the accuracy 
of the memory for highly familiar faces can be affected by other factors than the physical 
properties of our visual system (visual acuity). In that study we displaced the inner features 
(eyebrows, eyes, nose and mouth) upwards or downwards. The latter alteration gave rise to 
facial configurations similar to that existing when the person was younger (see e.g. Berry & 
McArthur, 1986; Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998) whereas the former gave rise to novel facial 
configurations that the face had never presented. With such facial alterations, participants 
tended to accept as unaltered faces with inner features moved downwards more than faces 
with inner features moved upwards. This result held for the participants’ own face as well as 
for other personally familiar faces. By contrast, this asymmetry was not present among 
participants performing a perceptual discrimination control task. In that case, there was no 
difference in the detection of upwards or downwards displacements. This study thus 
indicated that the representation of familiar faces in memory is not just a photograph that 
we can access to order. Rather, this representation can be influenced by parameters such 
as the past appearance of the face. Contrary to the vertical position of the inner features, 
the relative distance between one’s eyes is quite constant throughout facial development. 
This probably accounts for the high accuracy found when observers have to detect 
alterations of the interocular distance. 
Finally, another reason explaining that we did not find any difference between the self-face 
and other familiar faces regarding their representation in memory could be that we focused 
on configural perceptual aspects. It is feasible that differences would have emerged if we 
had examined more qualitative or emotional aspects of memory. 
For instance, responses could differ between one’s own face and other familiar faces if 
participants were instructed to subjectively judge from memory different aspects of faces 
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(e.g. their attractiveness, their distinctiveness, etc). Moreover, recent studies have shown 
that the processing of identity and the processing of emotional expressions are not 
independent in familiar faces (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2004; Kaufmann & 
Schweinberger, 2004). More specifically, participants that were to make a speeded 
familiarity judgment on novel faces and famous faces that had been morphed from a angry 
to a happy facial expression were influenced by the emotional expression in famous faces 
but not in unfamiliar faces (Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 2004). The judgment was faster 
when famous faces depicted a moderately happy expression. This suggests that 
representation of faces in memory include information about people’s typical expression. As 
it has been proposed that a neutral representation of our own face (as seen in the mirror) 
and a happy representation of our own face (as usually seen on pictures) might compete 
(see Rhodes, 1986), it is possible that, in such a task, the fastest responses would be 
observed with stimuli depicting a more neutral expression for the self-face than for another 
highly familiar face. This could be tested in future work by acquiring pictures of participants 
while they express various emotional facial expressions. The difficulty, however, would 
precisely be to elicit such expressions naturally and similarly in all participants. By contrast, 
explicitly ask participants to change their emotional facial expressions to order would give 
rise to unnatural facial expressions. A solution might consist in filming participants while 
they view pictures of emotional facial expressions and exploit the phenomenon of facial 
mimicry (see e.g., Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007). Snapshots of participants 
depicting the target facial expressions would then be extracted from the videos.  
In sum, we investigated one aspect of the representation in memory of one’s own face, the 
interocular distance. We found that, in that regard, the representation of one’s own face is 
very accurate but is not special by comparison with other familiar faces. Future work should 
examine other facial dimensions to determine the extent to which this result generalises to 
the whole face or not. Moreover, future work should also investigate more emotional 
aspects relative to the representation of one’s own face. 
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1.2. Neural correlates of visual self-recognition 
In a second study (see Chapter 5), we asked whether self-recognition is subtended by 
specific neural correlates by comparison with the recognition of other personally familiar 
persons. We tried to develop a new methodology aimed at determining the neural 
correlates of visual self-recognition. Indeed, the hemispheric dominance as well as the 
precise anatomical location devoted to self-face recognition was still debated in the 
literature (see Section 3 of Chapter 2).  
Self-face recognition 
Thus, our study was first motivated by the lack of consensus as regard with the neural 
correlates of self-face recognition. Moreover, previous studies had several limitations that 
we wanted to address. Therefore, we designed a task in which participants had to identify 
their intact face among a set of intact and altered pictures. The alteration was identical to 
that used in Chapter 4, that is, a horizontal displacement of the eyes. The pictures of each 
participant and pictures of the face of a participant’s friend were presented in a random 
order within an event-related scanning session. As a consequence, participants were forced 
to identify the face before they can decide if it has been altered or not. We analysed 
cerebral changes while participants recognised their real facial appearance. Hence, this 
task differed from task used in previous studies in which participants processed morphed 
images of the self-face (e.g. Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, et al., 2003; Kircher et al., 2000, 
2001; Turk et al., 2002; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005; Uddin et al., 2006). Indeed, these 
morphed pictures blend one’s own face with other faces and therefore, their processing 
might not reflect the usual processing of one’s own face. Moreover, our study implied a task 
giving rise to observable responses contrary to other studies in which participants were 
simply instructed to think about the person depicted on a picture (Platek, Keenan, et al., 
2004). A last advantage of using intact and altered pictures was that it introduced variability 
in the stimuli and hence prevented a too fast habituation of the cerebral response to the 
pictures. 
We found that recognising one’s own face specifically involved the right inferior frontal 
gyrus and of the right insula by comparison with recognising another highly familiar face. 
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The implication of the right inferior frontal gyrus is in line with previous studies reporting 
implication of this region in the distinction between self and others (Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 
2005) or in the attentive processing of the self-face (Sugiura et al., 2000). The right (Kircher 
et al., 2000, 2001) and the left insula (Sugiura et al., 2000) had been found to be implied 
during self-face recognition. The insula was attributed a role in the sustained attention to 
the representation of the self-face (Sugiura et al., 2000). In sum, our results are rather 
consistent with a right hemispheric dominance model of self-recognition (Keenan, Wheeler, 
et al., 2000, Keenan, Wheeler, & Ewers, 2003; Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004; Platek et al., 
2006). 
By contrast, the recognition of the other familiar face elicited specific activation in the 
superior temporal gyrus in both hemispheres and in the left precuneus by comparison with 
the recognition of the self-face. Actually, activity was reduced for both the self-face and the 
other familiar face in these regions but the deactivation was less important for the 
colleague’s face than for the self-face. This result is consistent with those of several 
previous studies reporting more reduced activation in the temporoparietal junction (Sugiura 
et al., 2005), in the left superior temporal gyrus and in the precuneus (Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 
2005) for the self-face than for other familiar faces. This result could arise from the fact that 
these regions contain the representation of people’s names and therefore that they are less 
likely to react when processing one’s own face than when processing familiar persons’ 
faces (Sugiura et al., 2005). Another study interested in the neural correlates of highly 
relevant persons presented mothers with pictures of their children and of their best friend 
(Bartels & Zeki, 2004). This study also showed deactivation in some regions (parieto-
occipital junction, superior temporal sulcus, middle prefrontal cortex, paracingulate cortex, 
temporal poles, posterior cingulate gyrus, medial cuneus and amygdaloid region) during the 
processing of the relevant faces. The authors attributed these deactivations to a diminution 
of negative emotions, social judgment and theory of mind with which these regions are 
associated. It is possible that these socially related processes also decreased more when 
viewing oneself than when viewing another familiar person. 
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Self-body recognition 
A second aim of our study was to examine the neural correlates of another part of one’s 
own physical appearance, the headless body. Indeed, at that time there was no study 
investigating neural correlates of self-body recognition (see Gillihan & Farah, 2005) with the 
exception of a study by Kurosaki and colleagues (2006). However these authors focused on 
the processing of altered bodies. Moreover, in their study, faces were not hidden and it was 
thus difficult to conclude that the regions they found were only devoted to the processing of 
bodies. These regions could also have been activated by the processing of faces (note that 
the same comment applies to other studies such as that by Sugiura et al., 2006). 
In order to collect comparable data between faces and bodies, we used the same method 
as that used with faces in a second event-related scanning session. We presented at 
random intact and altered pictures of our participants’ own body and of the body of another 
personally familiar person. We chose a bodily alteration as similar as possible to that 
applied to faces. We modified the waist-to-hip ratio by increasing or decreasing the width of 
the hips. Therefore, this alteration was on a horizontal axis and affected a relevant part of 
the stimulus, giving rise to easily detectable but plausible new bodily configurations. 
Participants were to perform an ‘intact-altered’ judgment on this set of pictures. 
We found that the right cingulate gyrus and a large frontal area on the right side were 
implicated in the recognition of the self-body. This is in line with results that we found with 
faces and with previous studies investigating self-face processing (Keenan, Wheeler, & 
Ewers, 2003, Kircher et al., 2000; Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004; Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura 
et al., 2000; Uddin, Kaplan, et al., 2005). The insula was also implicated in self-body 
recognition but on the left side. However, activations were less reliable with bodies than 
with faces. This could result from person identification being less easy from bodies than 
from faces leading to less sensible activation. Consistently, reaction times indicated that 
participants were faster with faces than with bodies. 
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Abstract self-recognition 
Third, we were interested in neural correlates subtending visual self-recognition 
independently of the stimulus domain. As we designed a study in which the self-face and 
the self-body were presented and judged by participants in comparable conditions, we were 
able to examine the existence of cerebral areas especially devoted to an abstract visual 
self-recognition independent of the type of material presented. We collapsed data obtained 
with faces and data obtained with bodies and compared the cerebral areas implied during 
the processing of self-related stimuli to those implied during the processing of stimuli 
related to another highly familiar person. 
Here, results showed an implication of the right anterior insula and of the right dorsal 
anterior cingulate during processing of self-related pictures. The implication of the anterior 
cingulate is in agreement with the claim that this structure might be generally involved 
during abstract self-processing (i.e., independent of the stimulus domain or of the sensorial 
modality) or when making decisions about self-referential information (Northoff & Bermpohl, 
2004; Platek et al., 2005). Indeed, the insula has been found to be implicated in different 
aspects of self-processing such as self-agency (Farrer & Frith, 2002), autobiographical 
episodic memory retrieval (Fink et al., 1996), self-face recognition or self-descriptive 
judgments (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). In sum, present results combined to those of 
previous studies suggest that the anterior cingulate and the right anterior insula could play a 
general role in making decisions about oneself. 
Note that, unlike previous empirical studies or integrative works that tried to infer neural 
correlates of self-processing by comparing data obtained in different tasks and with different 
methods, our method allowed a comparison of two types of self-recognition investigated 
with the same procedure. 
General face and body processing 
Our study also had the secondary goal of comparing cerebral areas associated with the 
general processing of faces to those associated with the general processing of bodies. To 
do so, we added two control sessions following the two experimental sessions devoted to 
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the investigation of self-face and self-body recognition. In a first control session, we 
presented the intact picture of the participant’s face and the same picture that had been 
scrambled. Pictures of faces and scrambled pictures thus had the same low level properties 
with the former having a facial structure and the latter having no meaning. These pictures 
were presented at random and were preceded by a coloured fixation cross. The cross was 
red in 87.5% of trials and yellow in the remaining 12.5% of trials. Participants were 
instructed to report yellow crosses by pressing a response key. This procedure allowed us 
to ensure that the participants were attending to the stimuli. In a second control session, the 
same method was used with pictures of the participant’s body. 
Results indicated that the processing of faces and the processing of bodies seem to recruit 
close but segregated areas of the occipital cortex. In addition, it seemed that there is a 
common implication of the right fusiform gyrus for face and body processing. These results 
are in agreement with previous studies that demonstrated that distinct regions of the 
extrastriate cortex are specifically devoted to faces (ventral occipital face area, OFA, Puce 
et al., 1996; Peelen & Downing, 2005) and bodies (extrastriate body area, EBA, Downing et 
al., 2001; Peelen & Downing, 2005). Moreover, recent studies (Peelen & Downing, 2005; 
Schwarzlose et al., 2005) also found that distinct but overlapping regions of the fusiform 
gyrus were associated with presentation of faces and bodies. 
Neural correlates of person identification 
From all abovementioned results we attempted to develop a general model of visual person 
recognition. Overall, our data indicated that posterior and anterior regions play specific roles 
in person identification. At a first level of processing, posterior regions (i.e., occipito-
temporal cortex) would intervene in the distinction of different aspects of persons (i.e., 
classification as face or body). Then, the fusiform gyrus could be implied in a more 
elaborated structural encoding of the different body parts and provide a first evaluation of 
the person’s familiarity (see Rossion et al., 2003). After that, anterior regions (i.e., mainly 
the frontal and superior temporal cortices, the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior 
insula) may serve to access more abstract information about identity of familiar individuals 
(e.g. semantic information about these persons and their names). More specifically, the 
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anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex would distinguish oneself from others and 
give rise to an abstract representation of oneself. 
Conclusion, limitations and perspectives 
In sum, this study showed that specific cortical regions, mainly the right frontal cortex and 
the insula, are implicated in visual self-recognition. These results support the claim that the 
right frontal cortex preferentially intervenes during self-recognition (Keenan, Wheeler, et al., 
2000, 2001; Platek, Keenan, et al., 2004). Moreover, it seems that anterior regions within 
the right hemisphere (i.e., the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate) are 
implicated in the distinction between the self and others and in a more abstract 
representation of the self. 
However, the fact that our participants were all females may limit the generalisation of our 
results. More specifically, regarding body processing, the study by Kurosaki et al. (2006) 
showed that differences exist between men and women when they are processing altered 
images of their own-body. It is possible that such gender differences applied to the 
processing of intact images of one’s own body. One’s own face processing might also be 
concerned with such gender differences. Future work should thus attend to this issue and 
include male as well as female participants in their sample. 
1.3. Self-face and attention 
After having shown that the representation of our own face in memory is not special (at 
least regarding its accuracy) whereas it is subtended by specific neural correlates, we 
asked, in a set of three studies, whether the self-face is particularly prone to capture and/or 
hold attention. 
For fifty years (Moray, 1958) it has been claimed that referential stimuli (e.g., one’s own 
name) are particularly prone to attract attention because of their meaning and of their 
importance (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998). However, this assumption has later been questioned 
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by other studies demonstrating that one’s own name does not automatically capture 
attention (e.g., Bundesen et al., 1997; see Section 4 of Chapter 2). 
Therefore, in a set of three studies (see Chapters 6 to 8), we examined the precise 
conditions in which self-referential stimuli have (or do not have) specific attentional 
properties. Here again, and by contrast with most of previous studies, we used the self-face 
because, contrary to one’s own name, it is a unique and distinctive self-referential stimulus. 
In addition, in order to disentangle possible self-effects from mere familiarity effects we 
compared the patterns of results elicited by the presentation of the self-face to those elicited 
by the presentation of another highly familiar face. Indeed, we hypothesised that familiarity 
effects could be sufficient to explain some finding of previous studies. 
Digit-parity paradigm 
We conducted a first study (see Chapter 6) aimed at examining whether the self-face is 
prone to produce a distraction when it is presented irrelevantly with the task at hand, 
whether this distraction is robust or only temporary and whether it is dependent upon the 
location of the self-face within the observer’s focus of attention. We used a paradigm that 
had been used with one’s own name (Harris & Pashler, 2004; Wolford & Morrison, 1980) 
and adapted it to take possible familiarity effects into account (i.e., we compared the 
distraction caused by the self-face to that caused by another highly familiar face). In the 
original paradigm, participants had to perform a digit-parity task while ignoring words 
presented between the two digits. 
In a first experiment, we replaced words by pictures of faces. By analogy with Harris and 
Pashler (2004)’s study, familiar faces were presented infrequently in a first block of trials 
(i.e. the self-face and a friend’s face appeared once each; unfamiliar faces appeared on the 
other trials). This first block assessed the reaction to the self-face after its first apparition 
(e.g., surprise reaction). Then, in a second block of trials, familiar faces appeared more 
frequently, on half of the trials. This second block determined whether the response to the 
self-face carries on after several presentations or if it is only transient. 
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In this first experiment, we found that the first occurrences of both familiar faces interfered 
with the digit-parity task when the faces were presented within the participants’ focus of 
attention. However, this effect was only temporary and participants seemed to habituate to 
seeing their own face as well as their friend’s face. Indeed, after a few presentations, 
reaction times elicited in trials in which familiar faces were presented were similar to 
reaction times for trials showing unfamiliar faces. This first experiment thus extends Harris 
and Pashler (2004)’s findings (i.e., one’s own name have no enduring capacity to attract 
attention) to a highly distinctive self-referential stimulus. Moreover, it also shows that the 
self-face is not really special since similar results were obtained with another highly familiar 
face. 
In a second experiment, we presented distractor faces at periphery, on the right or on the 
left of the two digits. Based upon findings by Gronau et al. (2003) with the own name we 
hypothesised that familiar faces should produce no distraction when they were presented at 
periphery because their processing was not necessary for the ongoing digit-parity task. 
Results showed that the distractive ability of the two familiar faces was reduced when they 
were presented at periphery, presumably outside the participant’s attentional focus. Indeed, 
they produced no distraction after their first apparitions. In addition, they overall produced 
no significant distraction in the second block of trials. Nonetheless, a sharper analysis of 
this second block of trials revealed that the friend’s face was more distractive than 
unfamiliar faces in the first part of Block 2 but that this response habituated in the second 
part of Block 2. By contrast, the presentation of the self-face had no significant effect. This 
indicated that the self-face does not automatically capture attention. The small effect 
obtained with the friend’s face was a bit unexpected (see Gronau et al., 2003). It suggested 
that participants shifted their attention at periphery after a few dozen of trials, when they 
mastered the task. This elicited a distraction that quickly habituated on subsequent trials. 
Nonetheless, this effect was not strong enough to affect Block 2 in its entirety. Importantly, 
this effect also demonstrated that faces were perceivable at their peripheral location. 
Therefore, the absence of interference by the self-face was not due to a lack of perception 
of the peripheral faces. 
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This first study thus indicates that the self-face is not a particularly potent distractor 
stimulus. Indeed, the presentation of another familiar face produced overall similar results 
(less clear effect with the friend’s face than with the self-face in Block 2 of Experiment 1 and 
clearer effect in Block 2 of Experiment 2). Moreover, the distraction produced by both faces 
was of short duration and was affected by the presentation within the participant’s focus of 
attention. This suggests that when the familiar faces are presented in a way so that they are 
difficult to ignore (i.e., centrally, see Beck & Lavie, 2005) they only elicit a surprise reaction 
that quickly disappears. In addition, our second experiment suggests that a familiar face 
does not automatically capture attention since its presentation at periphery had an effect 
only after several presentations. These results could indicate that the interference produced 
by familiar faces is not due to a capture of attention but rather to a transient difficulty to 
disengage attention from these faces once they are attended (for a similar rationale with 
threatening words, see Fox et al., 2001). 
Unfortunately the digit-parity paradigm did not allow us to break the observed interference 
effect down into capture and retention components of attention. In following studies, we 
addressed this issue by using paradigms allowing a clearer distinction between these two 
components of attention. 
Inattentional blindness paradigm 
In a second study (see Chapter 7), we more directly assessed whether the self-face 
captures attention by comparison with other faces. We used the inattentional blindness 
paradigm originally designed by Mack and Rock (1998). In the variant of the paradigm that 
we used, a critical stimulus is presented very briefly and unexpectedly within the observer’s 
visual field (i.e., at fixation) while he/she is engaged in another attentional demanding task. 
This task consists in judging which arm of a large cross appearing briefly around fixation is 
longer compared to the other one. After three trials in which the large cross has been 
presented alone, there is a first critical trial (i.e. inattention trial) in which the critical stimulus 
is presented besides the large cross. Inattentional blindness (IB) is said to occur when the 
observer fails to detect the presence of the critical stimulus.  
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First, we replicate, with photographic stimuli, Mack and Rock (1998)’s finding that faces 
capture attention and resist more to blindness than other stimuli. In Experiment 1 we 
presented pictures of neutral faces as critical stimuli. We compared their capacity to be 
detected to that of other common objects (i.e. fruits and vegetables). We found that faces 
were more resistant to blindness than objects since the former were detected more 
frequently than the latter. In addition, we evaluated how accurate observers were at 
recognising the critical stimuli that had been presented and found that despite their better 
resistance to blindness, faces were not better recognised than objects. In Experiment 2 we 
addressed the possibility that faces were better detected than fruits and vegetables due to 
their low level properties rather than to their meaning. We compared the capacity of upright 
faces and of inverted faces to resist to blindness. We replicated results of Experiment 1: 
upright faces were better detected than inverted faces but the former were not better 
recognised than the latter. This study thus suggests that the structure of a face can be 
analysed pre-attentively by the visual system. However, this analysis is not sufficiently 
elaborated to allow an accurate recognition of the individual face. 
Finally, in a third experiment we assessed whether identity and familiarity of a face can 
affect its resistance to blindness. More specifically, we evaluated whether the self-face that 
combines two properties likely to attract attention (self-referential stimulus like the own 
name and facial structure, see Mack & Rock, 1998) is particularly resistant to blindness. We 
compared three types of critical stimuli: a picture of the participant’s own face, a picture of 
the face of a participant’s friend/colleague, and the picture of an unfamiliar person of the 
same gender as the participant. Results showed that all three faces did not differ in their 
capacity to capture attention (we will not rediscuss the non-significant numerical difference 
between the friend’s face and the other faces here). Thus, this does not support the 
hypothesis that the self-face should capture attention more than other faces due to its self-
referential properties. However, familiar faces were overall better recognised than unfamiliar 
faces. This indicates that once attention has been drawn by a face, familiar faces are 
processed more efficiently than unfamiliar faces. This probably results from the robust 
representation we have of familiar faces in memory (see Tong & Nakayama, 1999). 
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Taken together, these results suggest that the structure defining faces can be detected pre-
attentively more than other stimuli since it determines their selection by attention and their 
perception. Nonetheless, it seems that the visual system cannot extract pre-attentively 
elaborated information about these faces since familiarity or identity did not affect the 
attentional selection. 
The results of this inattentional blindness study contrast with those of the previous study 
using the digit-parity paradigm. Indeed, the latter showed an effect of familiar faces in 
attention while the former did not. A possibility to explain this apparent discrepancy is that 
the distraction observed in Chapter 6 did not result from an attentional capture but from a 
difficulty to disengage attention from familiar faces. We tested this hypothesis in the last 
study. 
Visual search task and eye movements recording 
In this study (see Chapter 8), we used a technique allowing us to control exactly which 
stimuli participants are overtly attending to and when they are doing so, that is the eye-
movements recording. Moreover, we used a visual search task because this task takes 
place in an extended temporal window when it implies complex visual stimuli. Coupled with 
the eye-movements recording, it thus provides precise information about the different 
stages of attentional allocation (i.e. early capture of attention, attentional shifts, attentional 
disengagement, etc, see Weierich et al., in press). Hence, this study was aimed at 
determining precisely the way attention is allocated to the self-face. 
The visual search task we designed consisted in looking for a target face pronouncing an 
“o” among distractor faces pronouncing an “m” (or the other way around) on a display 
comprising 6 unfamiliar faces. The participant’s own face or the face of a participant’s friend 
could appear on some trials, as a target (i.e. “o” face) or as a distractor (i.e. “m” face), 
among 5 unfamiliar faces. Importantly however, it was unnecessary to identify the faces to 
perform the task. 
We found that one’s own face was not prioritised by comparison with other faces, or in other 
words, that it did not capture attention. Indeed, the self-face did not receive a saccade 
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faster than other faces. However, we demonstrated that one’s own face benefited from a 
preferential allocation of attention by comparison with unfamiliar faces. This was reflected 
by longer fixations on the self-face than on unfamiliar faces. These longer fixations on the 
self-face resulted in an interference effect since its presence increased response times to 
the visual search task. Finally, the fixation duration was modulated by the status of the self-
face as target or distractor: the fixation was even longer as it was a target. The pattern of 
results observed with the friend’s face was similar to that obtained with the self-face even if 
the friend’s face sometimes produced performance situated between the self-face and 
unfamiliar faces. 
Self-face and attention 
Overall, results of these three studies are quite consistent. They all suggest that the self-
face is not a potent distractor and that it does not capture attention (see especially Chapter 
7). Rather, it seems that the self-face is fixated longer than unfamiliar faces only once it is 
located within the observer’s focus of attention and attended (see Chapter 6 and 8). In other 
words, self-effects in attention could just reflect a preferential allocation of attention in 
favour of self-referential stimuli rather than an attentional capture. 
In our opinion, this finding could resolve apparent inconsistencies in previous studies. 
Indeed, it has been shown that the irrelevant presentation of self-referential stimuli 
interferes with the ongoing task when they appear within the focus of attention (Gronau et 
al., 2003; Wolford & Morrison, 1980) but not when they appear outside the focus of 
attention (Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau et al., 2003; Laarni et al., 2000). Therefore, “self 
effects” found previously could be due to a retention of attention by self-referential stimuli 
rather than to an automatic attentional capture. This would explain the absence of effect 
when self-referential stimuli are not located in the observer’s focus of attention. 
Another factor determining the attentional selection of self-referential stimuli seem to be 
their relationship with the ongoing task (Gronau et al., 2003; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004) as 
well as their status as target or distractor (Bundesen et al., 1997). Results of our eye-
movement study confirm this claim since the sustained fixations observed for the self-face 
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was modulated by its status of target or of distractor. Indeed, the time spent fixating the 
self-face was longer when it was a target than when it was a distractor. 
Moreover, the longer fixations on familiar faces affected reaction times so that participants 
were slower when a familiar face was present among the 6-faces display than when only 
unfamiliar faces were presented. This result differs from those of other visual search studies 
showing that one’s own face is detected faster than other faces (e.g. Tong & Nakayama, 
1999; see also Mack & Rock, 1998 for similar findings with one’s own name, but see Harris 
et al., 2004) and that could suggest that the self-face capture attention. However, we have 
to stress here that in our three studies the self-face was presented irrelevantly for the task 
at hand. In addition, in our visual search study, the target was not defined by facial identity 
but by other facial features (i.e. the shape of the mouth determining the speech-sound 
pronounced by the face). By contrast, in the study by Tong and Nakayama (1999), the 
participant’s own face was the target to search for among unfamiliar faces. In other words, 
the search concerned facial identity. Therefore, these opposite patterns of results (i.e. 
increased RTs in our study and reduced RTs in Tong & Nakayama’s study) could be 
explained by the different attentional set in which participants were (as shown with one’s 
own name by Kawahara & Yamada, 2004) and by the features defining the target (i.e., 
mouth configuration in our study and identity in Tong & Nakayama’s study). To assess this 
hypothesis, we could use the same procedure as that we used in our eye movements study 
but change the observer’s attentional set. The target would be defined by facial features 
determining identity rather than by features independent of identity. In these conditions, 
one’s own face should be detected faster than another face (see Tong & Nakayama, 1999). 
In addition, eye movements recording would indicate whether the self-face is advantaged 
because it receives the first saccade faster than other faces and/or because it is fixated 
during a shorter time than other faces (i.e., for it is easier to recognize). 
The results of our three studies allow us to interpret previous findings about the attentional 
properties of self-referential stimuli further and bring new insight about the attentional 
selection of complex stimuli. It seems that the self-face does not capture attention, at least 
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when its processing as a self-referential stimulus is not relevant for the task at hand17. This 
suggests that the visual system is not tuned to automatically detect self-referential stimuli. 
By contrast, it seems that the visual system can differentiate faces and non-faces pre-
attentively since the facial structure of a stimulus determines its selection by attention (see 
Chapter 7). In sum, our results suggest that attention and foveal inspection are necessary 
to process the facial features determining identity (see Underwood, Templeman, Lamming, 
& Foulsham, in press, for similar finding with scenes perception). 
In the context of visual search implying complex visual stimuli (see Chapter 8), it seems that 
at first, only task-relevant features (e.g., the shape of the mouth in our own study, the colour 
of the items in Bundesen et al., 1997, and in Gronau et al., 2003, s’ studies) would be 
selected and processed. In our eye-movements study, the slow and serial aspects of the 
search indicated that attention was also necessary to discriminate the speech-sound 
pronounced by faces: faces were fixated serially until the target was found. Hence, at this 
stage of processing, if the task-relevant features of an item do not match those defining the 
target, other task-irrelevant features of the item (e.g., those determining facial identity here 
or lexical entries in Bundesen et al., 1997) can be easily overlooked. This would explain the 
weaker effect of the self-face presented as distractor by comparison with situations in which 
the self-face was a target, as well as the absence of effect of distractors in other studies 
where distractors’ features never matched the features defining the target (e.g. in Bundesen 
et al., 1997, the distractors and the targets always had a different colour; in Laarni et al., 
2000, the self-face was always presented at background and target faces at foreground). 
This idea is consistent with the Input filter theory developed by Bundesen et al. (1997). 
According to this theory, the observer prepares an ‘input filter’ to optimise his or her 
performance as a function of the ongoing task. This filter determines the features of a 
stimulus that will draw attention. 
                                                          
17 Note that the processing of the self-face could nonetheless be prioritised when the task implies the 
identification of the self-face. The self-face could even capture attention in such a task if attentional 
capture is contingent on task set with complex stimuli as it is the case with simpler stimuli (see e.g. 
Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994; but see Schreij, Owens, & 
Theeuwes, 2008). This point should be addressed in future work. 
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In addition, our data suggest that the complexity of the feature defining the target will 
determine whether the target captures attention (i.e., if the feature is perceptually simple) or 
whether the processing of the task-relevant feature will just be prioritised by comparison 
with the processing of other task-irrelevant features (i.e., if the feature is 
perceptually/semantically complex). To put it differently, in cases where the target is defined 
by low level features such as colour, the target could automatically capture attention; 
whereas in cases of targets defined by higher level features (meaning of a word, speech-
sound pronounced by a face, etc), serial attention will probably be necessary to find the 
target (see e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Moreover, in that latter case, our data indicate 
that when the task-relevant features of an item match those defining the target, attention 
must engage on the stimulus before the observer decides that he/she has found the target. 
Indeed, targets were overall fixated about twice as long as distractors. This engagement of 
attention might reflect a checking process before the response is given. This attentional 
engagement would allow a deeper processing of the stimulus and, as a consequence, of its 
task-irrelevant features. These task-irrelevant features can have a distractive power 
triggering an even longer retention of attention when they are highly familiar to the observer, 
as shown by our eye-movements data. 
Future work should assess the extent to which attention is necessary for different types of 
categorisation of faces. Apparently, attention is not necessary to discriminate face from 
non-face whereas it is necessary to discriminate different persons from each other. Then, it 
would be interesting to examine which types of facial categorisations (e.g., gender, race, 
emotional expression, or age judgment) require attention. For instance, whether or not 
different emotional facial expressions can be processed pre-attentively is still debated (for a 
review, see Weierich et al., in press). 
In sum, our experiments indicated that one’s own face does not have special attentional 
properties by comparison with other highly familiar faces. Moreover, our experiments 
showed that the self-face can constitute an interesting tool of investigation in the field of 
visual attention. Our data bring new elements about the way the selection of attention 
proceeds. They all suggest that an elaborated processing of a complex visual stimulus, for 
instance in terms of identification, is not possible without attention (see Lachter et al., 
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2004). This finding runs against the late selection theory of attention according to which the 
meaning of the stimuli is processed before the selection of attention occurs (Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963). It seems that our results rather support an early selection theory of 
attention (Broadbendt, 1958; see Harris et al., 2004 for a similar view) or more intermediate 
views such as, for instance, the feature integration theory developed by Treisman and 
Gelade (1980). Indeed, this theory argue that individual features can be extracted pre-
attentively in parallel while a serial attention to each stimulus is needed to perceive these 
stimuli in an integrated way. A parallel can be done with this theory and our own results 
showing that ‘simple’ features defining a facial structure can be extracted pre-attentively 
whereas serial attention is needed to extract more complex facial information (e.g., the 
speech sound pronounced by the face or its identity). 
1.4. Integration of present findings 
The main question asked in this thesis was «do we process our own face differently from 
other faces?». We have attempted to answer that question from three different perspectives 
by comparing the self-face and other highly familiar faces. In terms of precision of the 
perceptual representation in memory, our own face does not seem special. Overall, it does 
not seem special either as regard with its potency to attract or hold attention. The only case 
in which we found specificities for our own face concerned its neural correlates. 
Discrepancy between neuroimaging data and behavioural data? 
One might ask why this particularity at the cerebral level found in the neuroimaging study 
was not reflected in the behavioural studies. In the case of our first study (see Chapter 4), a 
possible reason for that apparent inconsistency could be that we investigated too “low level” 
components of the facial processing, that is a structural encoding stage. Indeed, it is 
possible that common cerebral areas (e.g., the fusiform gyrus, see Chapter 5) intervened in 
the “intact-altered” judgment for both familiar faces. Remember that the presentation of the 
two types of familiar faces was blocked in our psychophysical experiment whereas it was 
mixed in our fMRI study. Therefore, at the beginning of each block, the participant knew 
which face would be presented throughout the block and it was not necessary to process 
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the facial identity at each trial (by contrast, in the fMRI study, participants had first to 
discriminate the self-face from the friend’s face at each trial before they could respond). 
Moreover, it is plausible that perceiving one’s own face triggered emotional or evaluative 
judgments (e.g., ‘I look very bad on this picture’), giving rise to specific cerebral activations 
for the self-face by comparison with other familiar faces, and highlighted by the fMRI study, 
but that were not reflected at the behavioural level because these processes did not affect 
the realisation of the task at hand. 
In our three studies investigating the attentional properties of the self-face, the processing 
of the self-face as a self-referential stimulus was also unnecessary to the successful 
realisation of the tasks. In the study using the inattentional blindness paradigm (see 
Chapter 7), we could not find any differences between the self-face, another highly familiar 
face and unfamiliar faces as regard with their relative attention-grabbing capacity. By 
contrast, faces differed from non-face in their ability to capture attention. Our fMRI study 
suggests that this pre-attentive analysis of the facial structure could take place in occipito-
temporal regions. Then, once attention is focused on the facial stimulus, the fusiform gyrus 
and more anterior regions would be implicated in a finer perceptual analysis of the face in 
order to extract identity and allowing the subsequent recognition of the stimulus. 
Apparently, in the inattentional blindness study, this analysis was more efficient for familiar 
faces than for novel faces since the former were better recognised than the latter. However, 
it seems that this perceptual analysis was not efficient in all cases. Indeed, participants that 
reported the presence of an additional stimulus when they were presented with their self-
face did not necessarily report that they saw this particular face. There are two alternative 
explanations for these results (corresponding to the two opposite theories of attentional 
selection). First, the self-face is not special in terms of attentional capture. In that case, 
even if facial familiarity/identity was accessible pre-attentively (as hypothesised by the late 
selection theory of attention), the self-face would not be advantaged more than any other 
faces by the visual system in terms of attentional selection. Second, the absence of 
difference between the three types of faces could result of the necessity to process faces 
attentively to extract familiarity and identity information (as would be hypothesised by an 
early selection theory of attention). In other words, the self-face could not be special in 
terms of attentional capture because it is not discriminated from other faces before it is 
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attended, and therefore, cannot be better detected than other faces. The results of our two 
other studies about attention (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 8) seem in favour of the second 
alternative. 
Indeed, in these studies, both types of familiar faces elicited differential responses by 
comparison with unfamiliar faces. They did so only in some specific conditions which 
suggest that familiar and self-referential faces do not automatically capture attention. 
Notably, it seems that participants preferred to attend to familiar faces than to unfamiliar 
faces, but only once they were fixated. This means that the familiarity of faces was 
processed by the visual system but at an attentive stage of processing. However, there 
were no noticeable differences between the self-face and other highly familiar faces. This 
could be because the self-face was not processed in a highly elaborated way and because 
regions such as the right insula or the right prefrontal cortex did not intervene in its 
processing (see Chapter 5; see also Sugiura et al., 2001). Indeed, the tasks we used did 
not require such a highly elaborated processing of the faces or processes of a more 
subjective or affective nature. Rather, the tasks did not allow much time to process the 
faces and they might consume the attentional resources necessary to an elaborated 
processing of the self-face. Nonetheless, an interesting mean to assess the extent to which 
the self-face was processed as a self-referential stimulus during such tasks would be to use 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Indeed, a specific implication of cerebral areas 
devoted to the processing of self-referential stimuli during the presentation of the self-face 
as an irrelevant distractor would be an indication that it is processed as the self-face by the 
brain and not simply as a familiar stimulus. However, we have seen that, at the behavioural 
level, the response to the irrelevant presentation of the self-face habituates quickly (see 
Chapter 6). This might be an issue with fMRI because this technique implies the 
presentation of a large number of trials per condition in order to obtain enough sensitivity. A 
solution could consist in increasing the variability of the stimuli by presenting participants 
with different pictures of their own face. 
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Implications for the study of self-consciousness 
We began this thesis by questioning the possibility of studying self-consciousness with self-
referential stimuli. We argued that a lack of specificity of self-referential stimuli by 
comparison with other highly familiar stimuli might question their use for a proper evaluation 
of self-consciousness. So what is the implication of our finding for the study of self-
consciousness? 
In Chapter 1 we developed the idea that self-consciousness covers multiple aspects and 
that self-recognition is just one dimension of self-consciousness. We have seen that in 
cases of non-verbal organisms (e.g. infants or animals), the presentation of the self-face in 
mirror or in pictures can be a useful way, not to say the only way, to examine whether they 
have some abilities related to self-consciousness. In this thesis, we studied healthy human 
adults. In our behavioural studies, we found that the self-face is not processed as a 
particular kind of stimulus. More precisely, we could not demonstrate any unequivocal 
specific treatment of the self-face when properly matched to a colleague’s face. Therefore, 
at the behavioural level, the presentation of the self-face might not be the most efficient way 
to study self-consciousness in healthy human adults. Of course, the ability to recognise that 
a picture of oneself depict one’s own face entails self-consciousness. Obviously, an 
organism incapable of self-recognition could not detect alterations brought to pictures of its 
face or would most likely not react to the unexpected presentation of pictures of its face. So, 
even if our tasks entailed self-recognition, we did not directly measure self-consciousness 
per se (note that this was not our purpose since this thesis aimed at evaluating whether the 
self-face is a special face). In addition, the exclusive use of the self-face does not allow the 
study of the many other components of self-consciousness and higher-level aspects of self-
consciousness such as for instance one’s own personal aspirations or the consciousness of 
one’s own emotions. In the healthy human adults, there are many other ways to investigate 
self-consciousness than just presenting participants with their own face. 
By contrast with what we observed at the behavioural level, our neuroimaging study 
showed specific cerebral responses elicited by the presentation of self-related stimuli. 
Therefore, the presentation of the self-face can be a useful way to investigate self-
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consciousness from a neuroscientific point of view, even in healthy adults. Moreover, in our 
fMRI study, the combined presentation of the self-face and of the self-body allowed us to 
examine a more abstract form of self-recognition. However, at the risk of being redundant, if 
the visual presentation of one’s own body parts probably allow the study of neural 
correlates of one’s own physical appearance, the implication of the activated cerebral areas 
in all components of self-consciousness remains hypothetical. 
In sum, beyond the ambitious and probably elusive aim of studying self-consciousness in its 
entirety, we think that the presentation of the self-face can constitutes an interesting tool of 
investigation in several situations. In the healthy human adult it can bring information about 
the neural correlates of the self-recognition component of self-consciousness. With non-
verbal organisms, differential processing of the self-face is a clue that the organism has at 
least some low level self-related abilities. In post-comatose patients, the mirror is also a 
particularly important tool to discriminate patients that are in a minimal conscious state from 
those that are in a vegetative state. Indeed, MSC patients are particularly prone to pursue 
their reflection in a mirror by comparison with other objects (Vanhaudenhuyse, Schnakers, 
Brédart, & Laureys, 2008). However, whether this visual pursuit reflects self-consciousness 
is still a matter of debate. Therefore, in such cases, it is probably wiser to consider the self-
face as a stimulus with a high capacity to elicit a response rather than as a direct measure 
of self-consciousness. 
Implications for the study of other cognitive processes 
The studies presented in this thesis also indicate that pictures of the self-face can offer 
interesting opportunities to study various cognitive functions. For instance, in the domain of 
the visual recognition of complex stimuli, the self-face constitutes a special type of stimulus 
because we encounter it only in specific situations by comparison with other items of the 
same category (i.e., faces). However, there are other stimuli that have their own specificities 
or that are special only for some individuals. Researches about expertise have shown that 
experts do not process the subjects of their expertise in the same manner as novices (see 
e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986). Therefore, the self-face could be used as a tool to investigate 
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visual recognition besides other types of stimuli (i.e. faces or “Greebles”, see Gauthier, 
Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998). 
In the domain of selective attention, the self-face also constitutes a very interesting tool of 
investigation. Because it is a very specific type of face, its presentation among other kinds 
of faces allows researchers to examine the level of complexity of information the visual 
system can extract (pre-attentively or attentively) about a stimulus and in which conditions. 
Other researchers have used various types of stimuli with the same purpose (e.g., scenes, 
words, emotional pictures, threatening stimuli with anxious individuals, etc). A recent eye 
movement study has shown that arachnophobic participants detected spiders faster than 
controls in a visual search task but that they subsequently avoided fixating the spiders more 
than controls (Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). These patterns of results thus seems opposite to 
what we have observed with one’s own face (i.e. no detection advantage in favour of the 
own face but longer fixations, see Chapter 8) but looks like those of Tong and Nakayama 
(1999, detection advantage for the self-face). These differences in results could again be 
explained by difference in the observer’s attentional set between our own visual search 
study and the two others. Indeed, as in Tong and Nakayama (1999)’ study, in the study of 
Pflugshaupt and al., spiders were the targets to be searched for. This example illustrates 
how it would be instructive to compare results obtained with different types of important 
stimuli in order to build more general theories about the way our visual system sorts out all 
the incoming visual inputs and extracts relevant information to allow us to perceive the 
world in an organised manner and behave in agreement with our current goals. 
2. Perspectives 
Throughout this general discussion, we evoked several hypotheses that would deserve 
further investigation. These hypotheses concerned the knowledge about the processing of 
the self-face or the use of the self-face as a tool of investigation of some cognitive 
processes. All these perspectives are summarized below. 
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A first extension of the present thesis could consist in examining other aspects (e.g. 
emotional aspects) of the representation of one’s own face. On the one hand, as discussed 
above, it would be interesting to test whether the representation of one’s own face include a 
typical facial expression and whether this expression is different or not from that of other 
personally known individuals. On the other hand, one could ask participants various 
questions about the way they perceive their own face (i.e. its relative attractiveness or 
distinctiveness) and how the same face is perceived by other familiar persons to examine 
whether the subjective representation of the self-face and other familiar faces is 
comparable. Furthermore, it could be interesting to assess the representation of the self-
face in patients suffering of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) and to compare this 
representation to that of participants that do not have such a disorder. This might help to 
build adequate treatment programs to correct the erroneous beliefs or representations of 
BDD patients. Indeed, patients with BDD are often particularly concerned with their facial 
appearance (see e.g. Veale, 2004). For instance, it has been shown that patients suffering 
from a BDD judged pictures of their own face less attractive than independent evaluators. In 
addition, BDD patients judged pictures of attractive persons as more attractive than control 
subjects (Buhlmann, Etcoff, & Wilhelm, in press). 
A second important extension of the present work would be to use neuroimaging 
techniques during various visual attention tasks in which the participant’s own face is 
presented irrelevantly for the task at hand. Indeed, such techniques would offer a mean to 
assess to which extent the self-face is processed by the brain in such situations, to relate 
these possible self-related brain activations to behavioural measurements (e.g. presence or 
absence of interference produced by the presentation of the self-face on the main task), 
and importantly to test whether the self-face is processed as a self-related stimulus (i.e., if it 
activates specific cerebral areas by comparison with another highly familiar face) or merely 
as a highly familiar stimulus (i.e., if the self-face and another familiar face activate similar 
cerebral areas and that differ from areas activated by the presentation of unfamiliar faces). 
Finally, a third extension of the current work could concern the attentional deploying 
towards complex visual stimuli as investigated with eye movements recording. We showed 
that the self-face does not capture attention when its processing is not necessary to the 
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task at hand. Studies using simple visual stimuli (e.g. flashes) have shown that the 
attentional set of the observer (Folk et al., 1992, 1994; but see Schreij et al., 2008) and the 
general context in which the stimulus appears (e.g. when its characteristics are unique, 
Pashler & Harris, 2001) are important factors in the determination of the attentional 
selection of these simple visual stimuli. Therefore, in order to test whether the same 
conclusion apply to complex visual stimuli, our eye movement study should be 
complemented by another study in which the target is defined by the identity and in which 
participants are instructed to search their own face or other faces. Moreover, in order to 
have a general characterization of the allocation of attention towards important stimuli, it 
seems crucial to assess whether results found with the self-face apply to other kinds of 
important stimuli (e.g. fear-related stimuli in anxious patients). 
3. Conclusion 
This thesis concerned the specificity of a highly distinctive self-referential stimulus: the self-
face. First, we showed that the perceptual representation in memory of the self-face is 
similar to that of other familiar faces as regard with its precision. Second, we demonstrated 
that although one’s own face perceptual representation is not really special, the visual 
processing of the self-face is subtended by specific neural correlates. Apparently, the self-
body is also processed via specialised pathways in the brain. In addition, some regions 
seem devoted to the abstract processing of one’s own physical appearance independently 
of the material presented. Third, we showed that one’s own face is not a particularly potent 
distractor by comparison with other familiar faces. It does not seem able to capture 
attention but rather benefits from a preferential allocation of attention by comparison with 
unfamiliar faces. In other words, its attentional processing is subject to various constraints 
(e.g. spatial localisation, available attentional resources) and attention seems necessary to 
process self-referential parts of a face. We discussed the idea that the presentation of the 
self-face can constitute a way to enhance chances of eliciting responses in non-
communicative patients but that it is not the best way to study self-consciousness in normal 
adults when using only behavioural methods. In addition, because of its unique 
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characteristics, the self-face can represent a useful tool of investigation of visual recognition 
and visual attention. 
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